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The Global Transformation of Borders and Mobility
Reece Jones and Md. Azmeary Ferdoush
Jones, Reece and Ferdoush, Md. Azmeary (eds), Borders and Mobility in 
South Asia and Beyond. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018
doi: 10.5117/9789462984547/intro
The migration ‘crisis’ of the mid-2010s featured many familiar stories: Syrians 
fleeing the war that destroyed their homes; Central Americans escaping gang 
violence to f ind safety in the north; Eritreans fleeing a totalitarian regime 
that prohibits emigration; hundreds of thousands of Rohingya crossing 
into Bangladesh from Myanmar; and migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa 
leaving the lingering poverty of colonial exploitation to search for better 
opportunities elsewhere. This book seeks to broaden and deepen the story 
of migration in the twenty-f irst century by focusing on the experiences of 
the people from South Asia who have played a signif icant role in global 
migrations, but received less attention in academic and media accounts. 
Despite the international media’s focus on people from Syria, people from 
Afghanistan make up the largest group stranded along the route through 
the Balkans after the closure of borders and construction of walls in 2015. 
In 2016, Pakistanis were the second largest group of refugees in Serbia 
(United Nations, High Commissioner for Refugees 2016). In the Middle East, 
people from South Asia make up the vast majority of the workers building 
skyscrapers, artif icial islands, and stadiums for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. 
In the f irst half of 2017, the largest single group crossing the Mediterranean 
from Libya to Italy were not from the Middle East or Africa, but Bangladesh 
(Dearden 2017).
Indeed, if you look for it, the Bangladeshi population is visible in all of 
the major cities of Italy.1 In Rome, Bangladeshi men dominate the area 
around the Colosseum, selling self ie sticks, bottled water, and souvenirs 
to tourists. In Florence, many of the small convenience stores are run by 
Bangladeshis, as are the majority of the stalls selling leather goods and 
1  Reece Jones conducted research in Italy in summer 2017, including interviews with 
Bangladeshis.
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football jerseys at the Mercato San Lorenzo. In Milan, an Italian colleague 
noted that she had assumed that there were many Indian migrants, but 
many had turned out to be from Bangladesh. Even before the current 
wave of migration, Bangladeshis already made up the second largest non-
European population in Italy (after Nigerians), with over 142,000 people 
living there with status. This population has tripled in just the past seven 
years and is projected to increase to 232,000 by 2030. It is also estimated 
that, as of 2009, at least 11,000 additional Bangladeshis were living in Italy 
without any legal status (Blangiardo 2009). The Bangladeshi migrants in 
Italy are overwhelmingly male (72 per cent) and, with an average age of 28 
years, are mostly young adults looking for better chances in life (Rahman 
& Kabir 2012). In addition to those arriving on boats from Libya – where 
many originally went to work in the oil industry, not to come to Europe –, 
others f irst went to the United Kingdom as students, or to Germany to 
apply for asylum. After their attempts to settle elsewhere ended or were 
denied, they came to Italy following their connections with the already-
established population.
Once they arrive in Italy, Bangladeshis without a legal status face a 
daunting life of scraping by on the edges of society, relying on the exist-
ing community for shelter and work opportunities. In addition to selling 
goods on the streets to tourists, many Bangladeshis work as cooks in the 
kitchens of tourist-oriented Italian restaurants. Those with status have 
access to more jobs, but still struggle to adapt to a new way of life with 
different expectations for behaviour and social interactions. As their new 
home changes them, they also maintain connections to their relatives in 
Bangladesh, sending home remittances and keeping abreast of political 
and cultural events. Their new life can be simultaneously invigorating and 
exasperating, as opportunities and wealth compete with lower status, racial 
biases, and a longing for home. As a 24-year-old who had been in Europe 
for two years without status explained, ‘The pay is good, but I miss all of 
my family at home.’
The story of these Bangladeshis – who undertake a dangerous journey, 
apply for asylum but are rejected, and then live without documents in Rome 
or Florence – is representative of the larger questions the contributors grapple 
with in this book. Globally, the world is experiencing one of the largest 
movements of people in history and a large proportion of those migrants 
are from South Asia. The factors that drive people to move include: wars 
over resources; global income divergence, as the gap between the wealthiest 
and the poorest continues to grow; population growth, which pushes more 
people out of rural areas into crowded cities in search of jobs; conflict over 
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artif icial borders that are the remnants of colonialism; and the spectre 
of climate change-induced migration, which could potentially displace 
hundreds of millions of people. In this context, the overall contribution of 
this volume is to answer the question: In an age of global migration, economic 
flows, and information exchange, how do borders and restrictions on mobility 
affect the lives of people from South Asia and beyond?
The chapters collected here answer this question by looking at migrants’ 
current situation at a range of scales and from distinct vantage points. The 
f irst section of the book considers the lingering impact of Partition on 
borders in South Asia, seventy years after that tumultuous event. How do 
people move through these South Asian border spaces? How do the lines 
on the map, and the increasingly militarized borders on the ground, affect 
people’s lives? How do borderland people and sovereign states cope with the 
reality that people and goods continue to move across these borders? The 
second section of the book turns to longer-distance migrations, describing 
the contemporary experiences of people from South Asia as they take part 
in the global movement of people. Why have so many people decided to 
move? How have the hardened borders of walls, guards, and surveillance 
technologies impacted their journeys? How do factors of ethnicity, gender, 
and religion shape their experiences once they arrive in their destinations? 
Finally, the third section of the book goes deeper into the experiences of 
diaspora communities who have resided for long periods in new homes. 
How do people in the South Asian diaspora represent their current and 
past homes? How are connections to the past maintained, and how do these 
connections constrict and enable their lives today? Throughout the book 
we draw on the stories and experiences of people on the move to illustrate 
how new borders, migration, and citizenship policies affect the lives of 
individuals around the world.
Theorizing Borders, Mobility, and Place in South Asia and Beyond
To answer these questions, this introduction situates the chapters within 
three distinct but closely related bodies of literature. First, by focusing 
on the experiences of borderlanders and migrants, this book provides a 
snapshot of the precarious lives of people who move, both within South 
Asia and globally from South Asia to Europe and North America. Drawing 
on recent trends in critical border studies, we argue that the hardening 
of borders does not stop the movement of people; instead, it only makes 
movement more risky and dangerous as people f ind new ways through and 
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around border restrictions. Second, the book engages with the literature 
on borders and mobility to demonstrate that migration from South Asia 
is a gendered experience, in terms of both who is able to move and their 
experiences at their destinations. Experiences of the journey – both en route 
and at the destination – also vary widely, depending on factors such as age, 
national origin, religious identity, and whether one has valid documents. 
Finally, it engages with the literature on place-making to argue that South 
Asian diaspora populations are in a constant process of making both where 
they currently live and, through representations, their distant, and often 
unknown, ancestral homes.
Migration in the Age of Security and Walls
The global movement of people and the violent and exclusionary responses 
of states have attracted substantial scholarly attention to the expansion of 
security practices and their impact on people on the move. In 2016, over 
7900 people died while attempting to cross a border, the largest number 
ever recorded. In 2017, there were 5400 deaths at borders around the world.2 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees reported that there 
were over 65.6 million people displaced globally in 2016, also a record 
(United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 2016). In response to 
these movements, border security has emerged as a key political issue in 
countries around the world. Donald Trump rode his campaign promise to 
build a wall on the Mexico border to the presidency of the United States. 
In the United Kingdom, voters opted to leave the European Union over 
fears of migration and open borders. Across Europe, countries have built 
walls, instituted new security procedures, and even closed internal border 
crossings that had been open since the late 1990s. In 2012, there were about 
35 border walls globally; in 2017, there are almost 70 (Jones 2016; Jones & 
Johnson 2016; Vallet 2014). The idea that globalization would produce a 
world of free movement of goods and people was in retreat as anti-migrant 
nationalism and anti-trade protectionism emerged as key political positions 
in many countries.
Recent interventions into the political geography of border spaces have 
suggested that these changes to the politics and practices of borders have 
transformed contemporary migration experiences (Johnson et al. 2011; 
2  Missing Migrants Project, International Organization for Migration. https://missingmigrants.
iom.int . This database is drawn from media reports on deaths and is therefore critiqued for 
being incomplete and dependent on the ebb and f low of coverage. 
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Parker & Williams 2009). Mobility is now characterized by new corridors, 
camps, and spaces of conf inement that funnel migrants toward specif ic 
locations and violently restrict the easiest routes to their destinations (Jones 
et al. 2017). These new geographies shift the movement of migrants to new 
landscapes and waterscapes that alter the experience for both people en 
route and the people they encounter along the way. At the same time, people 
on the move create their own corridors as new technologies enable the 
rapid dissemination of local knowledge of the conditions along the route 
through mobile phones, GPS, and social media. As Gabriel Popescu suggests, 
‘Digital technologies bring together issues of politics and space in ways that 
change how power is organized and distributed geographically’ (Popescu 
in Jones et al. 2017: 4).
In addition to the expansion of security practices at borders, many 
states are externalizing border enforcement through agreements with 
neighbouring countries. Border externalization means that much of the 
work of enforcing the border is done by transit states that are not the f inal 
destination of people on the move (Casas-Cortes, Cobarrubias, & Pickles 
2013, 2015; Collyer 2007, 2012; Collyer & King 2015). The United States has 
deals with Canada and Mexico that push its borders outside of the actual 
borderline; the European Union has signed deals with Turkey, Morocco, and 
Afghanistan that enlist these countries to patrol for potential migrants and 
prevent them from reaching the edges of the EU. The border is no longer 
located only at the edge of a state; it has become a mobile phenomenon 
(Jones & Johnson 2014; Amilhat Szary & Giraut 2015). The EU’s deal with 
Afghanistan allows it to deport an unlimited number of Afghan asylum 
seekers – who in 2015 constituted the second largest group in Europe, with 
196,170 applications – in exchange for providing aid money to Afghanistan 
(Rasmussen 2016). According to the UN, among the top seven countries with 
the largest diasporas, three are from South Asia – namely, India, Bangladesh, 
and Pakistan with sixteen, seven, and six million people, respectively (United 
Nations 2015).
Borders in South Asia
In South Asia, the past decade has been characterized by similarly dramatic 
changes at borders. India has expanded and reinforced the fences on its 
borders with Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, and currently has more 
kilometres of border fence than any other country in the world. It also 
has the largest border security force, with over 200,000 members (Gohain 
2015; Horstman & Cole 2015; McDuie-Ra 2014; Sur 2015b). In 2015, India and 
16 Reece Jones and Md. azMeaRy FeRdoush 
Bangladesh ratif ied the long-stalled Land Boundary Agreement that settled 
border disputes between the two countries and exchanged their border 
enclaves. Despite the accord, however, India continues to expand its fences 
on the Bangladesh border and the killing of more than 1000 Bangladeshi 
civilians by the Indian Border Security Force over the past decade mars 
the political relationship between the two countries (Human Rights Watch 
2010). At the same time, India and Pakistan’s standoff over Kashmir remains 
stalled without an end in sight. Seventy years after the Partition of British 
India, the borders that were left behind continue to divide people and 
perpetuate conflict in South Asia.
The borders in South Asia have received increased attention in the past 
ten years as scholars have moved beyond methodological nationalism to 
think about cross-border historical and contemporary realities. Rather 
than treating Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan as f inalized and separate 
containers of each population’s social, economic, and political life, scholars 
such as Willem van Schendel and Ranabir Samaddar have shifted the focus 
of study to look at cross-border connections (Baud & van Schendel 1997; 
Van Schendel 2001, 2002, 2005, 2013, 2015; Samaddar 1999). Following their 
lead, there has been a series of signif icant cross-border articles and books 
focusing on the border enclaves along the India-Bangladesh border, border 
fencing and security, and migration and refugees (Cons 2012, 2013, 2014, 2016; 
Gellner 2013; Jones 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2012; McDuie-Ra 2012, 2016; Shewly 
2013, 2015, 2016; Sanyal 2009; Sur 2013, 2015a; Ferdoush 2014, 2018; Ferdoush 
& Jones 2018). These new studies consider the continued impact of partition 
on South Asian communities and the current lived experiences of border 
spaces. The new trends are summarized and expanded in a recent special 
issue of Political Geography, which argues that the legacies of colonialism, 
partition, violence, and cross-border movement and connections make 
South Asia a ‘particularly productive place to engage questions of borders 
and margins’ (Cons & Sanyal 2013: 6).
Scholars such as Joya Chatterji, Lucy Chester, Vazira Zamindar, Willem 
van Schendel, and Jason Cons have each made signif icant contributions to 
the research on the aftermath of Partition’s borders in South Asia (Chatterji 
1994, 2007; Chester 2008, 2013; Zamindar 2007). Collectively, their work 
considers the arbitrary nature of the borders that have divided South Asia 
for seventy years and investigates the role these lines continue to play in 
the politics, economics, and cultural production of South Asia.
At the western India-Pakistan border, there was a rapid movement of 
people across the new lines just after Partition, but the eastern border 
saw slower migration as people assessed their situation and, over decades, 
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decided to move. Chatterji looks at ‘the impact of partition upon the social 
and political fabric of Bengal and of India’ during the twenty years after 
the event (Chatterji 2007: 4), emphasizing the differences between the 
post-Partition period in the east and the west of South Asia. On the eastern 
border, West Bengal’s leadership sought to disperse the migrants and prevent 
them from becoming a strong group. Huge migrant populations during 
the Bangladesh War of Independence accounted for 15 per cent of the total 
population and 25 per cent of the population in urban areas in West Bengal 
in 1973 (Chatterji 2007: 150). Chatterji also considers the post-Partition 
experience of the Muslims who chose to stay in West Bengal. She suggests 
that there was some forced assimilation, at least in public posture, and that 
they began to cluster in particular places – particularly when Muslims left 
the cities for rural areas near the border with East Pakistan.
Other scholars have considered the boundary commissions’ decision-
making process and the impact of the lines they drew. Chester’s work 
analyses the role of the boundary commissions in the Partition decision 
and the consequences for the India-Pakistan border (Chester 2008, 2013). 
Chester argues that the Partition boundaries demonstrate the effort of 
British colonial leaders to maintain some semblance of control over South 
Asia even after decolonization. The devastation after the event, according 
to Chester, was less about the precise location of the line on the map and 
more about the failure to recognize the large social disruption that the 
creation of new ideas of homeland and belonging would have.
As the reality of the situation took hold, people across South Asia were 
faced with the process of imagining a new mental map of their place in the 
world. Zamindar focuses on the impact that these new ideas of a ‘homeland’ 
def ined by arbitrary borders had over the ensuing decades (Zamindar 
2007). She uses oral histories and f irst-hand accounts of the impact that 
the emergence of these new territories had on the lives of people at a local 
scale to demonstrate that people who were compelled to move across the 
border, leaving their homes, relatives, and jobs behind, still feel a sense of 
loss and are in limbo. Many of them would still like to think of the regions 
divided by the new borders as really part of the same country. Frank Billé 
considers this feeling of limbo to be ‘territorial phantom pains’ (2014). By 
this, Billé means people’s perception that a geographic area is (or should 
be) part of their nation still, even though it no longer is.
The effort to f ix the line and then secure it is carried out through the 
imposition of bureaucratic control, the deployment of paramilitary forces, 
the homogenization of the borderland population, and the creation of 
techniques to resolve inter-state conflict (van Schendel 2005: 97). Each of 
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these processes has an impact on both the local borderlands and the political 
centres. Van Schendel equates the making of a border to an earthquake 
that disrupts the land, and emphasizes that borderlands are a space that 
calls many assumptions about states, and the entire world political system, 
into question: ‘Global reterritorialization is best approached by looking 
simultaneously at states, transborder arrangements, and transnational flows 
because these are complementary arenas of power, profit and imagination’ 
(van Schendel 2005: 385). He notes that at the India-East Pakistan/Bangladesh 
border there was always substantial violence directed towards borderland 
people, even during periods of peaceful relations between the states. Further, 
he argues that the tendency to only see borderlands through the lens of 
the state dehumanizes the space and erases the local scale of the suffering 
produced by the line.
Cons extends this point through a case study of the Dahagram-Angorpota 
enclave on the India-Bangladesh border that contextualizes these sensitive 
spaces within the broader literature of post-colonial state formation, national 
imagination, human territoriality and sovereignty (Cons 2016; Sack 1986). In 
doing so, he argues that sensitive spaces trouble the postcolonial imagina-
tion of continuous territory, a clearly demarcated border, and identity and 
belonging. Elizabeth Dunn and Cons argue that multiple forms of power 
operate at the same time in these spaces: both the ruled and the rulers work 
out their own ways to set up the rules of being governed and to govern in 
their everyday lives (Dunn & Cons 2014). Consequently, these spaces remain 
constant sources of anxiety and ambiguity for both those who are governed 
and those who seek to govern. They unsettle the notion of postcolonial 
South Asia, which is based on the idea ‘that nationality and territory must 
align’ (Cons 2016: 7). In the end, Cons suggests that there is an ambivalence 
around borders, especially the former border enclaves: ‘they are spaces that, 
to paraphrase Carl Schmitt, the center thinks with intense passion, though 
not necessarily with great care’ (Cons 2016: 21).
This book contributes to this growing literature on borders in South 
Asia by paying particular attention to how these changes at the border 
affect people who live in the borderlands. At f irst, the imposition of the 
Partition borders was a shock to people who had previously lived in the 
heartlands of British India. Even for many years after the line was drawn 
on a map, people on the ground were unaware of exactly where it was – or 
simply ignored it. However, by the late 1990s, the states increasingly tried 
to normalize movement through crossing points and prevent unauthorized 
movements through violence. While most of the borders in South Asia are 
now clearly demarcated and heavily militarized, this has not been successful 
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in stopping the movement of people and goods across them. Drawing on both 
the formal and informal phenomenon of cross-border mobilities in South 
Asia, the f irst section of this volume suggests that no matter how clearly a 
border is demarcated or how heavily it is militarized, people will continue 
defying the border as long as it remains a question of kinship, livelihood, 
structural needs, and, above all, survival.
Mobility, Place, and Belonging in Diaspora
Beyond South Asia, borders and mobility have received substantial attention 
from scholars interested in the relationships between people, place, and 
movement. Tim Cresswell argues that mobility ‘is a fundamental geo-
graphical facet of existence and, as such, provides a rich terrain from which 
narratives – and, indeed, ideologies – can be, and have been, constructed’ 
(Cresswell 2006: 1). Cresswell sees a difference between movement (simply 
going from here to there) and mobility (which has meaning attached to it) 
(Cresswell 2006: 25). There is a paradox in the contemporary world, where 
people are def ined by their place of birth, citizenship, and identity, but, 
at the same time, people and goods are constantly in motion – moving 
around cities, regions, and the world. The contributions to this volume 
dwell on this conflicted sense of the identity of people on the move, who 
are simultaneously defined by their movement as ‘migrants’ but also forever 
marked by their place of birth.
Following Yi-Fu Tuan, Cresswell def ines a ‘place’ as a space that has 
meaning attached to it by humans through naming it and interacting with 
it in some way (Cresswell 2004: 10; Tuan 1977). Doreen Massey expands 
this def inition by identifying four different aspects of ‘place’: place as a 
process, place from outside, place as the centre of multiple identities and 
histories, and place as an outcome of unique interactions (Massey 1997). 
First, a place is a process because it is always becoming, always in the 
process of making and remaking. A place is where lives take different 
shapes, forms, importance, and meaning every day. For a person who 
is settling into a new place, place-making becomes a process. Second, 
a place is not only created by the people living there, but also through 
how the place is identif ied and imagined by people living outside of that 
place. These ‘others’ have a perception of the place that also plays a role in 
making the place what it is. For example, for a migrant from South Asia who 
has never been to the Middle East or Europe, these still remain idealized 
places. An idea of them has been created by the media, by literature, and 
by word of mouth that plays a signif icant role in def ining what the Middle 
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East or Europe is. The third aspect for Massey is the role a place plays as a 
centre of multiple identities and histories. A place has its own history and 
different people connect to each history in different ways, which makes 
it distinct from other places. People who live in a place identify with that 
place, but this identif ication is not universal; people from the same place 
might identify with that place from a very different perspective. Finally, 
place is an outcome of unique interactions: a place is created and made 
unique as a result of the interactions that take place among people, both 
those living there and those outside. These particular ways of doing things 
create the sense of place that signif ies the difference between an insider 
who is from there and someone else: an outsider who has not yet achieved 
local status.
For diasporic populations, the idea of a homeland creates a very particular 
version of place that is rooted in memory and nostalgia. However, the 
meaning of the home is also contested, as people possess multiple con-
nections to different places that do not f it neatly into a simple categorical 
box. According to Robert Kaiser, ‘homeland’ is a term ‘used to symbolize 
the deep emotional connectedness that people are said to feel towards 
their place of origin, as well as toward more geographically expansive and 
socially constructed birth spaces such as national homelands’ (Kaiser 2009: 
4). Rather than treating these categories as existing realities, the focus for 
many scholars is on understanding the narratives and practices that produce 
an idea of home and create and reiterate those feelings of connection to 
place within a population and for individuals (Mack 1993). There is not a 
single version of a homeland that ties a particular group to the place, but 
rather evocations and enactments that produce an idea of home that may 
provide comfort – or a sense of persistent loss and longing – for a person 
on the move.
There is a growing literature that delves into the experiences of people 
from South Asia as they make new lives around the world. Mizanur 
Rahman and Tan Tai Yong focus on the impact of remittances as wealth 
f lows back to the relatives who remained at home (2015). Nazli Kibria 
has traced the experiences of Bangladeshi migrants in Britain, the 
United States, the Middle East, and Malaysia (Kibria 2011). Her work 
emphasizes the significance of religion for many migrants, who also work 
to integrate themselves into the economic and social lives of their new 
homes and thereby become enmeshed in the place. Bald et al. look at 
the experiences of South Asian people on the move, but emphasize the 
lens of US imperial power in shaping the process as the larger political 
forces of the Cold War, the War on Terror, and global capitalism affect 
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everyday experiences (2014). Tasneem Siddiqui offers the experiences 
of the women from Bangladesh who migrate mostly to the Arab states 
as domestic workers (2001). Gauri Bhattacharya and Susan Schoppelrey 
focus on the imaginations of South Asian migrants before migrating 
to North America and their post-immigration experiences. They also 
emphasize the unrealistic expectations that South Asian migrant parents 
place on their first-generation immigrant children, which result in 
substantial stress and anxiety (Bhattacharya & Schoppelrey 2004). Each 
of these works highlights migrant communities’ complex, conf licted, 
and dynamic sense of belonging in multiple places.
The chapters of this book illustrate these nuances, while also recognizing 
that there is something distinctive about the experience of migrating to a 
new home and navigating the multiple attachments that it produces. The 
contributors consider how migrants experience lives on the move and how 
they maintain connections to their ancestral home through literature and 
collective memory.
Structure of the Book
This book brings together an interdisciplinary and international group 
of scholars in the f ields of Anthropology, Development Studies, English 
Literature, Geography, History, Migration Studies, Political Science, 
Psychology, and Sociology based in Afghanistan, Australia, Bangladesh, 
Belgium, Croatia, India, Japan, and the United States to answer the 
overarching question of the book: How do borders and restrictions on 
mobility affect the lives of people from South Asia and beyond? The chapters 
investigate borders and migration in South Asia with an emphasis on 
three themes: experiencing borders in South Asia, migrant lives on the 
journey to new homes, and diasporic representations of mobility and 
borders. The contribution of this volume is to add layers of complexity 
to this story, as the individual experiences of people on the move belie 
the desire for easy metanarratives to explain a global picture. Instead, 
the contributors provide multiple snapshots of the situation at the local 
scale of South Asian borders, at the regional scale of labour migration 
within South Asia, and at the global scale of migration to Europe and 
North America.
The f irst section of the book focuses on the lingering impact of Parti-
tion’s borders within South Asia by considering how these lines continue 
to impact the lives of those who live in the borderlands. In Chapter 1, Reece 
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Jones investigates the local actions that transgress, subvert, and ignore 
the imposition of sovereign authority at the borders of sovereign states. 
To reconcile conflicting views on resistance, this chapter proposes the 
concept of ‘spaces of refusal’ to understand a range of activities that are 
not overt political resistance but nevertheless refuse to abide by the binary 
enframing of state territorial and identity categories. In Chapter 2, Edward 
Boyle and Mirza Zulf iqur Rahman draw on f ieldwork at cross-border 
markets along the India-Bangladesh border in Meghalaya and Tripura to 
examine how the multi-layered infrastructure of border management and 
governance affects local community interactions and the f low of goods, 
political processes, and cross-border connectivity. In Chapter 3, Azizul 
Rasel tells the neglected micro-narrative of the Adivasi Lushai people 
living in the borderlands of Bangladesh in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, 
examining how they deal with the border and the increasing surveillance 
of the Indian and Bangladeshi states in their everyday life.
The second section of the book looks at longer-distance migrations, 
both within South Asia and to the Middle East and Europe. In Chapter 4, 
against a backdrop of rapid urbanization and growing internal migration, 
Kavitha Rajagopalan argues that new forms of cross-border migration, as 
well as the entrenchment of nationalistic and Islamophobic approaches 
to citizenship and migration policymaking, are complicating the already 
complex picture of citizenship and belonging in contemporary South 
Asia. In Chapter 5, Ananya Chakraborty draws on case studies of undocu-
mented Bangladeshi women who are engaged in various informal sector 
occupations in Maharashtra to highlight the multiple vulnerabilities 
and threats that they face, not only due to their status as undocumented 
migrants, but because of their gender positioning in the informal labour 
market. In Chapter 6, Andrea Wright uses ethnographic and archival 
research conducted in the United Arab Emirates and India to illustrate 
how the Indian government developed and implemented emigration 
policies that viewed women as ‘vulnerable subjects’ at risk of traff icking. 
In Chapter 7, James Weir and Rohullah Amin recount the harrowing 
story of Akbar, a young Afghan man who set out on foot from Kabul 
to try to reach Frankfurt with millions of other people on the move in 
the summer of 2015. This f irst-person account of one migrant’s journey 
helps to humanize the confusing and overwhelming story of the global 
migration crisis. In Chapter 8, Marta Zorko provides an overview of how 
the militarization, securitization, and hardening of borders in Europe 
affect migrants from South Asia.
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The third section of the book considers South Asian diasporic experi-
ences in Africa, Europe, and Fiji through literature and historical memory. 
In Chapter 9, Malini Sur and Masja van Meeteren draw on the experience of 
Bangladeshi men who have migrated to Belgium to argue that integration 
should be conceptualized not as the outcome of ideal type national models 
of citizenship and integration, but as the product of the intersection of 
migrant aspirations and strategies within regulatory frameworks. In 
Chapter 10, Riddhi Shah argues that, despite hundreds of years of movement 
between East Africa and India through the Indian Ocean, histories of 
slavery are conspicuous in their absence in Indian and Gujarati collective 
memories. The chapter analyses Gunvantrai Poptabhai Acharya’s novel 
Dariyalal, which illustrates the lingering impact of migration and diaspora 
in the region. In Chapter 11, Tana Trivedi focuses on the work of Sudesh 
Mishra, a contemporary Fijian-Indian-Australian poet who addresses the 
idea of the fragmented diasporic identities of Indo-Fijians and the inability 
to locate a ‘home’ amidst borders of history, memories, and transnational 
identities. This chapter brings to fore the sense of fragmentation and 
dislocation that mark the lives of Indo-Fijians and demonstrates that 
Mishra is a transnational poet whose work proves that home is a contested 
space in Fiji.
A Point of Departure
In the end, the dozens of Bangladeshis selling Chinese-made self ie sticks to 
tourists from the United States and Japan at the Colosseum, an ancient ruin 
of the Roman Empire located in Italy, illustrates the reality of borders and 
mobility in the twenty-f irst century. Things are clearly changing. People 
move to new places, create new cultural ideas, establish new networks and 
alliances, and challenge the f ixity of the state and its borders. However, the 
past still matters: people maintain connections, albeit sometimes tenuous, 
to their previous homes, families, and belief systems. The borders and 
states that divide up territories and protect privileges deeply shape the 
experiences of people on the move. The history of what was once there is 
still important, even as new people and new technologies change what the 
relationships between people, places, and the world around us will look like 
in the future. The chapters of this book delve into the relationships between 
f ixity and movement, continuity and change, and the past and the future 
as they unravel the complex interplay between borders and mobility in 
South Asia and beyond.
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Section I
Experiencing Borders in South Asia

1 Spaces of Refusal
Rethinking Sovereign Power and Resistance at the Border1
Reece Jones
Jones, Reece and Ferdoush, Md. Azmeary (eds), Borders and Mobility in 
South Asia and Beyond. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018
doi: 10.5117/9789462984547/ch01
Abstract
This chapter investigates the local actions that transgress, subvert, and 
ignore the imposition of sovereign authority at the borders of sovereign 
states. Drawing on interviews with borderland residents, it analyses how 
people interact with, talk about, and cross the border in their daily lives. 
The motives and consequences of these cross-border connections are not 
adequately captured by the literature on sovereign power and the state of 
exception, which identif ies very little space for resistance, or the literature 
on dominance-resistance in power relations, which understands most 
actions as political resistance in a broad milieu of power. To reconcile these 
conflicting views on resistance, this chapter proposes the concept of spaces 
of refusal to understand a range of activities that are not overt political 
resistance but nevertheless refuse to abide by the binary enframing of 
state territorial and identity categories.
Keywords: India, Bangladesh, borders, resistance, refusal, identity
Cross-Border Movement
Moushumi, a servant in a wealthy Bangladeshi family’s home, set out 
for India in the late afternoon to visit her son.2 She packed a small bag 
1  This chapter originally appeared in the Annals of the Association of American Geographers 
(2012) 102(3): 685-699. It is reprinted with permission.
2  Moushumi is a pseudonym. All interviews for this project were conducted anonymously, 
except for those with elected public off icials. The research described in this chapter is based on 
101 in-depth interviews and f ifteen focus groups conducted in Bangladesh and the Indian state 
of West Bengal. The interviews were conducted in Bengali, except where indicated [in English], 
and translated by the author in collaboration with a research assistant in Bangladesh. Through 
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with a change of clothes and two shingara – Bengali-style samosas, more 
rounded than angular, with a savoury potato f illing. She met her ‘uncle’, 
the broker, outside his house and gave him 200 Bangladeshi Taka, about 
US$3. Six other travellers arrived as they waited for darkness to fall. She 
dozed on the f loor and ate a shingara. A few hours later they walked to 
the edge of the river, hopped in a small boat, and f loated for a few minutes 
– def initely less than ten – until the boatman pulled the boat back to the 
bank of the river. The travellers got out and climbed onto the waiting 
f latbed rickshaw for the ride into a nearby Indian village. She rested at 
a relative’s house that night and then continued her journey to her son’s 
house the next morning. She stayed there for about a month, cooking for 
her son and playing with her grandchildren, and then made the return 
trip to the Indian village near the border. She paid the Indian broker, this 
time in Rupees, waited for nightfall, and got back in the same boat. The 
return trip took slightly longer because it was against the current, but 
she was back at the broker’s house in Bangladesh by midnight. She set 
out early the next morning and was back to work at the wealthy family’s 
house by noon. She never saw any border guards, or even the new border 
fence, but they were certainly there somewhere in the darkness on the 
banks of the river. The only difference from her previous trips to visit her 
son was the extra cost of paying the brokers, but she enjoyed the ride in 
the boat, which was more pleasant than just walking across the border, 
as she had always done before.
How should theorists of state sovereignty, transnationalism, and re-
sistance conceptualize the experiences of Moushumi – and thousands of 
other people like her – who, when faced with what they perceive to be a 
cumbersome and arbitrary rule of the state, refuse to submit to the imposed 
territorial order and instead continue to live their normal lives? Is she merely 
a 60-year-old woman who decided to make the short trip to visit her son 
and grandson without regard for its political implications? Prior to 1947, it 
would have been an unremarkable trip within a single colonial space. Even 
for many years after 1947, when the new sovereign states off icially drew a 
line between her village and her son’s, movement continued without much 
intervention from the authorities. Or should she be considered a criminal 
because she violated the laws of both India and Bangladesh? Is she merely 
a poor, illiterate woman who does not understand the concept of state 
a deep engagement with the everyday lives of people who live in the borderlands, this chapter 
attempts to move beyond what Sherry Ortner (1995) calls the ‘ethnographic refusal’ to consider 
the meanings and implications of quotidian activities.
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sovereignty? Or is she part of the resistance that contests the borders that 
divide the world into territorially def ined, sovereign states? Should we 
interpret these everyday transgressions, when people simply ignore a distant 
rule that does not seem to apply to them, as acts of def iant resistance? Do 
these movements threaten the authority of the state? Or is it a minor flow 
that can be allowed across a leaky border?
Neither the literature on sovereign power and the state of exception nor 
that on dominance and resistance in power relations precisely captures the 
motives and consequences of Moushumi’s trip. The burgeoning literature 
on the state of exception identif ies very little space for resistance (Agamben 
1998, 2005; Edkins & Pin-Fat 2004; Minca 2007). In this framework, the 
worldwide expansion of the state system has resulted in an all-encompassing, 
unitary, and increasingly globalized sovereign power (Dillon 2004). The 
sovereign gains authority not simply by establishing and enforcing laws 
within a territory, but specif ically through the deployment of the state of 
exception: a time/space where others must follow the laws, but the sovereign 
can operate outside of the legal system if it perceives a threat to its authority 
(Agamben 1998, 2005). Jenny Edkins and Veronique Pin-Fat argue that this 
theorization of sovereign power precludes the possibility of meaningful 
resistance because any perceived threat can be neutralized through the 
use of the exception, a time/space where power relations are replaced by 
violence relations. In this frightening scenario, the political citizen with 
rights protected by laws is evanescent and, as Edkins and Pin-Fat put it, 
‘[w]e have all become homines sacri or bare life in the face of a biopolitics 
that technologizes, administers, and depoliticizes, and thereby renders the 
political and power relations irrelevant’ (2004: 9). In this view, Moushumi’s 
trip would not be resistance at all; rather, it is an activity that is currently 
allowed and monitored by the border guards, but that could quickly be 
violently suppressed if necessary.
While the state of exception literature f inds little space for resistance, 
the literature on dominance and resistance in power relations sees virtually 
every action within the framework of power (Scott 1985; Sharp et al. 2000). 
Power often appears to be pervasive: every action is political and is made 
by either a dominating or resisting agent in the broad milieu of power 
relations (Rose 2002). The best known example is James C. Scott’s argument 
that even when full-f ledged revolution is impossible, people continue to 
use all the avenues available to them to resist undesired changes to their 
lives: ‘Foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false compliance, pilfering, 
feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage, and so on […] They require little 
or no coordination or planning; the make use of implicit understandings 
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and informal networks; they often represent a form of individual self-help; 
they typically avoid any direct symbolic confrontation with authority’ 
(Scott 1985: xvi). In Scott’s formulation, almost any type of noncompliance is 
considered resistance. His point is that simply refusing to go along with a new 
regime of land ownership or resource management represents a dismissal 
of the imposed order and a way of continuing to practice alternative ways 
of living. In geography, Jo Sharp et al. have proposed an equally capacious 
def inition of resistance as any activity that ‘attempts to set up situations, 
groupings, and actions which resist the impositions of dominating power’ 
ranging from ‘breaking wind when the king goes by’ to ‘violent actions’ with 
transformative goals (Sharp et al. 2000: 3). In the dominance-resistance 
framework, Moushumi’s trip would certainly be an example of resistance 
to the authority of the state.
To reconcile these two sets of literature with starkly different views 
of power and resistance, this chapter makes three arguments about the 
state, sovereignty, and cross-border movement. First, it demonstrates that 
scholars of the state of exception profoundly overestimate the extent and 
homogeneity of state authority. Rather than understanding sovereign power 
as unitary and all encompassing, it is better conceptualized as multifaceted, 
partial, and conflicted (Jones 2009b). Despite the expansion of the sovereign 
state over the past century, there are many loosely administered places 
where the authority of the state is weak or non-existent. Exceptional violence 
periodically materializes in these spaces, but is not as pervasive as the term 
‘state of exception’ implies. Even at the border, where the performances of 
sovereign authority are often the most conspicuous, the territorial control 
of sovereign power is incomplete. Indeed, the overt performances and 
need for exceptional violence are indicative of its weakness; they would 
be unnecessary if it had f irm control. The second and third sections of this 
chapter demonstrate this claim by examining the literature on state-making 
in marginal areas, describing the f itful expansion of the Bangladeshi and 
Indian states at the border, and analysing the current practices of the border 
guards. These off icials – whom Judith Butler calls the ‘petty sovereigns’ of 
governmentality – are delegated the authority to make the decision about 
the exception for the sovereign; however, at the India-Bangladesh border, 
they use this authority to allow themselves to operate outside the laws of 
the state, often undermining the state’s goals of regulation, legibility, and 
order (Butler 2004: 56).
Second, this chapter questions the dominance-resistance binary that 
defines all activities as political. Instead, it looks for alternative ways to un-
derstand a variety of actions that are more concerned with simply getting by 
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or avoiding adverse changes to daily life. If everything is understood as part 
of the interplay of dominance and resistance in power relations, the analysis 
becomes increasingly meaningless because it fails to consider whether 
the resistance actually produces any changes to the power relationship or 
if it was even intentional – a decision that is often left to the researcher, 
not the individual (Pile & Keith 1997; Rose 2002; Sparke 2008). Cindi Katz 
proposes an alternative framework that distinguishes between full-fledged 
resistance – active contestation that attempts to produce emancipatory 
change – and other quotidian activities that are in relation to power but 
not overtly contesting it, which she classif ies as reworking and resilience 
in power relations (Katz 2004; Sparke 2008). ‘Reworking’ refers to actions 
that alter the organization but not the polarization of power relations. 
When power relations are reworked, some aspects are improved but the 
overall situation remains unchanged, as individuals and institutions retain 
their authority over others. Katz uses ‘resilience’ to understand actions 
that enable people to survive without really changing the circumstances 
that make survival so hard. The fourth section of this chapter analyses 
theories of resistance and argues for a more nuanced approach to contesting 
power in both the state of exception and dominance-resistance literatures, 
emphasizing the process of ‘enframing’ through which the categories and 
boundaries of sovereign power are instituted (Mitchell 1990).
Finally, this chapter proposes the alternative of ‘spaces of refusal’ to 
conceptualize everyday actions like Moushumi’s that disregard the rules of 
the state in not-completely-administered spaces, but that are not a politically 
motivated resistance to sovereignty. A space of refusal is a zone of contact 
where sovereign state practices interact with alternative ways of seeing, 
knowing, and being. In these spaces, people adopt various means to avoid 
the sovereignty regime of the state, even when the traditional response 
of f light is not available (Agnew 2005; Scott 2009). These include evading 
the state apparatus by not paying taxes, transgressing the state’s authority 
by engaging in activities that are prohibited by the state, and refusing to 
accept the lines and categories drawn by the state to create and practice its 
power. Spaces of refusal are not zones where there is a revolution against 
the state, nor are they spaces of romanticized resistance. Instead, they are 
characterized by a simple dismissal of the state’s claim to def ine subjects 
and activities in those spaces (Sharpe et al. 2000; Sparke 2008). The f ifth 
section of this chapter demonstrates how border residents have developed a 
multitude of strategies that acquiesce to, co-opt, transgress, and ignore both 
the sovereignty of the state and the violence regime of the border guards. By 
refusing to accept the binary enframing of the state that attempts to create 
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a world of us/them, here/there, and dominance/resistance, Moushumi and 
many others maintain imaginative geographies outside state-sanctioned 
categories of identity and territory. These acts of refusal disrupt the ordering 
logic on which the state relies and maintain the possibility that different 
frameworks outside of sovereign state territoriality may be created, even 
while those alternatives are not yet being pursued.
Creating State Spaces and Subjects
The sovereign state system is based on the idea that the entire territory of 
the world is divided up into separate spaces, which each have a distinct 
sovereign government that makes and enforces laws in that territory (Agnew 
& Corbridge 1995; Murphy 1996, 2005). The idea of bounded, territorially 
def ined sovereignty was institutionalized in Europe in the modern era 
and spread through the world via colonization. In terms of state control of 
territory, Scott argues that human history could be divided into four very 
simplif ied eras: ‘1) a stateless era (by far the longest), 2) an era of small-scale 
states encircled by vast and easily reached stateless peripheries, 3) a period 
in which such peripheries are shrunken and beleaguered by the expansion 
of state power, and f inally, 4) an era in which virtually the entire globe is 
“administered space” and the periphery is not much more than a folkloric 
remnant’ ( Scott 2009: 324). By tracing the ebb and flow of state-making in 
Southeast Asia, Scott argues that the peripheries at the edges of expand-
ing states were not barbaric places that had never experienced organized 
society. Instead, he demonstrates that these upland areas were populated 
by people who had fled the rule of the state because of slavery, conscription, 
or land co-optation. The spaces outside the state’s authority were zones of 
escape where:
This pattern of state-making and state-unmaking produced, over time, 
a periphery that was composed as much of refugees as of people who 
had never been state subjects [… They went] there to evade the manifold 
aff lictions of state-making projects in the valleys. Far from being ‘left 
behind’ by the progress of civilization in the valleys, they have, over 
long periods of time, chosen to place themselves out of reach of the state. 
(Scott 2009: 7, 24)
Scott’s story disputes the traditional histories of state-making, at least as 
told by historians of the state, which ignore the possibility of desirable 
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statelessness and instead always describe the other on the outside as 
barbaric, uncivilized, and in need of incorporation into the state.
Scott also questions the claim that states have controlled large ter-
ritories for most of written history. Instead, he contends, ‘To an eye not 
yet hypnotized by archeological remains and state-centric histories, the 
landscape would have seemed virtually all periphery and no centers. Nearly 
all the population and territory were outside their ambit’ (Scott 2009: 5). His 
book on stateless spaces reads like an elegy, however, because he concludes 
that these peripheral spaces outside the sovereign state system are now 
almost completely gone. He suggests that since the 1950s the deployment 
of technologies that produce time-space compression has allowed marginal 
spaces to be incorporated into the state.
This chapter demonstrates that this is not quite the case. Undoubtedly, 
sovereign states now claim all of the territory of the world and state admin-
istration has reached even the most remote places that had previously served 
as zones of escape from the state. In this sense, the refuges of completely 
unadministered space that Scott describes are mostly gone today. Despite 
maps that indicate the contrary, however, many places remain only loosely 
under the authority of the state. While a state may make the claim of absolute 
control and be present in most spaces to some degree, some people’s lives 
are only partially affected by it.
Contemporary political maps represent the land of the world as homog-
enous territories with sharp divisions between them, but the vast majority 
of the world’s population did not live in an independent sovereign state until 
very recently, after the period of decolonization following World War II. For 
most places and people in the world, the notion of territorial sovereignty is 
not old and essential, but new and not wholly familiar. In most cases, the 
colonial powers demolished the previous political systems and replaced 
them with colonial governments in territories defined by European imperial 
claims, not historical linguistic, cultural, economic, or political systems. 
At the time of decolonization, the only viable option was to maintain the 
borders of the European colonies as the borders of the new sovereign states; 
previous political systems had been dismantled, and redrawing borders 
based on language or ethnicity would be messy and contentious.
In the few cases when borders were redrawn, as with the borders that 
divide contemporary South Asia near Moushumi’s house, economic or 
cultural patterns of connection and circulation were rarely considered. 
Instead, British India was partitioned based on the notion that the categories 
Hindu and Muslim def ined the ‘nations’ of South Asia and that therefore 
each should have its own sovereign state (Chatterji 1994, 2007). In the former 
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province of Bengal, the history of syncretistic and blurred religious practices 
was ignored (Roy 1984). The economic circuits between jute farms in rural 
eastern Bengal and the mills and port of Calcutta were not considered. The 
linguistic and cultural similarities that would exist across the new border 
were elided. Instead, a line was drawn on a map straight through the former 
province of Bengal.
And yet, even that supreme act of division produced as many connections 
as discontinuities. On the one hand, millions of people did eventually move 
across the new line to join the country of their co-religionists (Chatterji 2007). 
In Bengal, this movement was much slower than the rapid rush over the 
western border between India and Pakistan. People found new homes across 
the border over the next thirty years, a process that sorted the population 
along religious lines in ways that had never before existed, partially bring-
ing the imagined religious divisions into being. On the other hand, large 
minority populations (25 per cent Muslim in West Bengal and 11 per cent 
Hindu in Bangladesh) remain. In an interview, a 64-year-old politician in 
India explained these connections: ‘The people here came from there and 
the people there came from here, so there is that connection. Those people 
who live near the border have a cordial relationship. They are invited over to 
our houses; we are invited to their houses. So in term of this, the relationship 
is very good. There is not any bad in it.’ These movements across the border 
also had the effect of linking families, like Moushumi’s and most families 
in Bengal, to both countries on both sides of the border (Ghosh 2002).
In the years after partition, the two states slowly and unevenly imposed 
their sovereignty in the borderlands (van Schendel 2005). The sovereign 
authority of the state did not immediately come into being in 1947 with the 
drawing of a map, nor in 1952 with the marking and surveying of the border, 
nor in the 1960s with the creation of border security forces. In practice, 
despite these attempts to bring the border into being, the borderlands 
functioned as they had before, with people crossing without consequence 
for many decades after Partition. With extended families in both countries, 
many people made trips to visit relatives on the other side. People would 
also cross the border to go to work, attend festivals, participate in weddings, 
and even simply to go to the market. The different regulatory and monetary 
systems on either side of the border also created new economic connec-
tions through smuggling networks that solidif ied business relationships. 
A 47-year-old teacher in Bangladesh explained how the border operated in 
the years after Partition: ‘My father and grandfather would tell us stories 
about going to the doctor in the Hindu village across the border and the BDR 
[Bangladesh Rifles, now Border Guard Bangladesh] and BSF [Indian Border 
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Security Force] would not say anything. They did not even bother to come 
near them. At that time, that was the normal situation.’ This freedom of 
movement could not last forever. The expansion of the sovereign state system 
occurred with the simultaneous creation of sedentary populations that 
farm the land and provide bodies for conscription and locatable resources 
for taxation (Scott 2009).
People who move disrupt the clean, territorially based identity categories 
of the state by evading state surveillance systems and by creating alter-
native networks of connection outside state territoriality (Torpey 2000). 
The creation of the passport and visa system, for example, is a method 
of monopolizing the capacity to authorize legitimate movement while 
unambiguously def ining national identity categories. Most nation-states 
base their claims to sovereignty on the notion that their people, however 
def ined, have always lived in that particular place. The erasure of histori-
cal movements supports this system and hides the connections between 
colonialism and the contemporary sovereign state by reframing the current 
state as a continuation of a historical political entity, not the European 
colony (Sharma & Wright 2008).
The most recent and substantial attempt to regulate movement in the 
Bengal borderlands is the border fence, road, and floodlighting project of the 
Indian government, which has resulted in the fencing of approximately three 
quarters of the 4096-km border (Kabir 2005; Ministry of Home Affairs 2008; 
Jones 2009a, 2009b). As Moushumi’s story indicates, and as more interviews 
will describe below, the advances of the state into the borderlands have 
not prevented movement across the border, but rather have regulated and 
channelled it, often through government off icials who use their authority 
for personal gain.
Although the organizing authority of the state was initially weak and 
slow to arrive in the borderlands, both states worked hard to establish 
their legitimacy within their territories, a process that became particularly 
important after Bangladesh’s independence in 1971. Both countries had 
populations that spoke Bengali and had similar cultural histories, which 
raised questions about the legitimacy of their claims to parts of the former 
province of Bengal. The result was intensive government efforts to def ine 
separate identity categories, justify their claim to authority over those 
territories, and emphasize the differences between the two places. This 
was done by not only drawing lines on the ground, but also by creating 
boundaries between people.
In a speech in 1978, the President of Bangladesh, Ziaur Rahman, outlined 
the differences between a Bangladeshi and a Bengali:
40 Reece Jones 
Bangladeshi nationalism means we are Bangladeshi. We have a different 
history. Our country has been born through a different process. Our tradi-
tions and culture are different. Our language is different, we are moulding 
it in our own way – we are modernizing it. We have different prose and 
poetry; we have different arts and thoughts. Our geographical position is 
different, our rivers and soils are different. Our people are different. […] [T]
oday a consciousness has grown among our people, which is different from 
that of the people of our neighbouring country. (Quoted in Huq 1984: 58)
To solidify these distinctions, successive governments have altered the con-
stitution of Bangladesh to define the subjects of the state as Bangladeshi, not 
Bengali (Murshid 1997, 2001). A 48-year-old teacher in Bangladesh explained 
the difference thus: ‘It is in our constitution. We started our independence 
movement as Bengalis, with our Bengali language. We say we are Bengali 
because of that. At the middle of the road, our political situation changed. 
At that time, those who were administrators, they changed the constitution 
to say that we are Bangladeshi not Bengali.’
In India, the state also began to define the population by issuing identifica-
tion cards for rations at state-sponsored shops. This process had the effect of 
defining the distinction between legal residents of West Bengal – essentially 
those who were there when the cards were given – and those who came after, 
who were classif ied by the state as illegal immigrants from Bangladesh. The 
distinctions between the two places have been further reified in recent years 
as terrorism has become a threat in India. In the popular discourse in India, 
the people and territory of Bangladesh have been increasingly described 
as a premodern threat to the stability of Indian civil society (Jones 2009a).
Both India and Bangladesh have attempted to impose their authority in the 
marginal spaces of the borderlands by drawing lines on the ground and in the 
popular imagination, but the top-down imposition of identities and homeland 
narratives is not always accepted by people in their everyday lives (Edensor 
2002). Some may acquiesce and accept the new order when the political 
situation changes and administrators dictate it, as the 48-year-old teacher 
suggests. Others may actively f ight a system imposed from above. But many 
people do neither: they live with the system, but do not necessarily accept it.
Multiple, Fragmented, and Partial Sovereign Power
As Scott suggests, the last 60 years do represent the f irst period in human 
history when this process of making state spaces has been actualized, 
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to varying extents, on a global scale. Independent sovereign states can 
legitimately claim to have some form of control over the vast majority of 
the territory in the world. In theory at least, almost everyone is subject to 
the administrative and legal system of a particular sovereign state. This 
situation has led some scholars to suggest that the spread of sovereign states 
has resulted in the replacement of power relations – where resistance can 
occur – with violence relations that leave no space to contest sovereign 
authority (Edkins & Pin-Fat 2004). This section briefly reviews the literature 
on sovereign power by describing the use of the state of emergency by states. 
Then it argues for a more nuanced view that disaggregates sovereign power 
from the sovereign state by analysing the conflicted practices of the agents 
of the state in the borderlands.
In recent years, much of the research on sovereignty has explored Giorgio 
Agamben’s work on the state of exception (Agamben 1998, 2005). Agamben 
draws on Carl Schmitt to argue that the power of sovereignty comes from 
not just being able to make and enforce laws in a def ined territory, but 
specif ically from being able to decide when those laws can be suspended 
(Schmitt 1996). The legal systems of all sovereign states include a provision 
of some kind that allows the declaration of a state of emergency when there 
is an imminent threat to the continued existence of the state (Hussain 
2003; Neocleous 2008). In a state of emergency, the laws of the state remain 
in place and most people are still required to follow them; however, the 
sovereign itself is able to operate aggressively both inside and outside of 
the legal system simultaneously to impose order and authority. States of 
emergency were originally intended for military threats posed by invading 
armies, but have increasingly been used in other situations, such as periods 
of labour unrest, economic crisis, or environmental disaster. Mark Neocle-
ous argues that the declaration of an emergency is not a rare event, but 
rather a normal part of the practice of sovereignty in the modern era. In a 
state of emergency, the sovereign can use violence without consequences 
whenever it perceives its authority to be threatened, which leaves very little 
space for resistance (Calarco & DeCaroli 2007; Martinot 2001; Neocleous 
2008). Even when there is not a declaration of emergency and the internal 
practices of a state can be questioned and reworked, the fundamental 
concept of sovereignty cannot be contested. If it is, the sovereign can declare 
an emergency and use exceptional violence to enforce its authority (Vacarme 
2004; DeCaroli 2007).
Scholars have successfully applied Agamben’s work on sovereign power 
and violence, which was originally theorized in relation to Nazi camps in 
WWII, to the United States prison at Guantánamo Bay, the US policy of 
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extraordinary rendition, and Israeli policies in Palestine (Gregory 2004; 
Minca 2007). Others have taken it further af ield to argue that gated com-
munities or export-processing zones are spaces of exception, or even that the 
bounded wonderlands of amusement parks could be fruitfully analysed in 
this way (Ek 2006). In my view, these applications of Agamben’s theory take 
it too far from its initial, limited focus on sovereignty and absolute violence. 
In Agamben’s theorization what is exceptional is not simply that there is a 
different set of rules. It is specif ically the ability to kill someone, or detain 
them indefinitely without consequences, while the normal laws are still in 
place. It is the rendering of a political citizen into a bare life that constitutes 
exceptional violence. These other spaces where particular laws are altered 
or not enforced, say in an export-processing zone, deserve scrutiny, but are 
not examples of Agamben’s exceptional violence. There are other ways to 
theorize these fuzzy spaces in between the legal and illegal, such as Oren 
Yiftachel’s concept of ‘gray spacing’ or Cecilia Menjívar’s concept of ‘liminal 
legality’ (Menjívar 2006; Yiftachel 2009).
The India-Bangladesh borderlands demonstrate both the use of ex-
ceptional violence in an attempt to expand sovereign authority and its 
incomplete and contradictory practice. The expansion of the state relies 
on taking the unknown and making it legible by def ining the people and 
types of activities that are legitimate within a bounded territory (Foucault 
1971, 1978). The authority of the state is based in the ability to standardize 
practices within a particular territory, allowing them to be monitored, 
administered, and controlled. In the borderlands, the process of instituting 
state authority occurs primarily through the regulation of the movement 
of people and goods in and out of the territory (Megoran, Raballand, & 
Bouyjou 2005). Borders in general, and fences specif ically, are performances 
of control (Sack 1986). They materialize the authority of the state and its 
agents to make decisions about law and order in that space. As Willem van 
Schendel and Itty Abraham argue, the effort to regulate and define practices 
at the border ‘constructs conceptual barriers between illicit bad-guy activity 
(traff icking, smuggling) and state-authorized good guy activities (trade, 
migration) that obscure how these are often part of a single spectrum’ 
(van Schendel & Abraham 2005: 9). The border is a key site for the state 
to establish the binaries of power that enframe the world as citizen/alien, 
nation/foreign, here/there, and we/they.
The broad strategies for defining the boundaries between legal and illegal 
activities within a territory are set in the capital, but the implementation of 
these decisions is delegated to local off icials as the agents of the state in an 
area. At this point of translation between state strategy and local tactics, 
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the claim of sovereignty is deployed, renegotiated, and reinterpreted every 
day. In the Bengal borderlands, the agents of the state often use the claim 
of sovereign authority to allow themselves to operate outside the regula-
tions and laws of the state. As a result, clear distinctions emerge between 
movement that is legal, movement that is illegal but allowed by the agents of 
the state, and movement that is illegal and results in an exceptional violent 
response by the agents of the state (Heyman 1999; Jones 2009b). Between 
2000 and 2009, over 800 Bangladeshi citizens were killed by the BSF and 
hundreds more were shot and injured, often without prior warning and 
without consequences for the border guards (The Independent 2006; The 
Bangladesh Today 2010).
The different sets of priorities of the state and the border guards are 
materialized through the two different ways for goods and people to move 
across the border: f irst, the official crossing points; and second, the hundreds 
of gates and rivers that mark gaps in the Indian border fence. A nearly 
universal strategy deployed by states to organize and regulate the flow of 
goods and people across their borders is the designation of particular points 
where movement is allowed to occur (Torpey 2000; Megoran, Raballand, 
Bouyjou 2005; Sharma & Wright 2008). At these off icial crossing points, the 
traveller submits to the authority of the state by identifying themselves with 
documents that demonstrate their position in the citizenship regime of the 
state (Salter 2006, 2008). In the long stretches between these off icial sites, 
all movement of people and goods across the border is forbidden. In the 
past ten years the government of India has constructed fences, roads, and 
floodlights to regulate these border spaces and to prevent any unauthor-
ized movement. Rather than stopping the flow of goods and people across 
the border, however, the security fence has directed and intensif ied the 
cross-border movements through the gates and rivers controlled by the 
border guards.
In an interview, a 24-year-old Indian contractor whose company worked 
on a large section of the fence in West Bengal explained the off icial purpose 
of the fence, but also the illegal activities that are still allowed:
Q: Why is the fence being built?
A: The president has demanded it no matter what the cost. The fence 
must be f inished by 2007. The main reason is terrorism. Bangladesh is the 
only way terrorists can enter India. […] The second reason is smuggling 
but that is not as important. Really the government does not care about 
that. Anyway, that will continue because the border guards will take 
some money and let it happen.
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While movement across the border is illegal, movement through the border 
fence – which is located 150 meters away from the borderline, in accordance 
with a 1974 treaty with Bangladesh – is sanctioned by the Indian state under 
certain circumstances. This distinction allows the border guards to establish 
their own system of licit and illicit activities.
The 150-meter zone of Indian territory between the fence and the border-
line is not an empty no-man’s-land; the land is owned by many small-scale 
farmers who need access to their f ields (Kabir 2005; Jones 2009b). To ac-
commodate these Indian famers hundreds of gates have been constructed 
and are operated by the border guards. Although these gates and rivers 
are not off icial border crossing points, they make the border quite literally 
porous, as there are hundreds of potential points for people and goods to 
pass through the border fence.
These gates and rivers function quite differently from the off icial border 
crossing points. At off icial border crossings, the agents of the state judge 
whether people are citizens of one state or another with valid documents and 
intentions. Goods are regulated by the state and (in theory, at least) properly 
taxed. At off icial crossing points, the view of the state is powerful and 
individuals submit to the state’s authority to decide their legitimacy (Salter 
2006). At the gates and river crossings, people do not submit simply to the 
authority of the state, but specif ically to the authority of the border guards. 
With the weapons and uniforms provided by the state, these individuals 
decide the types of activities that can be allowed, regardless of whether they 
are considered legal under the sovereignty regime of the state.
A 46-year-old shop owner in India suggested that Border Security Force 
(BSF) officials actively try to be posted along the border with Bangladesh so 
that they can take advantage of the increased authority the fence provides 
them: ‘Those BSF soldiers who are working elsewhere in India want to come 
and work in Hili [a border town]. They give a bribe in upper levels in order to 
be posted here. If they stay here for f ive years they are able to take five lakhs 
[500,000 rupees; US$11,000] then go elsewhere. It is done outside government 
channels. As long as this continues then the barbed wire fence is worthless.’ The 
ability to make that amount of money is significant, considering the starting 
salary for an Indian border guard is 2550 rupees per month (US$57) and the 
director general of the BSF only makes 26,000 rupees per month (US$570).3 
Indeed, the actions of the border guards themselves can easily be understood as 
examples of resilience in and reworking of their power relations with the Indian 
state. Although the state sets their salaries and dictates their duties, they have 
3  These f igures are taken from the off icial website of the BSF: http://bsf.nic.in.
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subverted its authority by finding alternatives ways to survive beyond their 
salaries. A 35-year-old taxi driver in India explained how this system works:
Q: How did you go to Bangladesh?
A: I crossed the border. I know a man who was in the business of smuggling 
in that area. First, he told the BSF that I was going to come. The guard on 
our side, the Indian, told the other guards on the Indian side and another 
man told the Bangladesh side. […] The BDR asked me my name, I said it. 
Then they asked to see a photo, I showed them. They already had a copy 
and they compared it then let me go. […] You do understand about BSF, 
they earn their money at the border. They earn some money illegally. The 
brokers run their business by always giving money to the border guards.
The arrangement with the border guards that allows smuggling and migra-
tion to occur is called line-ghat. The word ghat usually refers to the steps 
leading into a pool or pond, but in this case it simply means a gap in the 
border that allows goods and people to flow through. The line-ghat opens 
when the correct border guards are on duty and closes again when their shift 
ends. A 43-year-old smuggler in Bangladesh explained line-ghat as follows:
Those who are the border security off icers, the BSF, they are on duty there. 
All of them are not bad men, some are good. If you want to go, you talk 
to those good BSF men that speak Bengali and tell them that you need 
to go for a little bit of time to see some relatives. They say, ‘Ok, go ahead. 
Come back when I am on duty again’. We call this line-ghat. You have to 
tell them because they are in charge of border security.
His description of what constitutes ‘good’ and ‘bad’ behaviour is particularly 
noteworthy. In his understanding, the border guards are generally bad 
because they enforce the laws of India and do not allow goods or people to 
cross the border – but there are also some good men that allow the border 
to be transgressed.
Although the border guards and fence are meant to enforce the laws of 
the state, the result is often something different. As individuals who possess 
the authority to make decisions about life and death, the guards enforce 
their own authority in the borderlands, not just the sovereignty of the state. 
Anyone and anything can go across the border for a bribe – the cattle that 
cross the border even have pink numbers painted on their sides to indicate 
that the unoff icial ‘tax’ has been paid to the BSF. As van Schendel and 
Abraham argue, ‘Both law and crime emerge from historical and ongoing 
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struggles over legitimacy, in the course of which powerful groups succeed 
in delegitimizing and criminalizing certain practices’ (2005: 7).
Of course, some activities in the borderlands do still result in a violent re-
sponse from the border security forces. Although the violence has increased 
in recent years with the Indian government and media’s representation of the 
porous border as a terrorist threat, in practice – and from the perspective of 
borderland residents – the single activity that results in a violent response is 
not submitting to the authority of the guards in the borderlands. A 34-year-
old primary school teacher in India stated: ‘My school is only 50 meters from 
the border. […] This morning when I went to school I heard that last night 
either a Bangladeshi or an Indian was trying to cross the border and were 
f ired on by the BSF. They get fired on if they try to cross without bribing the 
BSF.’ A 45-year-old businessperson in India: ‘For people that are in a bad 
situation, those who live hand to mouth, they cannot afford the 1000 or 
2000 taka necessary, it is impossible for them. It is hard for them and they 
cannot go. Even if they have warm feelings for their relatives, if they don’t 
have money they cannot go. Or they go without consulting the BSF and risk 
their lives.’ A 29-year-old smuggler in Bangladesh: ‘Recently I had a nephew 
who was captured by the BSF. He did not give money to the BSF guards, 
which created a problem.’ The 35-year-old taxi driver in India: ‘A few days 
ago someone was crossing the border and they were f ired on. The BSF shot 
them. In the border area if you cross the border secretly and they shoot you, 
you can’t do anything about it. They can kill you.’
These killings in the borderlands are exceptional violence, in Agamben’s 
terms, because they happen without warning and without consequence for 
the border guards. Despite the violence and the large fencing project, how-
ever, neither the borderlands nor the entire state territory can be understood 
as a completely enclosed space of sovereign power where there is a ‘state of 
exception’. Submission to the border guards is not necessarily submission to 
the sovereign power of the state. Instead, it is submission to the authority of 
the border guards, specif ically, to regulate that space. Although they gain 
their legitimacy from the sovereignty of the state, they do not simply enforce 
the laws and regulations of the state, but also their own regimes of licit 
and illicit practices. The paradox of the borderlands is that the exceptional 
violence is done in the name of the state but primarily to conduct activities 
outside the ambit of the state. Furthermore, the extreme violence of the 
border guards illustrates their weakness and incomplete control of the 
space. The need to kill hundreds of people to direct the cross-border flows 
to the gates demonstrates that many people refuse both the state’s claim 
to regulate the space and the border guards’ regime of violence.
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Alternatives to Resistance
Despite the hardening of the border and the institutionalization of the 
authority of the border security forces, many people continue to f ind ways 
to evade both the state-sanctioned territorial line and the violently enforced 
bribery regime of the border security forces. But should these actions that 
subvert both the state and the border guards in these less-than-completely-
administered spaces be understood as resistance to sovereign power?
Cross-border movements’ potential to be a form of resistance to the nation-
state has been a topic of keen interest for many scholars of transnationalism 
over the past few decades (Bhabha 1994; Mitchell 1997; Blunt 2007; Smith 
& Bakker 2008). Katharyne Mitchell argues that cross-border movement is 
attractive to scholars because ‘as borders are normally associated with power 
relations – the power to keep in or out – the movement across borders, whether 
they be national borders, disciplinary borders or theoretical borders, carries 
with it the febrile fascination and flavour of the illicit [… which] provides 
numerous poststructural theorists the abstract position of inbetweenenss and 
movement necessary for the leverage of critique to be inserted into linear and 
containing narratives of space and time’ (1997: 101). This critique that some work 
on transnationalism essentializes state territorial categories and the border is 
important. In economic geography, Mitchell suggests, cross-border economic 
flows are often described as either contained by borders or breaching them 
– and therefore in both cases positing the pre-existence of a clearly defined 
border that divides discrete spaces. Similarly, the literature on international 
migration and diaspora tends to reify the home country and the new country 
as defined cultural spaces that the traveller moves between (Brubaker 2005). As 
Mitchell puts it, ‘[m]igrants leave one contained and defined spatial territory, 
cross one or more borders, and arrive in another identif iable space’ (1997: 
103). Indeed, the term ‘transnationalism’ itself creates the idea that nations 
are pre-existing categories, which can then be transcended.
Rogers Brubaker terms this problem of assuming the existence of pre-
existing groups ‘groupism’. He argues – here specifically referring to disaporic 
identity categories – that ‘To overcome these problems of groupism […] we 
should think of diaspora not in substantialist terms as a bounded entity, but 
rather as an idiom, a stance, a claim […] As a category of practice, “diaspora” 
is used to make claims, to articulate projects, to formulate expectations, 
to mobilize energies, to appeal to loyalties’ (Brubaker 2005: 12). Elsewhere, 
Brubaker (2002) argued that other identity categories including ethnicity, 
nations, and race should not be understood as f ixed things, but rather as 
perspectives on the world that are always in the process of becoming.
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Brubaker and Mitchell’s interventions about the essentialization of state 
territorial and group identity categories help to reframe borders as always 
inchoate and incomplete, shifting the discussion about borders away from 
how pre-existing territorial and identity categories are transgressed to how 
these never-quite-complete categories of homeland and nation are inter-
preted, experienced, or ignored. The point is not, as some of the literature 
in transnationalism might have it, that cross-border connections displace 
the ‘either India or Bangladesh’ frame with ‘both India and Bangladesh’. 
Instead, the movement across the border, and the thinking outside the state 
territorial and identity categories, is better understood as demonstrating 
that neither India nor Bangladesh are f ixed and f inalized categories.
Timothy Mitchell makes a similar argument about the dominance-resist-
ance literature. Mitchell argues that utilizing dualistic language to explain 
power in social practices reif ies a dualistic world of dominance and resist-
ance. Mitchell instead suggests ‘an alternative approach to the understanding 
of domination, one that not only avoids the dualism of contemporary social 
scientif ic writing but, through an analysis of the process I call “enframing”, 
examines how domination works through actually constructing a seemingly 
dualistic world’ (1990: 547). Power comes from the process of ‘enframing’, 
which is the ability to define the categories that order daily life and create 
the either/or schemes of power. Taking Mitchell’s view to the border, the 
limits of the imagination are established as the border becomes the line that 
divides one clearly defined state territory from another. This boundary also 
represents the division of one identity category from another. Consequently, 
activities that disrupt the moment of enframing, when the either/or binaries 
of identity, territory, and power are imagined and promulgated, emerge as 
crucial for understanding alternatives to sovereign power.
Indeed, as Edkins and Pin-Fat (2004) suggest, many actions that are 
categorized by scholars as resistance are really not, because they cannot 
result in a fundamental change in the structure of the relationship or the 
previous enframing of the state. Similarly, Katz’s scheme that classif ies most 
actions as resilience and reworking also reserves resistance for situations 
when contestation can potentially overthrow the polarity of power relations 
(2004). In terms of sovereign power, although people may break the laws 
of the state or cross a border illegally, these actions do not fundamentally 
alter who is the sovereign authority. These actions are in defiance of the 
sovereign authority, but are not necessarily resistance to the enframing 
that gives the sovereign its authority.
To move beyond this impasse, Edkins and Pin-Fat suggest two strate-
gies for recreating a space for the contestation of sovereign power (2004). 
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Their f irst suggestion is that sovereign power can be contested through the 
acceptance of the role of bare life – they use the example of the lone man 
standing in front of the Chinese tanks near Tiananmen Square –, which 
through its naked vulnerability exposes the violence of the system. As this 
chapter demonstrates, this misses the mark because it stems from their 
misinterpretation of exceptional violence as indicative of absolute author-
ity in an enclosed sovereign space. Here, by disaggregating the sovereign 
power of the border guards and the sovereign state, exceptional violence is 
understood as demonstrating weakness and the incomplete control of the 
state. Their second proposal, however, moves us beyond the debilitating 
dominance-resistance binary and towards the process of enframing identi-
f ied by Mitchell. Edkins and Pin-Fat argue that a space for contestation 
can be created ‘through a refusal to draw lines’ that would allow sovereign 
power to be exercised (2004: 13).
Spaces of Refusal
Political borders are not just a line drawn by the sovereign state: they are 
the line, par excellence. Therefore, the borderlands – where the performance 
of sovereignty is often the most visible and where exceptional violence is 
regularly deployed – emerge as a key site to examine how the incomplete 
spread of sovereign authority is experienced and understood in everyday 
life. By manoeuvring outside the gaze of the border guards and by disregard-
ing the lines drawn by the state on the ground and in the imagination, 
borderland residents continue to think about the people and territory 
in ways that do not conform to state-sanctioned categories. Rather than 
the zones of escape of previous generations, where people f led from the 
ordering regime of the state into unadministered areas, today these are 
spaces of refusal where the state is present but its power is incomplete and 
fragmented. These other ways of seeing, knowing, and being are important 
acts that refuse the sovereign power’s claim to define subjects and activities 
in those spaces.
Movement across the border outside the purview of the state and the 
border guards is, by design, diff icult to locate and analyse, but certainly 
exists (van Schendel & Abraham 2005; Rajaram & Grundy-Warr 2007). At 
the Bengal border, many people have legitimate reasons to enter the border 
zone to work their farmland. Other people who intend to cross the border 
use this zone as cover to allow them to move through the space undetected 
and unregulated. As a 60-year-old house cleaner in India explains,
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There are people that take a scythe and bag and cut grass for their animals 
near the border. By cutting and cutting they cross the border. If anyone 
asks what they are doing, they say cutting grass. When no one is there, 
they cross the border. Many people go this way. Sometimes there are 
holes in the ground. Someone on one side will drop something in the 
hole. Then someone cutting grass from the other side will go there and 
pick it up and bring it to their house. Things cross the border in this way.
Even at the more completely securitized spaces near the off icial crossing 
points, people f ind ways to evade dominating authority. The town of Hili, 
which was divided in half by the 1947 Partition, is one of the few off icial 
crossing points between India and Bangladesh in northern Bengal. Although 
today there is a brick and concrete wall that divides the town in half along 
the railroad track that marks the border, both sides are still known by the 
old name of Hili. Border guards patrol both sides of the wall and trucks line 
up along the road with goods that are passing through customs. Despite 
all of these performances of security in Hili, there are also many children 
sitting, playing, and jumping over the wall. As the 32-year-old chairperson 
of Bangladeshi Hili explained,
[in English] Right, our country is a poor country. Many people live hand to 
mouth. Our country has many, many people. Vagabond people, vagabond 
children, vagabond students, there are many unemployed people in our 
country. If they bring something from India they are able to make a small 
profit. They are crossing the border in hopes of making a profit. It is smug-
gling. It is not large scale but only poor people smuggling. [At the off icial 
border crossing point] there is smuggling by under-invoicing and other 
things, but this is not like that. They are only doing it to eat something. 
This is at such a small scale that you cannot even call it smuggling. They 
speak in the same way as they do on the other side. If the country had not 
been divided then this would not be necessary. It happens only because 
this is the border area. Children can come and go carrying goods.
The large wall in Hili is meant to prevent all movement across the border. 
If that is insuff icient, the numerous guards are meant to enforce the laws 
of the state. However, at least at Hili, that dominance relationship has been 
reworked to allow some transgressions of the border in full view of the 
agents of the state. While adults are prohibited from jumping over the wall, 
children can come and go as they please. In the process, connections are 
maintained across the borders imposed by the state and alternative practices 
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persist that demonstrate, albeit through minor cracks in the façade, that 
the sovereignty of the state is not absolute.
The refusal of an imposed order, however, does not have to include active 
transgression of the border. It can also be manifested in a refusal to accept 
state-sanctioned categories of people and territory. This occurs by not accept-
ing an exclusionary vision of who is a Bengali and who should live in Bengal; 
by not accepting a binary vision of space and identity; and by denying the 
state the right to define subjects. By thinking outside state categories, what is 
contested is the discourse that defines the actions of the state and its agents 
as true and right, while all other practices and knowledge are illegitimate.
In the binary enframing of the state, there is no space for ambivalence or 
ignorance: everyone is either Indian or Bangladeshi. Everyone must know 
who they are and where they belong, which defines their existence. Neverthe-
less, the current state-sanctioned categories of Indian and Bangladeshi 
are just over 40 years old; other identity categories have been practiced 
during the lifetimes of many residents, including Pakistani, Hindu, Muslim, 
Bengali, and British Indian. There are also many more localized categories 
like Dinajpuri and Rajbongshi.
One of the most widely practiced of these alternative identities is the 
broadly def ined Bengali category that encompasses the people on both 
sides of the border. A 30-year-old primary school teacher in Bangladesh, 
who has never visited India, explained the connections he perceived with 
people across the border: ‘Of course they are totally like us. Culture like 
us. Language like us. Behaviour like us. They don’t know Hindi, or any 
other language, except Bengali. There is no difference at all. Only there is 
one thing, if I desire to go there from here I cannot.’ On both sides of the 
border there is a persistent, and widely held, view that the 1947 partition 
of the province of Bengal was a mistake that had predominately negative 
consequences. A 27-year-old businessperson in India stated:
We did not want the separation. We wanted to be one country. If Bengal 
was not divided then you would not be able to talk to me here. My house 
over there [in contemporary Bangladesh], I would have stayed there. The 
older people in the area are all sad about the state of the country. Hindus 
and Muslims, everyone in both communities is sad. […] Those who came 
here through exchange, they are not happy either. It is an error.
The frustration about the division emerges from the feeling that the current 
borders do not reflect local history or perspectives. Instead, the border is 
seen as an imposition by outside forces to weaken and divide the previously 
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strong Bengali presence in South Asian affairs. A 65-year-old retired teacher 
in India stated: ‘It is true people are sad [about the division]. Nobody wanted 
it. But it happened. […] When it happened, everything was divided, our 
power, our capacity, our education, our allegiance, everything.’ A 38-year-old 
businessperson in India described it thus: ‘Our leaders, they divided us. The 
people did not want this. By heart we are the same, even if he is Hindu or 
Muslim. But the leaders in power they divided us. The people in Bangladesh 
want to come here, we want to go there. That is always in our mind.’ His 
f inal sentence is the crux of the argument in this chapter. Virtually everyone 
accepts that the division of Bengal into India and Bangladesh is a settled 
fact; very few people at this moment are actively contesting the sovereign 
authority of either country. Nevertheless, many – if not most – people in 
the borderlands continue to think about the territory and the people in 
different terms than those set by the state. They abide by state sovereignty, 
but alternative frameworks are, as the businessperson says, ‘always in 
our mind’.
Indeed, it is not just a united Bengali identity category that persists across 
the India-Bangladesh divide. On both sides of the India-Bangladesh border 
in northern Bengal there are small populations of people who are catego-
rized, at least by others, as Adivasi. ‘Adivasi’ is a broad term used to denote 
populations that are perceived to be indigenous and not part of the larger 
Indo-European ethnic, cultural, or religious groups in the area. During the 
research for this project, several Adivasi families were interviewed in hopes 
that they would able to provide an alternative perspective on communal 
religious distinctions and the state categories of Indian and Bangladeshi. A 
26-year-old homemaker in Bangladesh responded to our questions as follows:
Q: Can you f ind a difference between Adivasis and other peoples?
A: Difference? How can I see it? We are all brothers. Everyone. People are 
people. Everyone is the same kind.
Q: Why do people call you Adivasi then?
A: People have been calling us Adivasi for fourteen generations. What 
our ancestors did to get this name, we do not know.
Three weeks later and thirty kilometres away, a 56-year-old homemaker in 
Bangladesh made an identical point:
Q: Is there any difference between Bengalis and Adivasis?
A: What kind of difference can there be between Bengali and Adivasi? 
People are one. There are not any differences.
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Q: But if there is no difference why do people still call you Adivasi?
A: People have been calling us that since before my grandfather’s time. 
What can I say now?
The perspective these women provide, which was reiterated in other inter-
views, is instructive in its steadfast refusal to be hemmed in by categories 
and kinds. In their matter-of-fact dismissal of the categories that shape 
their neighbours’ lives, these women question the taken-for-granted logic of 
the sovereign state as humanity attempts to negotiate the damage modern 
ordering, bordering, and categorizing have wrought on the world. They 
provide hope that the violence done through the enframing of the state 
can not only be endured and reworked, but also undone.
Making Space for the Possible
One thing I do know is that we are all brothers and our blood is the same. 
If I cut you, it is red. Mine is too. (52-year-old businessperson in India)
Moushumi and the thousands of other people like her who live close to 
the border between India and Bangladesh see the performance of state 
sovereignty every day. While generations ago there were zones of escape 
outside the sovereign state system, today most of the territory in the world 
has been claimed and assigned to a particular state. Flight is no longer an 
option. Nevertheless, the homogenous maps of the state with clean lines 
separating different peoples and territories still do not completely dictate 
everyday existence along the border. People accept that the state is there 
and a categorical order has been imposed, but they do not necessarily accept 
those categories. When required they perform their role as subjects of 
the state, but at other times they continue to think and live in alternative 
conf igurations that maintain connections across, through, and around 
sovereign state territoriality. People in the borderlands smuggle goods 
across the border, refuse to submit to the border guards, refuse to apply for 
a passport, refuse to travel many kilometres to an off icial crossing point, 
and refuse to accept the authority of the state to regulate their movement. 
Moushumi refuses to be denied a visit with her son and grandchildren 
simply because the state has redefined territorial categories in the area.
To understand the significance of these acts of refusal, this chapter makes 
three arguments about sovereign power at the border. First, although the 
sovereign state system is represented as administering all of the territory 
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in the world, there are many places where sovereign power is new, uneven, 
and tenuous. In these spaces, sovereign power does operate, but not in the 
absolute terms claimed by the state, represented on maps, or assumed by 
some scholars. Rather than beginning with the view that the state has 
absolute authority in these spaces – which reif ies state sovereignty and its 
claim to power – it should be understood as partial and conflicted, as the 
agents of the state make contradictory decisions on enforcing sovereign 
authority every day. The literature on the violence of the exception still needs 
to be engaged, but in a more critical manner that emphasizes the incomplete 
and uneven practice of sovereign power. Rather than a generalized state of 
exception, the focus should be on how, when, where, and why exceptional 
violence is periodically materialized. There is a moment and a decision by 
an individual agent, not an all-encompassing state.
Second, this chapter argues for a more nuanced conceptualization of con-
testation in both the sovereign power and dominance-resistance literatures. 
Scholars of sovereign power are right to suggest that there is no space for 
resistance in a completely enclosed sovereign space, where the violence of 
the exception has become the rule – but the uneven and conflicted practice 
of sovereignty leaves many not-completely-enclosed spaces within the 
territory of the state. This chapter demonstrates this temporal and spatial 
unevenness at the border, where the performances of security and sovereignty 
are often most conspicuous, but it is also obvious in many other places like 
neglected urban slums. Indeed, the necessity of the overt performances at 
the border, and the violence regime of the border guards, demonstrates the 
incompleteness of the state’s claim of sovereignty. At the same time, even in 
these partially administered spaces, every action in defiance of the state or 
the border guards should not be understood as resistance. Instead, following 
Katz, it is more useful to think of many of these actions as a reworking or 
resilience in a diff icult situation. These activities make life possible but do 
not result in, or even envision, emancipation from that situation.
Third, to get out of the binary enframing of domination-resistance, the 
concept of ‘spaces of refusal’ is proposed for conceptualizing the multiple 
strategies that transgress, reinterpret, and ignore sovereign power, but do 
not necessarily rise to the level of overt political resistance. Although these 
activities cannot be understood, or romanticized, as examples of oppositional 
consciousness that achieve emancipatory change, they are nevertheless 
important. In these spaces of refusal, the binary enframing of the state 
is not accepted, which preserves the alternative mental, emotional, and 
practical networks that could eventually be drawn upon. This is not to say 
that any of the other categories practiced by people in the borderlands are 
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the true and legitimate categories. They are not. All categorical schemes are 
partial, incomplete, and always in the process of becoming. The argument 
here is simply that the territorial and identity categories of state subjectivity 
are not the only option, despite maps and state discourses that attempt to 
foreclose other possibilities. By emphasizing nuance, fragmentation, and 
process, the possible remains.
The borderlands, therefore, are both a space where the violence regimes of 
the state and the border guards are periodically materialized and a space of 
refusal where situated ways of being and knowing continue to exist. Even as 
the state ratchets up the performance of its sovereign power by attempting to 
lock down and close the border, people continue to move and think outside 
the binary enframing of the state. By not allowing the sovereign power to 
draw social boundaries between people, and not respecting the territorial 
lines drawn on the ground, the potential for alternatives is created – even 
if at the present moment they are not being actualized.
References
Agamben, G. (1998). Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press.
Agamben, G. (2005). State of Exception. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Agnew, J. (2005). Sovereignty regimes: Territoriality and state authority in con-
temporary world politics. Annals of the Association of American Geographers, 
95, pp. 437-461.
Agnew, J. and Corbridge, S. (1995). Mastering Space: Hegemony, Territory and 
International Political Economy. New York: Routledge.
Bhabha, H. (1994). Location of Culture. London: Routledge.
Blunt, A. (2007). Cultural geographies of migration: Mobility, transnationalism 
and diaspora. Progress in Human Geography, 31, pp. 684-694.
Brubaker, R. (2002). Ethnicity without groups. European Journal of Sociology, 43, 
pp. 163-189.
Brubaker, R. (2005). The ‘diaspora’ diaspora. Ethnic and Racial Studies, 28(10), pp. 1-19.
Butler, J. (2004). Precarious Life. New York: Verso.
Calarco, M. and DeCaroli, S. (2007). Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life. Stanford: 
Stanford University Press.
Chatterji, J. (1994). Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 1932-1947. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chatterji, J. (2007). The Spoils of Partition: Bengal and India 1947-1967. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
56 Reece Jones 
DeCaroli, S. (2007). Boundary stones: Giorgio Agamben and the f ield of sovereignty. 
In: M. Calarco and S. DeCaroli, eds., Giorgio Agamben: Sovereignty and Life. 
Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp. 43-69.
Dillon, M. (2004). Correlating sovereign and biopower. In: J. Edkins, V. Pin-Fat, and M. 
Shapiro, eds., Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics. New York: Routledge, pp. 41-60.
Edensor, T. (2002). National Identity, Popular Culture and Everyday Life. Oxford: Berg.
Edkins, J. and Pin-Fat, V. (2004). Introduction: Life, power, resistance. In: J. Edkins, 
V. Pin-Fat, and M. Shapiro, eds., Sovereign Lives: Power in Global Politics. New 
York: Routledge.
Ek, R. (2006). Giorgio Agamben and the spatialities of the camp: An introduction. 
Geografiska Annaler B, 88(4), pp. 363-386.
Foucault, M. (1971). The Order of Things: An Archeology of the Modern Sciences. New 
York: Random House.
Foucault, M. (1978). A History of Sexuality, vol. 1. New York: Random House.
Ghosh, G. (2002). Outsiders at home? The South Asian diaspora in South Asia. In: 
D. Mines and S. Lamb, eds., Everyday Life in South Asia. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, pp. 326-336
Gregory, D. (2004). The Colonial Present: Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq. Malden, MA: 
Blackwell.
Heyman, J., ed. (1999). States and Illegal Practices. New York: Berg.
Huq, A. (1984). The problem of national identity in Bangladesh. Journal of Social 
Studies, 23, pp. 47-73.
Hussain, N. (2003). The Jurisprudence of Emergency: Colonialism and the Rule of 
Law. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Jones, R. (2009a). Geopolitical boundary narratives, the global war on terror and border 
fencing in India. Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 34, pp. 290-304.
Jones, R. (2009b). Agents of exception: border security and the marginalization of 
Muslims in India. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 27, pp. 879-897.
Kabir, E. (2005). Border Fencing: A Major Irritant in Indo-Bangla Relations. Dhaka: 
News Network.
Katz, C. (2004). Growing Up Global: Economic Restructuring and Children’s Lives. 
Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.
Martinot, S., ed. (2001). The Problems with Resistance. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books.
Megoran, N., Raballand, G., and Bouyjou, J. (2005). Performance, representation, 
and the economics of border control in Uzbekistan. Geopolitics, 10, pp. 712-740.
Menjívar, C. (2006). Liminal legality: Salvadoran and Guatemalan immigrants’ lives 
in the United States. American Journal of Sociology, 111, pp. 999-1037.
Minca, C. (2007). Agamben’s geographies of modernity. Political Geography, 26, 
pp. 78-97.
Ministry of Home Affairs (2008). Annual report. http://mha.gov.in
spaces of Refusal 57
Mitchell, K. (1997). Transnational discourse: Bringing geography back in. Antipode, 
29(2), pp. 101-114.
Mitchell, T. (1990). Everyday metaphors of power. Theory and Society, 19, pp. 545-577.
Murphy, A. (1996). The sovereign state system as political-territorial ideal: Historical 
and contemporary considerations. In: T. Biersteker and C. Weber, eds., State Sov-
ereignty as Social Construct. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, pp. 81-120.
Murphy, A. (2005). Territorial ideology and interstate conf lict: Comparative 
considerations. In: C. Flint, ed., The Geography of War and Peace: From Death 
Camps to Diplomats. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 280-296.
Murshid, T. (1997). State, nation, identity: The quest for legitimacy in Bangladesh. 
South Asia, 20, pp. 1-34.
Murshid, T. (2001). Nations imagined and fragmented: Bengali ethnicity and the 
breakup of Pakistan. In: W. van Schendel and E. Zürcher, eds., Identity Politics 
in Central Asia and the Muslim World: Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Labour in the 
Twentieth Century. New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, pp. 85-106.
Neocleous, M. (2008). Critique of Security. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press.
Ortner, S. (1995). Resistance and the problem of ethnographic refusal. Comparative 
Studies in Society and History, 37(1), pp. 173-193.
Pile, S. and Keith, M., eds. (1997). Geographies of Resistance. New York: Routledge.
Rajaram, P. and Grundy-Warr, C., eds. (2007). Borderscapes: Hidden Geographies 
and Politics at Territory’s Edge. Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.
Rose, M. (2002). The seduction of resistance: Power, politics, and a performative 
style of systems. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 20, pp. 383-400.
Roy, A. (1984). The Islamic Syncretistic Tradition in Bengal. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
Sack, R. (1986). Human Territoriality: Its Theory and History. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Salter, M. (2006). The global visa regime and the political technologies of the 
international self: Borders, bodies, biopolitics. Alternatives, 31, pp. 167-189.
Salter, M. (2008). When the exception becomes the rule: Borders, sovereignty and 
citizenship. Citizenship Studies, 12, pp. 365-380.
Schmitt, C. (1996). The Concept of the Political. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Scott, J.C. (1985). Weapons of the Weak. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Scott, J.C. (2009). The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland 
Southeast Asia. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Sharma, N. and Wright, C. (2008). Decolonizing resistance, challenging colonial 
states. Social Justice, 35, pp. 93-111.
Sharp, J., Routledge, P., Philo, C., and Paddison, R. (2000). Entanglements of Power: 
Geographies of Domination/resistance. New York: Routledge.
58 Reece Jones 
Smith, M. and Bakker, P. (2008). Citizenship Across Borders: The Political Transna-
tionalism of El Migrante. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Sparke, M. (2008). Political geography: Political geographies of globalization III: 
Resistance. Progress in Human Geography, 32, pp. 423-440.
The Bangladesh Today (2010). BSF kills another Bangladeshi. 27 April.
The Independent (Bangladesh) (2006). BSF, Indian miscreants kill 461 Bangladeshis 
in 6 years, Odhikar. 08 January.
Torpey, J. (2000). The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the 
State. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Vacarme (2004). ‘I am sure that you are more pessimistic than I am…’: An interview 
with Giorgio Agamben. Rethinking Marxism, 16, pp. 115-124.
van Schendel, W. (2005). The Bengal Borderland: Beyond State and Nation in South 
Asia. London: Anthem Press.
van Schendel, W. and Abraham, I., eds. (2005). Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: 
States, Borders and the Other Side of Globalization. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press.
Yiftachel, O. (2009). Critical theory and ‘gray space’: Mobilization of the colonized. 
City, 13, pp. 240-256.
About the Author
Reece Jones is a Professor of Geography and Environment at the University 
of Hawai‘i at Mānoa. He is the author of two books, Border Walls: Security and 
the War on Terror in the United States, India and Israel (2012, Zed Books) and 
Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move (2016, Verso). He also edited 
Placing the Border in Everyday Life with Corey Johnson (2014, Routledge 
Border Regions Series) and Open Borders: In Defense of Free Movement (2018, 
University of Georgia Press).
2 Border Layers
Formal and Informal Markets Along the India-Bangladesh 
Border
Edward Boyle and Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman
Jones, Reece and Ferdoush, Md. Azmeary (eds), Borders and Mobility in 
South Asia and Beyond. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018
doi: 10.5117/9789462984547/ch02
Abstract
This chapter argues that the border between India and Bangladesh 
serves as a site for formal and informal structures of interaction and 
exchange, with various actors and processes complementing, contesting, 
and overlapping in their functions and priorities. While the respective 
national governments seek to encourage cross-border trade and promote 
economic corridors, these national policies f ind local ref lection in the 
much-trumpeted establishment of border haats, or off icial cross-border 
markets. A close examination of the political processes shaping this 
border policy reveals both India’s desire to simplify its own edges and 
the multi-layered and contradictory manner in which this policy is 
implemented at the border itself. Based upon f ieldwork conducted in 
Meghalaya and Tripura, this chapter examines how the multi-layered 
infrastructure of border management and governance affects local 
community interactions and f lows of goods, political processes, and 
cross-border connectivity.
Keywords: Northeast India, Bangladesh, informal markets, border haats, 
border infrastructure
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Introduction
On a patch of land where the Khasi Hills fade into the plains of Sylhet, a 
market is held on every f ifth day.1 This market is operated by local residents 
to facilitate the exchange of goods between two distinct groups of people. 
The Khasi highlanders bring with them the fruits of their forest plots – betel 
nuts, oranges, gourds, and, when in season, pineapples – and begin to gather 
from the morning, drinking tea and buying from and selling to one another 
amid the profusion of semi-permanent trading stalls, thrown together from 
wood and concrete. They are there to await the appearance of the market 
itself later in the day, which occurs once their counterparts make themselves 
ready. The Bengali farmers who form the other side of this exchange bring 
their harvest with them – a collection of aubergines, tomatoes, huge green 
beans, and cauliflowers – together with f ish and non-agricultural products 
like plastic toys and helium balloons. Trade between these two groups, who 
are largely unable to speak one another’s languages, is smoothed over by 
the presence of a number of self-appointed translators, who take up stations 
behind groups of traders and facilitate the process of exchange. In the main, 
the market looks like an excellent demonstration of comparative advantage, 
with the distinct agricultural ‘baskets’ of the plains and hills being brought 
together for the prof it of all concerned. Yet the local geography that gave 
rise to the distinct patterns of residence and livelihood that characterizes 
these two groups of people has also led to a further division over the past 
70 years, one with effects that have remained largely unexercised to date, 
but which are potentially far-reaching. For clearly visible, just beyond the 
tree line at the base of the hills beneath which the market occurs, is a 
boundary marker, denoting the international border between India and 
Bangladesh. For the market to be held, the Bengali farmers must march 
across the f ields in which the marker stands and congregate at the base of 
the hills with their goods, and in so doing violate the sanctity of the modern 
state’s territorial boundaries.
While local memory cannot recount the origins of this market, which will 
henceforth be referred to as the Khasi Hills Market, the pattern of exchange 
between the peoples of the hills and plains that it represents is far older 
than the modern nation-states of India and Bangladesh, or the demarcated 
territorial borderline that runs between them. Although this market has 
1 If a market is on the Monday, the next one would be on Friday. The exception is when the 
f ifth day falls on a Sunday, in which case the market is shifted to Monday to accommodate the 
devoutly Christian Khasi market-goers.
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until recently escaped the gaze of the state, unlike the carry-trade occurring 
in places like Hili (see Chapter 1), exchange here does not occur because of 
the border. Instead, the border serves as an additional institutional obstacle 
to be negotiated so that the market, and others like it, can be held.
This chapter inquires into how we can incorporate such zones of cross-
border exchange into our wider understanding of the boundary running 
between Bangladesh and India’s Northeast. In recent times, local administra-
tions and national governments in the region have come to show an interest in 
sanctioning variations of spaces like these to promote economic development. 
At the same time, it is along this boundary between Bangladesh and India 
that New Delhi’s claims to secure the body of the nation are most stridently 
asserted through the creation of fencing along the border’s entire length. 
This seeming contradiction highlights that the manner in which the border 
is understood to be functioning changes according to the scale at which it is 
viewed. The chapter will begin by briefly setting out the notion of ‘border layers’ 
as a means of grasping such scales of operation, before moving on to examine 
the concept’s empirical application to the spaces of local exchange along 
stretches of Bangladesh’s border with Northeast India. It will then conclude 
by briefly reflecting upon the utility of understanding the border as layered.
Border Layers
The Khasi Hills Market offers an excellent example of the discrete layers 
through which the border between India and Bangladesh functions. The 
local residents on both sides of the border who come together at this market 
are perfectly cognisant of the national boundary between them and the 
need for it to be crossed for trade to occur. To do so, they are forced into 
negotiations with agents of the state whose sanction is required for such 
markets to go ahead. The markets are thus regulated and ordered by those 
‘petty sovereigns’ who are charged with maintaining the state’s authority, 
yet take place without off icial recognition from either New Delhi or Dhaka. 
While at the national layer, as we detail later, the border is envisaged as a 
line across which the movement of people and goods is made legible and 
controlled by the state’s sovereign authority, locally neither the presence 
of the boundary line nor those responsible for its enforcement prevent the 
type of small-scale exchange visible at markets such as this.
Our invocation of ‘border layers’ appears to tally with a number of ap-
proaches in border studies, including the invocation by Chris Rumford of 
‘multiperspectival borders’ as well as recent references to the ‘polysemy’ 
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and ‘multiplicity’ of borders (Rumford 2012; Balibar 2002; Sohn 2016). These 
concepts stem from an understanding of borders that has long acknowledged 
that it ‘is the process of bordering, rather than the border outcomes per se, 
which should be of interest to all border scholars’, and that consequently 
we need to focus on the ‘multiscalar production of borders’ (Newman 2006: 
148; Laine 2016). In the account offered above, however, it appears that the 
various ‘layers’ at which the border are produced operate in an entirely 
independent fashion: the local border at the base of the Khasi Hills and 
the national one visible on maps in New Delhi seem to have very little to 
do with one another. As noted, however, recently, the Northeast region has 
seen the granting of off icial sanction for such local markets through the 
introduction of off icial border haats (‘markets’). This chapter argues that 
such a development highlights how the border’s layers, the various scales at 
which it is constituted, are not autonomous, but interact with one another 
in a manner ensuring that the border is always in a process of transition.
The interplay between expressions like local, regional, and national in 
the previous paragraph suggests how the boundary of the state manifests in 
different ways at the various layers at which the state’s borders function. The 
notion of ‘border layers’ adopted here does not seek to reify the various layers 
(local, regional, national) at which the borders of the state are produced, 
although in the absence of any alternative such terms will be used. Rather, 
the aim is to trace how the border exists both institutionally and discursively 
at various layers, and how these layers impact one another. Doing so not 
only allows us to understand that the sovereign authority associated here 
with New Delhi must inevitably be multifaceted, partial, and conflicted, 
but also through the presence of multiple layers helps us to appreciate that 
neither ‘resistance’ nor ‘refusal’ provides us with a complete explanation 
for what is occurring along this border (see Chapter 1).
The examples of the Khasi Hills Market and the recent sanctioning of such 
spaces as border haats indicate how the various border layers are bound up 
with one another. The f irst section below shows how the introduction of 
the border haats is indicative of a regional transformation in perceptions of 
the border. The second section highlights how this transformation of border 
functions in India’s Northeast stems from the invocation of a variety of 
national goals, which can result in policies that appear to push in different 
directions, as in the example of fences and haats noted here. The third 
section situates this transformation within a broader context, indicating 
how changes at the border are being driven by both foreign policy aims 
and wider trends visible in borders elsewhere. The f inal section returns to 
the space of the border itself, and the local layer within which it functions.
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Sub-regional Spaces of Exchange
The lives of those residing in the vicinity of the border incorporate multiple 
practices of exchange, both licit and otherwise. The Khasi Hills Market 
described above is considered an example of unoff icial border exchange 
because the existence of the market remains unknown to the central 
administration in distant New Delhi, at least off icially.2 Consequently, the 
international trade and border-crossing that are necessary for the market 
to occur are unsanctioned by the state. Strictly speaking, the exchange that 
occurs at such informal markets forms part of the vast quantity of goods 
known to be smuggled across the India-Bangladesh border, although the 
Indian state is generally far more concerned with the large-scale passage 
of obviously illicit goods across the border, such as fake Indian currency 
notes, guns, and drugs, as well as the export of cattle to Bangladesh (Tiwary 
2015). Although informal markets such as this seem to offer nothing more 
nefarious than the odd plastic toy gun, the exchange taking place there is 
illegal due to the absence of the involvement the state’s customs agents, as 
well as the border violations that are necessary for the market to take place.
The prioritization of certain flows over others demonstrates the institu-
tionalization stemming from the state, which through its activities creates 
distinct layers of border flows, ranging from those adjudged and treated as 
highly illicit and dangerous to those occurring between local communities 
without off icial recognition. These unofficial markets exist in lieu of a state-
sanctioned border trade. While the Northeastern province of Meghalaya,3 
in which the Khasi Hills Market is located, does possess a total of eleven 
Land Custom Stations (LCS) along its border with Bangladesh, only six are 
active; and these do not serve to facilitate the kind of local barter trade that 
occurs at the unoff icial markets.4 Similarly, in nearby Tripura, which is 
surrounded by Bangladesh on three sides, an official cross-border trade with 
2 This does not mean that the state is not aware of these markets, or that no one in New Delhi 
pays attention to their existence. However, these markets are not sanctioned by the state, and 
thus are not ‘legible’ to it.
3 Under India’s federal structure, its constituent administrative divisions are off icially ‘states’. 
However, as this invites confusion here with references to the nation-state of India, we will refer 
to these here as ‘provinces’.
4 ‘Appears to possess’ might be a more accurate phrase, as different numbers are given by 
different authorities. This f igure, and the one for Tripura that follows, is based on the website of 
the Ministry of Development of North Eastern Region, but the data may refer to 2012 or earlier: 
http://mdoner.gov.in/node/1474. In any case, several are inactive, others are only allowed to 
export an extremely restricted range of goods, and the upgrade of Dawki to an ICS or Integrated 
Check Post has coincided with the absolute collapse of trade at that border crossing. 
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Bangladesh through eight notif ied LCSs was restarted in 1994-19955 – but 
as in Meghalaya, four are currently inactive, and those that are functioning 
are unsuitable for more small-scale, local trade.
Recently, however, increasing attention has been paid to reviving what 
India off icially terms the ‘border trade’ along its boundary with Bangla-
desh. This policy has found expression in Meghalaya and Tripura with the 
setting-up of border haats.6 These are markets for the local exchange of 
5 It is not clear if there are in fact seven, eight, or nine LCSs, and whether the ones shown here 
are correct, as MDONER’s own website provides both a list of eight LCSs and a map of them, 
on which the map in this chapter is based. Two LCSs listed are not shown on the map, while 
one on the map is not on the list. The authorities in Tripura have been less than forthcoming in 
clarifying the issue. We have assumed here that the ‘Old Raghnabazar’ LCS listed is the same 
as the one marked as ‘Kailashahar’ on the map. As both are marked as currently inactive, the 
issue is not so important, but the representation given here should not be considered def initive.
6 Border trade is off icially def ined ‘as overland trade by way of exchange of commodities 
from a bi-laterally agreed list by people living along both sides of the international border’, see 
http://mdoner.gov.in/content/border-trade. Haat is a word, in Assamese, Bengali, Hindi, and 
other subcontinental languages, referring to a market held at regular intervals in rural areas 
(as opposed to a bazaar, referring to permanent markets).
Figure 2.1  Land Customs Stations in Northeast India
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agricultural produce established on the international zero-line, with one 
part of the market located on the Indian side of the border and the other 
in Bangladesh, providing a space in which locals from both sides of the 
border are able to gather and trade together. In both India and, perhaps 
more urgently, Bangladesh, the border haats are presented as revivals of 
former trade practices, with similar markets, often on the same locations, 
understood as having flourished from Mughal times right up until either 
the founding of Pakistan (Economic Times 2011) or the aftermath of the 
Bangladesh Liberation War (Sohel 2014).
In fact, this trade was initially recognized in the agreement signed 
between India and the newly-independent Bangladesh on 28 March 1972, 
which provided for small informal trade among people living within a 
16-kilometer belt of the border in the Indian provinces of West Bengal, 
Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura, and Mizoram, on one hand, and Bangladesh 
on the other.7 However, concerns over smuggling meant that in October 
1972 the provision for border trade was discarded from the Agreement by 
mutual consent (Wirsing & Das 2016: 23). From the perspective of the state’s 
centre, therefore, this kind of local trade in products of limited value by 
border residents did not occur between late 1972 and the recent opening 
of border haats under the state’s aegis.
The respective governments of India and Bangladesh remain off icially 
unaware of the existence of places of unsanctioned exchange like the Khasi 
Hills Market. However, the last two decades have seen the articulation of 
the kinds of local, negotiated cross-border interactions that are visible at 
such unoff icial border markets in the national-level agreements between 
India and its neighbours in the region. This is indicative of a shift in thinking 
about the border of the nation, in which the edge of the state is transformed 
from a linear barrier into a zone of permeable interaction mandated by 
the state.
National Goals
The interest of the political centre in the Northeast region’s local trade 
appears to have f irst manifested on its eastern border, in an agreement that 
India signed with Myanmar on 21 January 1994 (Bhatia 2016: 231). According 
to this agreement, in addition to the normal cross-border trade conducted 
7 ‘Trade Agreement between the Government of India and the Government of the People’s 
Republic of Bangladesh’, Article IV.
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through Land Customs Stations on the Indian side of the border (initially 
at the Moreh-Tamu crossing in Manipur, established on 12 April 1995, with 
stations later added at Zokhawthar-Rhi in Mizoram and Nampong in 
Arunachal Pradesh), trade in a restricted list of products was permitted 
for residents living within 40 km of the border.8 The list of bilaterally agreed-
upon ‘traditional’ products f irst consisted of 22 items of largely agricultural 
produce, but has since been expanded to 40 (in 2008), and then 62 (from 
2012) items, and now incorporates goods whose exchange is somewhat 
less hallowed by custom, including motorbikes, electrical appliances, and 
agricultural machinery. Trade by the locals in these ‘traditional’ products 
is duty free and conducted alongside the ‘normal’ cross-border trade at land 
customs stations.9
The recognition of local border trade by the Indian state was subse-
quently expanded to incorporate a border trade with China, as agreements 
reached as part of the Conf idence-Building Measures in the early-1990s 
were followed with a further Memorandum of Understanding in 2003 and 
f inally applied to trade at the Nathula Pass in Sikkim.10 These agreements 
allowed for the import of fourteen items to India and the export of 29 
(since expanded to 20 and 34 (Das 2014: Appendix 1)) entirely duty-free, 
while also specifying the length of the trading season, on which days 
the market would be held, and charging levies on vehicles. That same 
year, 2006, also saw the signing of the South Asian Free Trade Agreement 
(SAFTA) which, although hardly as comprehensive or effective as its 
architects envisaged, was indicative of a desire among the states in the 
region to ameliorate the effects of the traditionally punitive tariff barriers. 
Two years later an agreement to resume border trade was signed between 
India and Pakistan.
It is in the wake of these national and regional exemplars that the last 
decade has seen moves to legitimize the border trade between India and 
Bangladesh as well, through the introduction of border haats. In October 
2009, it began to be reported that Bangladesh had finally dropped its opposi-
tion to the ‘reopening’ of these border markets; the decision to establish the 
8 Unlike the other two land customs stations, there is not yet any ‘normal/MFN’ trade permitted 
at Nampong. 
9 In December 2015 the Indian government suspended the ‘barter’ system that had been 
previously utilized in trade with Myanmar, and this has slowed the ‘off icial’ border trade to a 
crawl (Htwe 2016; Roderigues 2016).
10 The Conf idence-Building Measures were ‘The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on 
the Resumption of Border Trade’ signed on 13 December 1991 and the ‘Protocol on Entry and 
Exit Procedures for Border Trade’ signed on 01 July 1992.
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markets was off icially made in January 2010, on the occasion of the historic 
visit of Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to New Delhi (Ministry 
of External Affairs 2010). Subsequently, a Memorandum of Understanding 
and Mode of Operation for the border haats was signed between India and 
Bangladesh on 23 October 2010. These border haats are specifically designed 
to allow the local residents on opposite sides of the border to trade with one 
another for locally-produced goods, primarily agricultural and horticultural 
produce; the markets are supposed to consist of an equal number of traders 
from both sides, utilizing either side’s currency or bartering for goods.11 
Only those resident within 5 km of the haat are permitted to trade, and 
the value of purchases on any given day cannot exceed the equivalent of 
US$50 (raised to US$100 in 2012).
However, despite the extremely small scale of the trade envisaged at 
these sites, establishing them appears to have been a torturous process for 
all concerned. The f irst was declared open for business on 23 July 2011, at 
Kalaichar (in the West Garo Hills district of Meghalaya)-Baliamari (in the 
Kurigram district of Bangladesh), and was inaugurated by the then-Union 
Commerce Minister Anand Sharma and his Bangladeshi counterpart 
Faruq Khan (Talukdar 2011).12 A second haat in Meghalaya was opened on 
1 May 2012 at Balat (East Khasi Hills district)-Dalora (Sunamganj district); 
13 January 2015 saw the Commerce Ministers of both countries, Nirmala 
Sitharaman and Tofael Ahmed, jointly open the f irst border haat in Tripura 
at Srinagar (South Tripura district)-Purba Madhugram (northeastern Feni 
district). This was followed on 11 June that year by a further haat in Tripura 
at Kamalasagar (in Sipahijala district)-Kasba (in the Brahmanbaria district 
of Bangladesh) (New Indian Express 2015). The latter had off icially been 
inaugurated the previous Sunday by both countries’ Prime Ministers via 
videoconference link, and all of these haats have subsequently received that 
def initive sanction of their physical existence, representation on Google 
Maps (Times of India 2015).13
11 The commodities permitted for trade are as follows: 1) vegetables, food items, fruits, spices; 
2) minor forest produce, e.g., bamboo, bamboo grass, and broomsticks, but excluding timber; 
3) products of cottage industries like gamchas, lungis, etc.; 4) small agricultural household 
implements, e.g., dao, ploughs, axes, spades, chisels, etc.; 5) garments, melamine products, 
processed food items, fruit juice, toiletries, cosmetics, plastic products, aluminium products, 
and cooking utensils.
12 See the local administration’s report on this haat at: http://southwestgarohills.gov.in/
kalaichar_border_haat.pdf.
13 Although for a long time only the ones in Tripura were visible, by November 2016 those for 
Meghalaya were also present.
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The short histories of these haats render it diff icult to make def initive 
judgements in regards to their stated aims of reopening trade routes severed 
by Partition, supporting the development of remote border communities, 
and improving people-to-people contact along the border, but reporting on 
them to date does suggest that their impact has been positive (Bhattacharyal 
2015). Their perceived success is also reflected in demands for more haats 
to be opened. As early as November 2012, the Grand Council of Chiefs in 
Meghalaya (GCCM) was requesting a further 38 haats be opened along 
that province’s border with Bangladesh (Meghalaya Times 2012), while in 
2015 it was being reported that ‘India in consultation with the Bangladesh 
government and respective state governments has identif ied 70 locations 
in f ive border states to set up the “Border Haats” in a phased manner’ (As-
sam Tribune 2015). This would consist of 35 haats in West Bengal, 22 in 
Meghalaya, f ive in Tripura, and four each in Assam and Mizoram, with an 
additional f ifteen haats also being proposed for the India-Myanmar border 
Figure 2.2  Locations of Border Haats along the India-Bangladesh Border
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(BanglaNews24 2014). In January of 2016, India’s BJP-led cabinet granted 
ex-post-facto approval for the original 2010 Memorandum of Understanding 
signed by the previous Congress-led government, while also announcing 
that the two national governments had agreed to the establishment of four 
more border haats in Meghalaya and two more in Tripura (PMINDIA 2016). 
While the pace and scale of the expansion in the number of these border 
haats remains somewhat opaque, that the system will be extended does 
not seem to be in doubt.14
The Indian state’s rationale for sanctioning this border trade is seen to 
stem from two main factors. The f irst is the remoteness of these border 
areas, which does not allow local people access to commercial centres to 
sell their products or buy items of daily necessity within their national 
borders. The second is the traditional socio-cultural ties and economic 
complementarity that these people share across the border, which provides 
them with a natural milieu for greater economic interactions (Das 2014: 
5). It is not necessary here to belabour the point that these (local and 
contingent) advantages would apply irrespective of whether the state 
is involved in sanctioning the local border trade at the border haats, or 
if it occurs outside of its purview, as with the Khasi Hills Market. This 
strongly suggests that neither India nor Bangladesh is simply a disinterested 
facilitator of this trade, or acting solely out of a concern for those living 
in the borderlands.15
This is particularly apparent because the Indian government is sanc-
tioning such opportunities for cross-border commerce while simultane-
ously fencing the entirety of the border’s 4000 km-plus length.16 This 
is explicitly done to prevent the f low of people and material across the 
boundary with Bangladesh, and consequently the border itself appears 
distinctly Janus-faced, both opening and closing at once. Local demands 
for further cross-border trade opportunities paradoxically represent 
both the state’s increasing receptiveness to the importance of this trade 
14 In November 2016, it was being reported that the forthcoming renegotiation of the border 
haat agreement between India and Bangladesh will lead to the opening of at least six new haats 
(Nagorik Kontha 2016).
15 India is also funding the requisite road and infrastructure upgrades necessary to bring 
these haats online, though one suspects the slightly breathless reporting of this in New Delhi 
may not be matched by actual improvements on the ground.
16 Of which 1880 km is with the Northeast: 856 km with Tripura, 443 km with Meghalaya, 318 km 
with Mizoram and 263km with Assam. Whether this will be f inished in 2017 appears debatable, 
and in any case parts of the fence are in such poor repair that the project is likely to be a Sisyphean 
task. See van Schendel 2005 for the background and Jones 2012 for more recent effects.
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for security and development and the increasing pressure placed on 
unsanctioned markets as a consequence of the growing prevalence of 
fencing and tightened security at the boundary. In their introduction to a 
recent special issue on borders in India’s Northeast, Willem van Schendel 
and Erik de Maaker note how, in Asia as elsewhere, economic growth 
leads to a ‘strengthening’ of states (by which they mean an increase in 
their institutional capacity) and consequent efforts to buttress national 
borders (2014: 4). However, the seemingly contradictory nature of the 
policies being pursued towards the border ref lect not only this growth of 
‘infrastructural power’ (Mann 1984), but also the wider trends frequently 
observed in the study of borders.
International Development(s)
Studying borders requires more attention to their layered nature because do-
ing so provides us with a way to get a handle upon the paradoxical character 
of the border itself. This paradox has been apparent worldwide over the last 
two decades: the initial post-Cold War focus on the debordering effects 
of economic integration has shifted to studies of borders that are forced 
to emphasize the persistent concern of states to (re)secure their national 
boundaries. As James Sidaway argues, ‘it’s become a sad cliché’ to note 
the proliferation of walls and fencing since 1989, and India’s border with 
Bangladesh proves no exception to this rule, given New Delhi’s apparent 
determination to complete the fencing of its entire length by 2017 (2015: 
214).17 This fencing has been primarily justif ied on the grounds of restricting 
Bangladeshi migration into India and preventing certain security threats 
(most recently Islamic terrorism, although there is a far longer history of 
cross-border insurgencies in the region) from taking advantage of the border 
by sheltering within and operating from a different jurisdictional space 
(Wirsing & Das 2016). As indicated in Chapter 1, this fencing should be 
understood as indicative of the central government’s desire to materialize 
its sovereignty right up to the edge of its territorial extent by accepting or 
denying the access of individuals into the body of the state. That such a fence 
is deemed necessary, of course, is indicative of the diff iculty that states, in 
South Asia as elsewhere, experience in asserting effective control of their 
17 See, e.g., Indian Express 2016. There appears to be some confusion in reports as to whether 
this refers only to Assam and Tripura or to the entire length of the border. If the latter, it is 
impossible that it will materialize by 2017.
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boundaries. While markets like the one at the foot of the Khasi Hills confirm 
van Schendel’s assertion that the state ‘is never the overarching entity’ in 
the borderlands, such examples of local cross-border connections contrast 
with different locales along the same border where the ‘potential to be 
reduced to bare life is ever present’ (van Schendel 2005: 380; Sur 2015: 77; 
Jones 2012: 144). As the distant central state lacks an ‘overarching’ control of 
its own sovereign territory, it is acutely aware of (and thus ‘cartographically 
anxious’ about) its own insecurity, to the point that these ‘sensitive spaces’ 
trigger the ruthless response that has transformed large sections of the 
India-Bangladesh borderland into a ‘killing f ield’ (Krishna 1994; Cons 2016; 
Human Rights Watch 2010). However, as both off icial and unoff icial border 
markets demonstrate, to characterize the entire length of the borderline as 
a space of exception fails to do justice to the multi-layered existence of the 
border, which is capable of simultaneously recognizing and rejecting the 
necessity of cross-border interactions. It is the somewhat paradoxical nature 
of the border, which possesses both f iltering and barrier functions, that 
makes these two trends able to exist as different layers of the same boundary.
This is emphasized by the fact that the recognition of border trade has not 
occurred in isolation from New Delhi’s security concerns. With Myanmar 
and China, too, the question of recognizing a limited border trade became 
part of bilateral relations through its incorporation into wider issues of 
regional politics. The trade deal with Myanmar reflected India’s need for 
a cross-border agreement in order to secure land access to Southeast Asia, 
while border trade with China was proposed as part of confidence-building 
measures seeking to receive the latter’s recognition of India’s incorporation 
of Sikkim (Economic Times 2003). These wider goals also share a concern 
with maintaining and supporting the sovereign borders of the nation, and 
the border trade with Bangladesh is no exception in this regard.
The border itself has recently been presented as an engine of growth, with 
a reinterpretation of how India’s Northeast is seen from New Delhi that is 
suff icient to propel a new emphasis on the development of connectivity 
(Rana & Uberoi 2012). Nevertheless, the reluctance of the state to trust local 
actors and patterns of governance means that this invocation of mobility 
has exaggerated the state’s concern with the management and monitoring 
of f lows. It should be remembered that while in Dhaka and New Delhi it is 
obvious that these border haats are the outcomes of a new policy that seeks 
to revive patterns of trade and local exchange disrupted by Partition, this 
may not reflect realities along the border – as our account of the unoff icial 
border trade with which we began this chapter suggests. It is more accurate 
to see these newly established border haats as moves by the respective states 
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to grant an off icial sanction to unoff icial markets.18 Their introduction is 
seen as essential for forestalling local opposition to the fencing of the border 
and increasing border security by drawing locals into systems of exchange 
that are off icially mandated and controlled by the state.
This off icial sanction enables the state to incorporate these markets 
into wider narratives regarding both security and cross-border connectiv-
ity in the Northeast, enabling these local relations to be reconstituted as 
international flows that transverse the region, rather than merely existing 
upon its edges. This more expansive regional vision is driven by claims that 
the government will now ‘act’ rather than merely ‘look’ east; it will accelerate 
the development of a number of economic corridors, BCIM (Bangladesh, 
China, India, Myanmar), Kaladan, and the like, to encourage development 
in the region. Borders, and the trade moving across them, become central 
to this vision of a regional economy. Therefore, while the two policies of 
fencing and permitting border trade may appear contradictory, they reflect 
the paradoxical role of borders as both opened and closed: consequently, 
the facilitation of movement and closure of the border are by no means as 
opposed as generally assumed. Here, the India-Bangladesh border dem-
onstrates how ‘in reality we have a world where the constant power and 
reconf iguration of f ixed territories, through a system of ordering, takes 
place at one and the same time as the dynamics of cross-border flows and 
networks [which] are parallel processes and are to be found in the same 
time and space arenas’ (Newman 2010: 775).
The region is being reconceptualized as a f luid economic space that the 
state nevertheless has every intention of maintaining tight control over 
(Uberoi 2016). The introduction of these border haats serves to symbolize the 
state’s control of the national border in the same manner as the fence – i.e., 
as a body that is able to administer its territorial extent and sanction trade 
beyond it. While the trumpeting of these border haats is symbolically 
important for asserting New Delhi’s control of the border, its interest in the 
lives of locals and desire to see regional economic development driven by 
trade and cross-border economic flows are claims that appeal to the centre 
rather than manifesting at the edges of the state.
18 In a similar fashion to the India-Myanmar border, where in ‘practice, the agreement actually 
does not go much beyond according a formal sanction to exchanges traditionally going on 
between the local populations in the border areas of the two countries’ (Bezbaruah 2007). This 
is evident in the expansion in the number and nature of items allowed to be traded at the border 
with Myanmar, where the items added to the list in 2012 in particular have little to do with 
supporting the production and traditional exchange patterns among locals, and are instead 
evidence of the widespread smuggling of these items being undertaken.
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Localizing Border Layers
The apparent interest of the nation-state in the welfare of the locals’ lives 
along its borders is mediated by the state’s concern with securing those same 
borders. Yet as the Khasi Hills Market shows, life along the borderline is not 
only characterized by the ‘overarching security discourse’ of politicians and 
bureaucrats, or by ‘acts of resistance’ to their dominance (van Schendel 2013: 
267; Chapter 1). While this security discourse has created a brutal reality along 
sections of the India-Bangladesh border, the intersection of forest and f ield 
where unofficial border markets are held is characterized more by ‘everyday 
life’ than daily deaths. These markets are unofficial because they are officially 
unknown in New Delhi, but such events still occur with the connivance and 
under the watchful eye of the state’s agents in these sensitive spaces: the 
patrols by members of India’s Border Security Force (BSF), and later visits 
by the equivalent paramilitary force across the borderline, Border Guards 
Bangladesh (BGB), to the traders crossing the border. As such, they are not 
easily characterized as ‘spaces of refusal’ either, given that these activities are 
only possible with the connivance of those embodying the state at its edges.
The market therefore reflects not only the everyday life of those resident 
in its shadow, but also the everyday negotiations required to bring it into 
existence – negotiations that take in both the state’s local agents and those 
on the other side of the borderline with whom the market is held. Research on 
the lives of borderlanders has often understood acts like border crossing as an 
example of opposition to or defiance of a central state’s efforts to impose an 
imaginary borderline on the ground.19 This is not borne out in this instance, 
where attendance at such markets holds no signif icance, and has no con-
nection, with the question of the legitimacy of the state’s borders, any more 
than would one’s presence at an off icial border haat. In conversation with 
villagers, most supported the fence, invoking national security arguments 
about migration and terrorism, regional concerns about the reservation of 
Meghalaya for residents, and local complaints about Bangladeshi farmers 
cutting their forests and stealing their crops. What locals objected to was not 
the fencing itself, but the way it would be implemented.20 A police sergeant 
19 Although it is common to romanticize the seeming non-compliance of locals with the 
ordering imperatives of the centre, it is far from clear that this should be primarily understood 
as ‘resistance’; as Karin Dean (2012:227) notes, following Nick Megoran, we should not imagine 
that most people are consciously attempting to subvert the state order, but merely trying to 
manipulate it for their own ends.
20 Duncan McDuie-Ra f inds the same phenomenon, although he is keener than this study to 
celebrate the ‘resistance’ of locals to the demands of the centre (2014).
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noted how fencing would merely result in the dispossession of locals, while 
a village council leader of a cluster of border villages pointed to the state’s 
insistence on construction of the fence 140 meters away from the border as 
the problem. Indeed, it is this issue that has previously led to protests and 
temporary halts to the fence’s construction.21
The crucial question remaining for those in the borderlands is their ability 
to negotiate with the state, and this space for negotiation is circumscribed 
with the erection of a fence. One village headman on the border noted how 
he regularly crossed the border with the BSFs permission to visit relatives 
on the other side, but that many others did so without bothering to inform 
the state. It is this local agency that is threatened by the fencing; any future 
redef inition of informal markets as border haats would mean that they 
would come to be controlled by the state’s agents, with the pattern visible 
at other haats repeated along this section of the border. At other off icial 
haats, the BSF has been accused of restricting attendance to the markets, 
with locals attempting to barter for access. This they frequently do through 
contrasting the small-scale nature of their own border trade, despite its 
importance to their lives, with the BSF’s own involvement in, or lack of 
engagement with, more serious cross-border movements. Contrasting the 
insignif icance of their exchange with the responsibilities of the BSF is a 
means of appealing to the sympathies of state’s agents. After all, it is these 
large-scale movements that serve to justify the imposition of the fence upon 
the everyday lives of locals in the borderlands.
The general recognition of the state’s boundary emphasizes the fact that 
negotiations enable the emergence of a space for exchange. The central 
governments of India and Bangladesh have presented border haats and 
other indications of goodwill, such as the recent enclave exchanges, as 
important diplomatic indications of their improved relations. For those 
along the border, however, it is the presence of these unoff icial markets 
themselves which shows how locals have succeeded in negotiating the 
complexities of the border with which they live, overcoming periods of 
limited trust to re-establish the relations necessary for unoff icial markets 
to occur. Their acceptance of the border and ability to successfully negotiate 
trade across these multi-layered boundaries emphasizes that it is vital for 
the regional development vision of the central government to involve the 
21 Similarly, ongoing disputes in Tripura over the fencing of the f inal sections of the border 
centre not on the legitimacy of fence construction itself, which is constantly averred by all 
parties, but on the Indian government’s intention to follow the terms of the 1975 agreement 
with Bangladesh and construct the fence 150 meters from the actual borderline.
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interests of the local people. Unless borderland zones of economic activity 
are incorporated into the government’s plan to Act East, the state’s desire 
to transform borders into engines of growth for the regional economy will 
no more resonate with locals than its insistence that unsanctioned local 
exchange across the border poses an existential threat to the state.
In her work on the local enforcement of national borders in the post-Soviet 
Fergana Valley, Madelaine Reeves cautions that what ‘emerges is more 
complex and altogether more ambivalent’ than either local acceptance of the 
boundary or resistance to its imposition (2011: 918). We agree in that, while 
the presence and location of the state’s boundary have been accepted, the 
associated layers of institutionalized discourse within which the borders of 
the state are produced have not found traction among the local population. 
The recent emergence of the fence as a reality with which they must live does 
not indicate that they are any more likely to accede to the cartographic image 
of the borderline held in New Delhi than they have been to date. Rather, local 
communities will continue to respond to the reality of their circumstances. 
This means that while there is little active contestation of the boundary 
at present, the ‘consensus’ with regards to the India-Bangladesh border in 
the Northeast ‘inheres in recognition of the existence of [the] border, not 
agreement over purpose or function’ (Rumford 2012: 891).
Conclusion: Layering Borders
In recent years, a large literature has shown how spaces on the border can 
be characterized as fluid, shifting, and mobile places of interaction (Baud 
& van Schendel 1997). In this chapter, we have emphasized border layers as 
the outcomes of multiscalar processes of border production. This approach 
is effective when examining a border like that between Northeast India and 
Bangladesh, as there is no real dispute over the location of the boundary line. 
Instead, conflict both between these states and within them stems from 
differing conceptions of what the borderline actually means in practice. 
While the fact that a market is able to be held with international boundary 
markers in the background may appear to suggest that this borderline 
has not materialized and is able to be ignored by local actors, in fact both 
states and their local residents have accepted the existence of the border 
as ‘a line a priori’ (Reeves 2014: 170).22 This leaves us requiring a means of 
22 However, our aim has not been to examine how power is enacted through the ‘reproduction 
of uncertainty’ by the state’s local agents. Reeves contrasts the deliberate uncertainty produced 
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incorporating both cross-border f lows and the ‘hyperbolic’ (Brown 2010) 
necessity of securing the border into an analysis that does not reduce itself 
to a dialectical construction of an opposition between state power and 
local resistance. The notion of border layers has been adopted for just this 
reason – to make visible the multiscalar construction of the border.
In this instance, New Delhi wishes to use border haats to speak to the 
state’s concern with both security and development at the local, regional, 
and national layers. In arguing for the importance of border layers, the aim is 
not to draw attention to the ‘nested hierarchies’ at which the state operates, 
but rather to how the existence of the border within certain institutional 
and discursive spaces is able to ‘jump scales’ between local, regional, and 
(inter)national. At the border itself, the presence of a national boundary 
has been forcefully imposed by the Indian and Bangladeshi states, yet local 
communities have proven capable of negotiating these boundaries to engage 
with one another in spaces of exchange. Communities in the borderlands 
remain able to trade across these boundaries while at the same time being 
fully cognizant of their signif icance.
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Abstract
This chapter investigates the neglected micronarrative of the Lushai 
Adivasi people living in the borderlands of Bangladesh in the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts, examining how they experience and deal with the new 
border in their everyday life. The chapter explores the broader impact of 
the postcolonial border on the Lushai, both direct and indirect – from 
psychological to political, from environmental to economic. It examines 
how the Lushai negotiated the newly drawn border and continued their 
struggle to retain their identity, arguing that the Lushai subvert the ‘rigid’ 
border in their everyday life and demonstrating that the Lushai people 
living on the borderland of Bangladesh and Mizoram create a Lushai unity 
that transcends the national borders amidst the increasing surveillance 
of the nation-states.
Keywords: Lushai, borders, transnational space, Chittagong Hill Tracts, 
Mizoram
Introduction
The making of borders in once-colonized regions like Africa and South 
Asia was an arbitrary and tortuous process that disregarded ethnic identi-
ties, one of the important bases of the modern nation-state (Hutchinson 
& Smith 1996: 13). For this arbitrary state and border making, widespread 
communal riots spread both before and after the Partition of India. 
Thousands of people were forced to leave their ancestral places; many 
thousands were killed and raped (Pandey 2001; Chatterji 2007; Zamindar 
2007). Apart from the immediate pitfalls of the creation of the border, 
Partition also ignited the seeds of future clashes, suppression, the 
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marginalization of minority groups, and the further disintegration of 
these states.
Borderlands are one of the most fertile grounds for researching the process 
of border-making, cross-border mobility, and its ramifications for states and 
society, particularly with a focus on indigenous minority groups (eg., Cons 
2012, 2013, 2014, 2016; Jones 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2012, 2016; van Schendel 
2005; Zamindar 2007). In Border Landscapes, for example, Janet Sturgeon 
concentrated on the Akha in the borderlands of China and Thailand and 
their transformation of the border landscape (2005). In the end, she f inds 
that in both China and Thailand the Akha were marginalized and their 
access to resources and land use shrank due to state policies (Sturgeon 
2005: 51-62). Similarly, Sara Shneiderman’s ethnography of the Thangmi or 
Thami in the Himalayas demonstrated their circular migration between 
Nepal, India, and the Tibetan Autonomous Region in China (Shneiderman 
2015: 98-128). As these states expanded their authority, it also resulted in 
the marginalization of the Thami.
This chapter investigates the neglected micro narrative of the Lushai 
Adivasi people living in the borderlands of Bangladesh in the Chittagong 
Hill Tracts (CHT) by examining how they experience and deal with the 
new border in their everyday life.1 This study focuses on the Lushai of Sajek 
Valley, on the banks of the tiny, hilly Sajek River bordering the Indian states 
of Mizoram and Tripura. In the next section, a brief overview of colonialism, 
border-making, and their general impact on the Adivasis in the CHT is 
provided. The third section considers the consequences of the state and 
the state imposed borders on the physical environment of the hills. Then 
the chapter investigates how the postcolonial border has impacted the 
Lushai people of Bangladesh. It considers how they negotiate the border 
in their everyday life through their understanding of their identity and 
through their mobility and connections to other Lushai people in the state 
of Mizoram in India.
1  This chapter is based on f ield research, mainly interviews and f ield observation, in the CHT 
and on the available primary and secondary literatures. For f ield research, I went to Sajek Valley, 
the most eastern zone of Bangladesh in Rangamati district in November 2015, February 2016, 
and December 2016. Any study on the Adivasi people of Bangladesh is challenging because of the 
lack of available sources, which can partly be explained through the disinterest of mainstream 
scholarship in the study of Adivasi society. The conventional archives possess very few records 
on them; national newspapers, magazines, and journals rarely run news concerning Adivasi 
issues. Another impediment in researching the Adivasi people in this area is the diff iculty 
of carrying out f ield studies. The area is still a conflict zone and is tightly controlled by state 
machinery. Researchers and humanitarian activists are highly monitored by the state security 
intelligence. I was even interrogated by the army while conducting this f ield study.
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The Colonial and Partition History of the Chittagong Hill Tracks
While the hill districts have little geographical congruence with the plains 
of Bengal, they have remarkable resemblance with Myanmar and the Indian 
states of Assam, Tripura, and Mizoram. The hill region of Bangladesh, now 
known as the Chittagong Hill Tracts, was depicted on the earliest known 
map of Bengal drawn by Joao Baptista Lavanha c.1550. During that time, 
the area was not named the Chittagong Hill Tracts but was part of the 
larger hilly terrain connecting India with Burma. After entering the area 
by 1860, the British named it the Chittagong Hill Tracts (van Schendel, 
Mey, & Dewan 2001: 19). This name suggests that the British understood 
the hills as an extension of the low lands of Chittagong of Eastern Bengal. 
Similarly, they treated the hills adjacent to Arakan as an extension of the 
lowland of Arakan and named them the Arakan Hill Tracts, and the hills 
adjacent to Tripura the Hill Tippera (van Schendel, Mey, & Dewan2001: 
19). The British brought the CHT – i.e., all the land to the west of the North 
Lushai Hills, South Lushai Hills, and Arakan Hills – under the purview of 
the Bengal Province.
The Lushai are one of the marginalized groups in present-day Bangladesh 
and are now the smallest among the twelve major ethnic groups in the 
CHT (Kamal, Islam, & Chakma 2007: 108). They have a distinct culture, 
Figure 3.1  The Chittagong Hill Tracts
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language, traditions, customs, and values. Lushai living in the Sajek Valley 
claim that they settled there before the British colonization of India.2 It is 
generally accepted by the community that Lushai people f irst migrated to 
Burma from Chinlung in China, and that their ancestors were Mongolians. 
The local tradition states that the Chinese king left China because of a 
disagreement with his father and headed to Burma, present-day Myanmar. 
Upon his arrival in Burma, he founded a village called Oxatlung. The king’s 
descendant, Jamukha, ruled there for a long time. In the course of time 
Jamukha’s successors expanded their rule into the Chin Hills, Manipur, 
Kachar, Mizoram, and Satkang (Chittagong), and continued their rule for 
more than two hundred years (Kamal, Islam, & Chakma 2007: 108).3 The 
Lushai migrated to Manipur, the Lushai Hills, and the surrounding areas 
between 1463 and 1466 (Vumson 1986: 58-59). From there they spread over 
the hill regions that are now districts in Chittagong division.
Some scholars think that the word Lushai originated from the two words 
Lu (‘head’) and shei (‘long’) (Kamal, Islam, & Chakma 2007: 108). It is thought 
that the Lushai had the tradition of growing long hair, which made them 
look like long-headed (Kamal, Islam, & Chakma 2007: 108). Vumson thinks 
the original name ‘Lushei’ was distorted in the narrative and records of 
British colonial administrators into ‘Lushai’. By ‘Lushai’ or ‘Lushei’, the 
British meant all of the Zo clans living in Mizoram(Vumson 1986: 56). The 
British used several spellings for the Lushai, such as ‘Lushai’, ‘Lushei’, and 
‘Lhoosai’ (Lewin 1869).
In the 1860s, Captain T.H. Lewin, the British colonial Deputy Commis-
sioner of the area, wrote:
The Lhoosai, commonly called the Kookies, are a powerful and independ-
ent people, who touch upon the borders of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. 
They extend in numberless hordes, north and north-east, until they 
reach Cachar on the one hand, and the frontiers of Burmah on the other. 
They cannot be considered as a nation, for they have no coherence of 
government or policy, but, with slight differences, they speak one language 
and follow the same customs. They are known to the Bengallees by the 
name of Kookie, and to the Burmese as the Lankhe. Our knowledge of 
the Lhoosai clans is of course confined to the tribes on our immediate 
frontier, with whom we have been brought into contact (Lewin 1869: 98).
2  Interview with a retired school teacher, Lamthimkima Lushai, 19 February 2016, Sajek Valley.
3  However, according to Lewin, `They differ entirely from the other hill tribes of Burman or 
Arakanese origin, in that their faces bear no marks of Tartar or Mongolian descent’ (1869: 103).
expeRiencing the BoRdeR 85
From Lewin’s account it is apparent that the Lushai were a prominent group 
during the colonial period. However, Lewin showed a disinclination to give 
Lushai the status of a nation. For him, the Lushai did not have ‘coherence 
in government and policy’.
Colonialism had a signif icant impact on the Lushai and other Adivasi 
groups of the CHT and there was large-scale disruption in their ways of 
life. The colonizers restricted natives’ rights to land and free movement. 
The British imposed a ban on the carrying of indigenous weapons – which 
had been a key part of Adivasis’ lifestyle, and were used for hunting and 
personal safety. Colonialism also seriously impeded the jhum (shifting or 
slash-and-burn) cultivation practiced by Adivasi peoples, which was once 
their principle livelihood and is the most viable cultivation method in the 
hilly area. The colonial administration started to regulate the resources of 
the CHT and undermined hereditary political institutions and customary 
ownership of land. The Forestry Act was one of the most exploitive, which 
heavily impacted and marginalized Adivasi people in the CHT by preventing 
them from entering newly reserved forests. This hindered their ability to 
hunt, f ish, graze domesticated animals, and even cut bamboo for building 
materials (Muriel 1939: 5, 19).
However, the most impactful event for the Adivasis of the CHT was the 
imposition of a border through the region. The creation of borders in South 
Asia was an arbitrary and convoluted process; the colonial government was 
indecisive about whether to Partition India until June 1947 – only a month 
and half before the British rule ended in the subcontinent. In that month, 
the Governor General declared the formation of two Boundary Commis-
sions, one for the Punjab and the other for Bengal. The Bengal Boundary 
Commission was given the authority to draw the Bengal borderline. Sir 
Cyril Radcliffe was the chairman of both Commissions and was given only 
six weeks to sketch the boundary (van Schendel 2005: 39). However, he was 
not familiar with the area and there also were various interest groups and 
lobbyists trying to influence the Commission. While drawing the border 
between India and Pakistan, the boundary Commission was obsessed with 
the Muslim-Hindu binary and disregarded other ethnic minorities and 
religious groups (van Schendel 2005: 39). The Chairman and members of 
the Boundary Commission did not give much thought to Adivasi people, 
who were neither Muslims nor Hindus, but mostly Buddhists, Christians, 
or animists. Three chiefs of different ethnic groups in the CHT met with 
the members of the Boundary Commission during this time and demanded 
that the CHT be given independence. If that was not possible, their second 
choice was to be included in India (Roy 2000: 45-46). To the surprise and 
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dismay of many, the CHT was awarded to Pakistan, the Arakan Hill Tracts 
to Burma, and Hill Tippera and the Lushai Hills (present-day Mizoram) was 
given to India (van Schendel & Dewan 2001: 20).
The Partition of 1947 separated different Lushai communities with an 
international border, and many were reluctant to remain in Pakistan.4 
After the Partition, many Lushai from the CHT migrated to Mizoram. The 
1951 Population Census shows around 3351 Lushai residing in East Pakistan 
(which became Bangladesh in 1971), but by the 1991 Bangladesh Census that 
number was only 66 (Vumson 1986: 315; Kamal, Islam, & Chakma 2007: 108).5 
Unfortunately, the two most recent Bangladesh Censuses do not provide 
detailed information about the ethnic composition in the CHT.
Thus, from a dominant ethnic group the Lushai have dwindled and 
become the most marginalized group in the CHT. All of the major ethnic 
groups in the CHT, for example, the Chakma, Marma, Tripura, and Bawm, 
have their own political associations through which they advocate for their 
rights. These groups have representation in the local boards and councils of 
the CHT districts. More importantly, the entire CHT is divided into three 
administrative circles: the Chakma Circle, Bawmang Circle, and Mong 
Circle. In these circles, the highest position is raja, followed by headman, 
and karbari. The Lushai fall under the jurisdiction of the Bawmang Circle. 
However, no Lushai could ever become a raja (a ‘king’);6 they are only 
represented as headmen and karbari (‘business person’).7 Their political 
disempowerment has contributed to the challenges facing the Lushai in 
other sectors such as health, education, jobs, and overall living standards. 
Consequently, even the Lushai who remain in Bangladesh are considering 
migrating to Mizoram to join their families that are already there.
The Impact of Borders and the State on the Environment
On a chilly winter evening of 8 December 2016, when the entire valley 
was covered with fog and clouds, I had a friendly and vibrant chat with 
Lalthanga and a few other Lushai. Lalthanga Lushai is the headman of the 
Lushai community in Ruilui Para of Sajek Valley. He was surrounded by six 
4  Interview with Lalthimkima Lushai, 19 February 2016.
5  The 1951 number includes Lushai and Kukis. Kukis and Lushai were considered to be the 
same ethnic group by the British administrator of the Hill Tracts. Some scholars think Kukis 
are clan of Lushai people (Shakespear 1912).
6  Interview with Lalthanga Lushai, 8 December 2016.
7  Interview with Lalthanga Lushai, 9 December 2016.
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to eight people from his community for an evening chat. I entered in the 
middle of their conversation, introduced myself, and talked about my project. 
Lalthanga showed interest in my research and agreed to participate. We 
started our conversation about the weather and the scenic natural beauty 
of the valley, where tourists from Dhaka come to take in the clean air and 
mountain views. The headman appreciated my compliments about the 
beauty but said that the environment and natural beauty had been 100 times 
better during the British colonial period. He said that in the past there had 
been dense forest all around, and animals like tigers, elephants, deer, wild 
pigs, and snakes were common. The headman said that these wild animals 
had roamed the area as late as the 1970s, when people would not dare to 
venture out alone at night. However, over the past forty years, the dense 
forests have declined rapidly and except for a few hens, pigs, and deer, most 
of the wild animals and birds are now lost from the area.8
The environment of the CHT began to change with the colonial interven-
tion into the area. The British introduced the idea of conserving the forest 
and animals through the creation of reserves, which resulted in restrictions 
on the movement and settlement of Adivasi communities. With the new 
border and the emergence of Pakistan in 1947 the restrictions became 
greater, and expanded further after the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. The 
new state acquired more land for the reserve forest and military bases in 
the area (IWGIA 2012: 22, 30-33). Reece Jones has argued that the adoption 
of common land as private property can have detrimental impacts on the 
land and environment because it confers on the individual the total right 
to exploit the land. He argues that private property and state control open 
the opportunity for capitalist exploitation of the land (Jones 2016: 87-88).
Although the British did make a few changes to customary land rights in 
the CHT, massive changes have taken place after the emergence of Pakistan 
in 1947 and the birth of Bangladesh in 1971. In the CHT, there had been no 
individual ownership of land, but the Bangladeshi state has disregarded 
Adivasi forms of customary land ownership and has been trying to impose 
individual land ownership on the area. In 1979, the state also started a project 
of encouraging the mass migration of lowland Bengali people into the CHT. 
Between 1979 and 1984, thousands of landless poor non-Adivasis settled there. 
This mass migration was patronized by the government, which provided 
logistical support in the form of rations, money, ploughs, and cows (Roy 2000: 
107). The growing population and lack of local environmental knowledge led 
to the over-exploitation of the land and environment. Previously, the CHT 
8  Interview with Lalthanga Lushai, 8 December 2016.
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Lushai people were mainly involved in agriculture.9 They would earn their 
livelihood through jhum cultivation and hunting wild animals. However, 
increasing population pressure in the CHT and state exploitation of Adivasi 
land placed pressure on agricultural land. Excessive cultivation of the same 
jhum plots decreased their agricultural productivity. The Lushai in the Sajek 
Valley used to have very good orange groves, but most of the orange groves 
are now dying from malnutrition because of the new aridity of the land.10
Consequently, the economy of the Lushai people has gradually trans-
formed from agriculture to tourism. The Sajek Valley is one of the most 
remote places in Bangladesh; the area was not connected with the cities of 
Rangamati or Khagrachhari by road until the Bangladesh Army began to 
construct one in 2010, which f inally connected the valley with the other 
hill districts in 2013. After the construction of this road, the valley has been 
developed into a popular tourist spot. There is an increasing tendency to 
construct tourist lodges in the valley. The Bangladesh army has already 
constructed two concrete tourist lodges; my field research found that current 
and retired army off icers are investing money to construct tourist lodges 
as joint ventures between the army off icers and the Lushai living in the 
valley.11 Lalthanga Lushai estimated that around 50,000 people visit Sajek 
every year.12 This excessive number of people has a negative impact on the 
environment of the area; the valley is already experiencing a water crisis 
that is particularly severe during the cold season.
The Lushai in the valley are now mainly dependent on income from 
tourism. For example, Laldova Lushai has two houses to rent to the tourists, 
and he and his wife also cook for the tourists. If for any reason, for example 
conflict, fewer or no tourists were to visit the valley, they would be in a very 
precarious situation. When I visited the valley in February 2016, for example, 
there was a conflict between the Adivasis and the Bengalis that affected 
tourism in the Sajek Valley. The tourists who did come to visit the valley 
quickly left, and for the next few months the Lushai hosted very few tourists. 
This overdependence on tourism has led them into perpetual food insecurity.
9  Interview with Lalthimkima Lushai, 19 February 2016.
10  Interview with Lalthanga Lushai, 9 December 2016.
11  Interview with David Lushai, 9 December 2016. 
12  Interview with Lalthanga Lushai, 8 December 2016. It was not possible to corroborate the 
information with other sources. The army keeps records of the number of tourists who come 
to the area, but they do not share information outside their organization. However, Lalthanga 
Lushai’s estimate seems plausible. He mentioned that Ruilui Para has the capacity to accom-
modate 500-550 tourists, Konglak Para can accommodate 100-150, and the Bangladesh army 
has constructed two luxurious resorts that can accommodate 20-25 tourists in total.
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The construction of the Kaptai Hydroelectric Dam in 1962 also impacted 
the environment of the CHT, both directly and indirectly (Bari 2012: 313-314). 
The dam submerged 54,000 acres of agricultural lands in the CHT, and it is 
thought that these agricultural lands were the most fertile in the area (Roy 
2000: 95-100). It displaced more than 100,000 people, who were not properly 
rehabilitated: the total amount of submerged land was 54,000 acres, but 
only 20,000 acres of alternative land were allocated to the affected people 
(Roy 2000: 95-100). Moreover, most of the land allocated was unsuitable 
for cultivation. In addition, 8000 Adivasi people did not receive any land, 
because the government did not recognize their customary land rights. 
After the construction of the dam, many Chakma were relocated to the 
Marishya and Baghachhari areas, adjacent to the Sajek Valley (Adnan 2004: 
46), and many settled in the valley itself, creating additional pressure on 
the land.13 This led to the over-exploitation and consequent degradation of 
the soil and environment.
Another development in the postcolonial state that affected the environ-
ment of the CHT, and the Sajek Valley in particular, was the founding of state 
factories. One such factory is Karnafuli Paper Mills (KPM), established in 
1951 by the Pakistani Industrial Development Corporation. The KPM was 
13  Interview with Lalthanga Lushai, 9 December 2016. 
Figure 3.2  The Sajek Valley
90 Azizul RAsel 
taken under the control of Bangladesh Industrial Development Corporation 
after the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War. This mill mainly extracts raw 
materials (wood and bamboo) from the CHT (Habibullah 2012: 212-214). 
To collect these raw materials, the state constructed massive roads; and 
cars and giant trucks ply these roads, disturbing the wild animals living 
in the area. One of the main reasons for the extinction of the wild animals 
referenced by the Lushai headman is the interruptions caused by the KPM’s 
cars and trucks and the destruction of the forest.14
The f inal way the border impacts the environment of the Sajek Valley and 
the CHT is through border fencing, which has created an impediment for the 
migration of wild animals. Lathanga, Laldova, and David Lushai reported 
that there was no fencing on the border in the initial years after Partition, 
but recently they have observed that India has been constructing fences.15 
All of these environmental changes have a direct or indirect connection 
with the border. The Adivasi, particularly the Lushai, are not involved in 
policymaking and are not empowered to regulate their own resources. 
Thus, when the state undertakes policies and projects in the CHT, it does 
not consider the probable environmental or other consequences in the area, 
or the connections of the local population with the land or with people who 
are now on the other side of the border.
Lushai Mobility, Identity, and Transnational Space
Borders create a physical and psychological separation among humans: 
physical, by restricting the movement of people and animals through 
international immigration laws, regulations, and border fencing; mental, 
by creating a sense of separation through the idea of the modern state, 
national identity, and sovereignty. In this section, I investigate how the 
Lushai people of Bangladesh responded to the implementation of the border. 
Although they had to take on the off icial national identity of Pakistani and 
later Bangladeshi, did the border really create a disconnect between them 
and their counterparts living in Mizoram? If not, how do they maintain 
connections with those living on the other side of the border? Do they 
attempt to create a Mizo or Lushai unity or ‘nationhood’, transcending the 
national border and identity?
14  Interview with Lalthanga Lushai, 8 December 2016.
15  Interview with Lalthanga Lushai, 8 December 2016, Laldova Lushai 9 December 2016, and 
David Lushai, 9 December 2016 .
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Bangladesh shares a 4096 km border with India, of which Bangladesh 
and Mizoram share 318 km (Border Management Division n.d.). It is clear 
that the new international border disrupted the movement of the Lushai 
population in both Bangladesh and Mizoram (India). Many Lushai migrated 
during the years following the creation of the border. Thus, the number of 
Lushai population in the CHT decreased signif icantly after the Partition in 
1947. Lalthimkima Lushai was one of the few Lushai who did not migrate 
from Bangladesh. His father was in the police service and was posted in 
Rangamati before the Partition. He did not opt to change his posting after 
Partition and remained in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). After retiring 
from the job, his father and family settled in the Sajek Valley, which was very 
densely forested and remote at that time. During Partition, Lalthimkima 
was just sixteen-years-old. He grew up in that remote village and luckily 
got a job as a primary school teacher in the nearby Marishya Valley, another 
hilly region like Sajek. For the last few years before retirement, he was posted 
in a primary school in his area, in Ruilui Para, Sajek Valley. Although he 
stays in Bangladesh, many of his relatives, including his son, have migrated 
to Mizoram. His elder son is well-settled there and has received Indian 
citizenship. His grandchildren from his elder son are studying in Aizawl, the 
capital of Mizoram. His younger son died recently and his daughter-in-law 
also moved to Aizawl, but later came back to Sajek to earn money to pay 
for her children’s education in Aizawl.16
Lushai people migrated from Bangladesh in three main phases. The f irst 
massive migration occurred right after Partition, when Mizoram was added 
to Assam in India. The second phase was after 1972, when Mizoram was 
declared a Union Territory, and the third phase was after the end of the long 
Mizo nationalist movement through which Mizoram received the status of 
Federal State of Indian Union in 1986 (van Schendel 2015). A similar uprising 
occurred in the CHT in Bangladesh, and in response the Bangladeshi state 
deployed security and law enforcement agencies throughout the region. The 
state has virtually made the whole area a cantonment: approximately one 
third of the Bangladeshi army is posted in the CHT, around 35,000-40,000 
soldiers. In addition to this, a number of other armed forces are deployed 
in the area. Among these forces are 10,000 BGB (Border Guards Bangladesh) 
personnel and 10,000 Ansars (‘paramilitary forces’), which makes the total 
number 50,000-60,000 (IWGIA 2012: 12). In the Sajek Valley, there is a large 
army camp and a BGB camp. There are two more army camps within few 
kilometres of the Sajek Valley, in Machlang and Baghaichhari. Saimon 
16  Interview with Lalthimkima Lushai, 19 February 2016.
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Lushai said that there was widespread surveillance and distrust of the 
Lushai during the Mizo nationalist movement.17
When asked about the reasons for migration to India, most of the Lushai 
were initially hesitant to respond. However, after a while they started to talk. 
One of the main reasons, they pointed out, is that they regard Aizawl as their 
cultural and spiritual centre. Further, Mizoram offers opportunities and 
scope that are not available to them in Bangladesh. As the most marginalized 
ethnic group in the CHT, Lushai’s status and opportunities are minimal. 
Most of the Lushai in Bangladesh are concentrated in the Sajek Valley, 
where there is only poor access to education, healthcare, and jobs. There 
is one primary school in Ruilui Para and another at Kanglak, and a middle 
school at Ruilui Para where students are enrolled up to the eighth grade. For 
secondary and higher secondary education, they need to travel many miles 
of thorny mountain roads to the adjacent district of Khagrachhari or take a 
boat to Rangamati – a journey that takes almost an entire day. Accessing a 
university education in Bangladesh is often beyond their dreams. Another 
important reason for migration is their state-sponsored suppression. Like 
other ethnic groups in the CHT, they face attacks from the Bengali settlers. 
One such incident occurred in 2008, when the settler Bengalis launched a 
massive attack against the Lushai in the Sajek valley. The settler Bengalis 
burnt more than 78 houses and killed one person; the army was also allegedly 
involved in this attack on the side of the Bengali settlers (IWGIA 2012: 27).
Although the new international border impeded their movement, the 
border has never been insurmountable for the Lushai. Lalthimkima, Saimon, 
and Lalthanga Lushai, the headmen of the Lushai community in the Sajek 
Valley, reported that the border was comparatively porous in the initial years 
of its creation. They did not even have a sense of the border at f irst.18 However, 
with the outbreak of the Mizo nationalist rebellion in 1966, it became more 
diff icult to cross. The army headquarters of the Mizo Nationalist Front 
(MNF) was located in the Sajek Valley, and the rebels were spread across the 
CHT. The then-Pakistani state was cautious and remained vigilant toward 
the Lushai living in the CHT;19 Bangladesh followed the same policy until 
1986, when the MNF reached an agreement with the Indian government 
and Mizoram was declared a state. Many Lushai in this area were detained 
by India during the Mizo war, allegedly for supporting the Mizo rebels.20
17  Interview with Saimon Lushai, 9 December 2016.
18  Interview with Lalthimkima Lushai, 19 February 2016 and Lalthanga Lushai, 8 December 2016.
19  Interview with Saimon Lushai, 9 December 2016. Also see van Schendel 2015. 
20  Interview with Chua Lushai, Saimon Lushai, David Lushai, 9 December 2016.
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The Lushai of the Sajek Valley make frequent visits to Aizawl. It takes 
three to four hours of walking along the hilly roads through the jungles 
and across the shallow and narrow Sajek River to reach the border village 
of Silsuri in Mizoram. From there, it is another eight to ten hours by bus to 
reach Aizawl. They usually start their journey to Aizawl early in the morning, 
and it takes the whole day to reach there. When asked about the legality 
and possibility of any harassment in this journey, the Lushai thought the 
question of legality was irrelevant; they believe they should have the right 
to visit the other people from their ethnic group on the other side of the 
border.21 They told me that except for during the Mizo rebellion, they have 
never faced much diff iculty in crossing the border. If sometimes they do face 
legal action, other members of their ethnic group in Mizoram come to help 
them. This is particularly signif icant because most positions in the higher 
echelons of the government in Mizoram are currently held by Lushai people.
However, the border has become stricter over the past few years. After the 
1 July 2016 terrorist attack in Dhaka, in which twenty people were killed at a 
restaurant, India tightened security in the border (BBC News 2016). This has 
sometimes created diff iculty for the cross-border movement of the Lushai 
people. In September 2016, Laldova Lushai went to visit his relatives in Aizawl 
as usual, but some Chakmas from the Silsuri village of Mizoram informed the 
BSF that he had crossed the border. He was arrested on suspicion of terrorist 
inf iltration and held in BSF custody for about a month. During this time, 
Laldova was routinely beaten, even though he tried to tell the BSF that he 
was not a terrorist and was only going to Aizawl to visit his relatives. He was 
freed after a month due to a request from one of his relatives who works in 
the police department in Aizawl.22 By contrast, the Lushai face almost no 
diff iculty from Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) when they cross the border. 
The headman and others informed me that the army and BGB are well aware 
of their movements and do not interfere.23 Indeed, the Lushai now have better 
relations with the army and BGB than do other ethnic groups in the CHT.
Some Lushai from Bangladesh exhibit a pattern of circular migration 
across the border. Some Lushai migrate to Mizoram and settle there for 
many years, but come back to Bangladesh after a decade or more. After 
living for a few years in Bangladesh, they again go back to Mizoram. Some 
are even citizens of both Bangladesh and India. I was able to interview one 
21  Interview with Lalthimkima Lushai, Lalthanga Lushai, and David Lushai, 19 February 2016. 
22  Interview with Laldova Lushai, 9 December 2016.
23  Interview with Lathanga Lushai 8 December 2016, Laldova Lushai 9 December 2016, David 
Lushai, 9 December 2016, Daniel Lushai 9 December 2016, and Saimon Lushai, 9 December 2016. 
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such individual, Saimon Lushai. His extended family still live in the Kanglak 
Para of Sajek Valley, but he migrated to Aizawl in 1986. He lived there for six 
years and then came back to Bangladesh in 1993; he lived there until 1997, 
and then again went back to India. When I interviewed him in December 
2016, he had been visiting his extended family in Bangladesh since August 
and planned to re-join his family in Aizawl in the New Year.24
Conclusion
The dominant nationalist discourses of South Asia have long marginal-
ized the history of minority ethnic groups. This chapter has explored the 
broader impact of the postcolonial border on the Lushai, both direct and 
indirect – from psychological to political, environmental to economic. The 
chapter also examined how the Lushai negotiated the newly drawn border 
and continued their struggle to retain their identity. I argue that the Lushai 
subvert the ‘rigid’ border in their everyday life and demonstrate that the 
Lushai people living on the borderland of Bangladesh and Mizoram create a 
Lushai unity that transcends the national border, even amidst the increasing 
surveillance of the nation-states.
The Lushai of the CHT create a transnational space from below through 
their activities and cross-border mobility. Transnationalism can be explained 
as the mobility of people, capital, power, and information across borders; 
it also means the reconstitution of a society or group of people (Ley 2004: 
156). Most of the Lushai families in Bangladesh maintain transnational 
family ties. David Lushai said that there is a tendency among the Lushai of 
the Sajek Valley to arrange a marriage for their son or daughter in Mizoram 
and thus retain or create strong ties with the Lushai living in Mizoram. 
David recently turned 38 and his father Lalthimkima Lushai and elder 
brothers are desperately seeking a bride for him. His father’s preference is for 
a bride from Mizoram.25 Transnational family ties also help them cross the 
international border with ease. The Lushai of the CHT create a transnational 
space through cultural festivities, traditional clothing, buying books about 
Lushai history that are published in Mizoram, preparing traditional foods 
that are popular in Mizoram, watching Mizo television channels, listening 
to Mizo radio programmes, and singing traditional Lushai songs. They also 
use the same Mizo calendar as their counterparts across the border.
24  Interview with Saimon Lushai, 9 December 2016.
25  Interview with David Lushai, 9 December, 2016.
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Lushai people from Bangladesh visit Mizoram for diverse purposes: 
education, medication, work opportunities, cultural festivals, and seeing 
their extended families. Almost all of the Lushai I interviewed let their 
children go to Aizawl for their undergraduate and graduate studies. For 
example, the headman Lalthanga Lushai has four children, two of whom 
are currently attending colleges in Mizoram. His daughter, Helen Thanga 
Nuri, has recently f inished her M.S. degree in Mizoram and his son Buanga 
is studying for an undergraduate degree in Business Administration.26
Not only do the Lushai of the CHT visit Mizoram, but their relatives from 
Mizoram also occasionally visit Bangladesh to meet their extended families. 
Lalthanga Lushai proudly told the author that when a Mizo minister visited 
Bangladesh, he had come to visit them. Lalthanga and all of the Lushai 
people I talked with in the Sajek Valley seemed to feel very proud of Aizawl.27 
When the Mizo nationalist revolt started in the 1960s they were emotionally 
connected to the movement and supported it wholeheartedly. The Lushai of 
Bangladesh see the Lushai of Mizoram as their true community.28 The Lushai 
living in the borderlands of Bangladesh and Mizoram create a complex 
Lushai identity that transcends the border and the imposed postcolonial 
national identity.
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Abstract
South Asia serves as a unique site of inquiry for understanding the 
complexities surrounding citizenship and belonging today. South 
Asia’s already complex migration landscape is further complicated by 
rapid urbanization, political Islamophobia, and inadequate policies 
on migration and citizenship. Nowhere is this complexity thrown into 
sharper focus than the porous borderland where India, Bangladesh, 
Myanmar, and Nepal meet, where refugees and stateless persons from 
Nepal and Bhutan regularly join economic migrants from Bangladesh 
and newer refugee streams from Myanmar. They move with relative 
freedom across unguarded swathes of terrain, into Indian tribal and 
urban ethnic Bengali communities that are targets of Islamophobic 
rhetoric and communal violence. The unresolved histories of shifting 
borders have led to decades-long territorial disputes and depatriated 
populations in this region, and most South Asian countries lack op-
portunities for long-term and permanent legal migration. This chapter 
explores the emerging migration realities in the northeastern corner of 
South Asia as a case study of unauthorized migration in regions with 
limited-to-no migration management infrastructure. Ultimately, the 
chapter considers what citizenship and belonging mean in a global era.
Keywords: citizenship, refugees, Myanmar, Bhutan, India, globalization
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Introduction: South Asia in an Age of Global Migration
Shyam Rai entered Nepal on the flatbed of an Indian lorry when he was four 
years old.1 He was hemmed in on all sides by a sweating forest of knees and 
thighs, one among the estimated 90,000 people who were expelled from 
the Kingdom of Bhutan over the course of half a dozen years in the early 
1990s. Stripped of their Bhutanese citizenship in 1989, coerced or tortured 
into conceding to ‘voluntary emigration’, the Nepali-speaking Hindu people 
known as the Lhotshampa (‘southerners’) to the Buddhist Bhutanese, crossed 
into India as refugees, the women smuggling Bhutanese passports in their 
bras in the hope of reconciliation and a return home. India then deployed 
its army to the border under strict orders to remove the refugees, which 
they did by piling them into Tata trucks without medicine or provisions, 
let alone seating and safety belts, and driving them to the Mechi River that 
divides India from neighbouring Nepal. There, they herded them across 
the watery border and left them stranded on the opposite riverbank. For 
months, while they waited for distant powers to sort out their fate, the 
Lhotshampa camped in the open air in the jungle beside the riverbank, 
plagued with hunger and disease. Rai describes a ghastly scene, calling forth 
the disconnected images and eerie sounds characteristic of traumatized 
early memory, as he speaks of babies dying all around him of cholera, their 
cries haunting the unlit night.
For nearly three decades, the Lhotshampa hung in limbo in refugee camps, 
sometimes leaving to work as undocumented seasonal migrants in cities in 
Nepal and neighbouring India. Eventually the majority were resettled as 
refugees, primarily in the United States, but also in Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand, Norway, the Netherlands, Denmark, and the United Kingdom. Some 
still hold out hope for a return to Bhutan, a country that does not want them 
back, while some wish to claim Nepal as their home, even if it refuses to 
accept them. Others still decouple their sense of nationhood and homeland 
from any physical geography or paper citizenship. In a sense, the Lhotshampa 
are a people created more through their rejection by different dominant 
groups than by their own volition, who are perceived as migrants even 
1  Opening this chapter and woven throughout is the story of Shyam Rai, a Lhotshampa 
(‘Bhutanese Nepali’) and resettled refugee that I interviewed in his home in Utica, New York in 
January 2015, as part of my research on Rust Belt and post-industrial cities in the US seeking to 
repopulate and revitalize themselves by attracting and retaining different categories of migrants. 
Utica ‘specialized’ in refugees. I have also included some of my observations from a site study 
of citizenship and belonging I participated in with a research team from the Carnegie Council 
for Ethics in International Affairs in Myanmar in June 2015.
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though it was the national boundaries that moved, not them. In different 
nation-state settings and into their eventual and continuing dispersal into 
a global diaspora of sorts, they have accumulated various and overlapping 
migrant statuses and existed in multiple and often contradictory states 
of exclusion and marginality, even as they increasingly comprise a large 
percentage of the global refugee population that has been formally resettled 
in third states, with the accompanying economic and social rights.
Although their collective experience of migration, refuge, and dispersal is 
both driven by and to be understood within its own historic context and the 
interplay of religious and ethnic dynamics in a country that has retained its 
independence in a region that continues to be defined primarily by coloniza-
tion and its aftermath, the Lhotshampa can be taken as emblematic of larger 
inquiries into citizenship and belonging in contemporary South Asia (Caddell, 
2005; Daiya 2008; Sadiq 2008), as well as of globalized and globalizing migra-
tions.2 Efforts to locate their national identity and citizenship claims can be 
extrapolated not only toward the understanding of the experiences of other 
refugee populations in and into the region, like the Rohingya of Myanmar, 
but also of marginalized minority communities in countries dominated by 
nationalist politics, like Muslim citizens of India, whose citizenship claims 
can seem compromised and outright threatened amid mass emigration from 
Bangladesh in the region, in which purported economic migrants travel the 
same fraught pathways as refugees and settle in vulnerable urban Muslim 
communities. South Asia both today and in the twentieth century is and 
was a site not only of hypermobility, as has been argued elsewhere in this 
collection, but also of negotiated, disputed, and in some cases, imagined 
borders.3 Identity communities forged by migrations and resettlements, 
forced or otherwise, during the imperial and colonial occupations of this 
2  Scholarship from the sociology of globalization, which I will cite in the next section, 
emphasizes that global migration must be seen as not just a consequence, but also an engine, of 
globalization. Here, I am simply distinguishing between migration that is globalized (networked 
and interconnected across the globe) and migration that is globalizing (which forges rather than 
follows pathways of communication and commerce). 
3  Although I do not delve into border studies in this chapter, I should point out that the f ield 
has undergone some powerful transformations in the twenty-f irst century. As van Houtum, 
Kramsch, and Zierhofer wrote in 2005, whereas in the past border studies was largely the study of 
boundaries or demarcations, ‘border studies can now dominantly be characterized as the study 
of human practices that constitute and represent differences in space.’ I also argue that borders 
often exist in the collective imagination of peoples who engage in different and differentiated 
human practices, who relate to and cross these borders in different ways, and that the imagined 
borders of different groups may differ. Further, it should be noted that South Asia is a site of a 
number of border disputes and conflicts.
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region must navigate questions of belonging in countries that have themselves 
continued to grapple with the concept of a national identity throughout the 
post-colonial era and well into the age of globalization.4
Our world today is being shaped by migration in more ways than we can 
possibly comprehend, and yet migration itself remains a great mystery. 
Migration scholarship generally suffers from poor data and is often unable 
to prompt meaningful policy solutions in nations that are driven by narrow 
or xenophobic approaches to migration management; yet, in the face of these 
structural challenges migration scholars strive to theorize today’s global 
world. Migration scholarship seeks to offer insight amid unprecedented rates 
of irregular migration and undocumentedness, complicating the already com-
plex picture of multivalent legal migration and rocket-fuelled urbanization. 
As the source of the world’s largest diaspora5 and its fastest-growing pool of 
irregular economic and climate-change migrants; as the leading non-Western 
recipient of both labour and capital; as a site of endemic poverty and slavery, 
in which citizenship is no guarantee of rights; as a site of recurring refugee 
crises driven not just by war but by identity politics (for want of a better 
word); and as the leading non-Western locus of political Islamophobia, South 
Asia provides a powerful lens through which to understand the increasingly 
complex challenges surrounding citizenship and belonging today.
This chapter seeks to illuminate some of the complex realities surrounding 
citizenship and belonging in South Asia, and its regional hegemon India. 
Through an analysis of two refugee populations – the Lhotshampa of Bhutan 
and the Rohingya of Myanmar – I illustrate how migration in the region is 
characterized by a layering of statuses and migration experiences, which, 
against the backdrop of post-colonial and emerging identity politics, as 
well as the hypermobility described elsewhere in this volume, complicates 
not only our efforts to understand migration but also to document un-
documented and stateless populations. In the case study of the Rohingya 
4  I intentionally identify this group of people as Lhotshampa, the Bhutanese word for ‘southern-
ers’, to emphasize that their group identity is not drawn from their language or ethnicity, but 
rather from the geographic region in which they have historically lived. That they can literally 
be considered natives to that region and at the same time excluded as outsiders, that their given 
name (a name they rarely use to describe themselves, by the way) refers not to their distinguishing 
characteristics but to a territory from which they have been expelled, illustrates the profound 
doublethink surrounding their rightful claim to citizenship.
5  The 2015 International Migration Report (http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/popula-
tion/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2015.pdf), published by the 
UN’s Population Division, states that India’s diaspora has grown 60 per cent since 2005 to become 
the world’s largest. This piece in Quartz India summarizes the report’s data specif ic to India: 
https://qz.com/594139/indias-diaspora-grows-60-in-a-decade-to-become-the-worlds-largest/.
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from Myanmar, I examine complicating factors that are emerging in their 
accelerating migration into Bangladesh. Then I examine how the shifting 
political landscape in India further exacerbates the off icial paralysis toward 
developing an appropriate migration policy regime in the region. Finally, I 
conclude with a broader discussion of the causes and consequences of global, 
globalized, and globalizing undocumentedness, and what this multifaceted 
and poorly understood reality bodes for the future of a world on the move.
Migration and Citizenship in a Global Age
In the last decade, migration scholars have begun to grapple with a growing 
realization that many of the extant and widely accepted theories of migration 
are insufficient. Dana Diminescu writes, ‘migration theories seem to be hob-
bled by a vision that continues to separate migrant mobilities from sedentary 
mobilities, migratory trajectories from urban itineraries, transnational circula-
tions from proximity movements, and so forth’ (2008: 566). Until recently, many 
theoretical models of migration continued to rest on Ernst Ravenstein’s Laws 
of Migration (1885); even a century later, Dorigo and Tobler’s mathematical 
model of migration tacitly accepted Ravenstein’s premises as law even though 
the evidence in front of their very eyes should have undercut at least three of 
the said laws (Dorigo and Tobler 1983: 1). Certainly, many instances of these 
patterns of migration have existed for centuries and continue to exist today, 
but it is undeniable that the motivations, pathways, and patterns of migration 
are far more complex than we have traditionally held to be the case: migrants 
move not just from poverty toward wealth, from rural to urban environments, 
from one country to another, but also in patterns and pathways that are 
invisible, submerged, cyclical, networked, impelled by social or other factors, 
or which otherwise defy what might be thought of as the most obvious, most 
visible logic of risk versus reward or cost versus benefit.
Globalization scholarship, in particular the theories on globalization 
emerging from the f ield of sociology, has increasingly entered into this 
breach. Still, Saskia Sassen, the leading voice in the sociology of globalization, 
cautions against simply projecting notions of globalization onto migration 
(i.e., assuming that migration merely exists because of globalization) and 
exhorts migration scholars to understand whether and how migrations are 
or are not ‘shaped by, grounded in or merely inflected by globalization’ (2007: 
129). According to Diminescu, globalization studies have accomplished this 
goal: ‘Globalization, network theories and transnational processes have 
pointed up certain aspects that can be used to configure his future profile: 
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multi-belonging (to territories and to networks), hypermobility, flexibility in 
the labour market, the capacity to turn a relational dexterity into a productive 
and economically effective skill are all features that we will certainly f ind 
in the make-up of our migrant’ (2008: 569). Diminescu is just one of many 
scholars who point to hypermobility as a defining feature of contemporary 
migration, but it should also be briefly noted that a growing body of literature 
points to the ways migrants have also been immobilized during this era 
of presumed unfettered international movement. Craig Martin writes, ‘[t]
he trajectories of those vulnerable peoples “locked-out” of global flows are 
replete with periods of extreme turbulence in the form of ceaseless movement 
that they have little control over, through to phases of stillness, “chronic 
waiting”, and uncertainty’ (2011: 193). Or, as Ronen Shamir writes, ‘while 
globalization is a lived reality of hypermobility for a small social stratum 
of “cosmocrats”, mobility is still a scarce resource, and the overwhelming 
majority of the world’s population is more or less permanently immobilized. 
Yet, regardless of the attention given to the widening mobility gap of the 
present era, globalization is predominantly theorized in terms of social open-
ness and social fluidity’ (2005: 197). Nonetheless, the promise, if not outright 
quality, of hypermobility certainly characterizes and compels migration in 
a globalized age. While others in this volume speak to hypermobility and 
labour market flexibility in South Asia, the feature I wish to extract from 
Diminescu’s conceptualization of the contemporary migrant is what she 
calls ‘multi-belonging’. Narrowly interpreted, this term refers to the fact 
that migrants define social and political belonging not just based on their 
physical location but also through their participation in certain identities, 
communities, social practice groupings, or networks. From this we can 
extrapolate the idea that understanding migrants’ experiences and identities 
is central to theorizing migrant behaviours, including their movements.
Criticizing turn-of-the-millennium migration studies for its ‘focus on 
single major factors and [… the] consequences of dominant structures rather 
than attend[ing] to obscure networks or subtle processes’, Nikos Papaster-
giades has called for an approach in which ‘the identity of migrants is not 
subordinate to external categories, but formed out of their own experience of 
movement and settlement’ (2013: 33-35). Central to the migrant’s experience 
of movement and settlement is her access to documentation and, ultimately, 
to citizenship. In a 2015 article, I have maintained that amid the globalization 
of migration is also the globalization of undocumentedness, in which we 
see not only an increase in long-standing undocumented and unauthorized 
migrant populations, but also an increase in undocumentedness worldwide, 
along with the emergence of newer migrant destinations (Rajagopalan 2015).
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Urban planners and architects describe the beaten tracks that pedestrians 
and cyclists make through the grass between off icial sidewalks and roads 
as ‘desire lines’. This term beautifully captures what happens in migration. 
As Sassen writes, ‘in large-scale migrations the option to migrate is socially 
produced’ (2007: 132). In other words, migrants travel pathways that have 
been revealed in communication with others who have gone before, but 
also with others who are fantasizing, dreaming. Jeffrey Cohen and Ibrahim 
Sirkeci assert that an understanding of contemporary migration patterns 
must derive from an analysis that accounts not just for economics but also 
culture, or ‘the social practice, meaning and symbolic logic of mobility’ 
(2011: ix). Overlay this web of desire lines and a culture of migration that 
is increasingly found in societies worldwide on a map of the proliferat-
ing ‘migration f ields’ (or ethnic enclaves) generated by the confluence of 
exclusionary or restrictive migration regimes with the emergence of many 
more urban centres and migrant destinations, and the old model of ‘chain 
migration’ becomes what can be understood as chain-link migration. A 
widening web of networked, interconnected South Asian diasporas now 
exist: Pakistanis from England to New York, Bangladeshis from the Persian 
Gulf to Kuala Lumpur, Indians from Uganda to Canada.
And yet, the countries and regions that determine whether, why, and how 
it is permissible to migrate in the narrowness of these determinations inter-
rupt and paralyse parts of these desire line pathways, rendering ever-greater 
numbers of migrants unauthorized, undocumented, unacknowledged, and 
unprotected. Migration and citizenship policies that do exist in the South 
Asian region are fraught with politicized considerations and intentional 
exclusions, rendering the region’s rapidly proliferating cross-border migrants 
unauthorized or out-of status, often in possession of multiple, overlapping, 
or invalidated documentation. And yet, at the same time, migration is both 
prolif ic and accelerating, with border crossings negotiated through informal 
transactions or undertaken through the porous regions where national 
borders run through tribal or ethnic territories, separating brother from 
sister and kin from homeland.
Multiple Belongings and Exclusions in South Asia
While many regions and the migrant populations moving within, through, 
and from them must cope with similar challenges surrounding questions of 
citizenship and inclusion in a global, hypermobile age, South Asia functions 
as a particularly heightened site for such enquiry. The space where India, 
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Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and Bhutan coexist (in some places meeting, 
in some places overlapping) is not only an ethnically diverse region that 
has been historically overrun with geopolitical intrigue and imperial play, 
but it has also experienced overlapping migrations unleashed, variously, by 
political repression, economics, and natural disasters. Some of the borders 
in this space remain porous and poorly controlled, while others have been 
extensively disputed, hotly contested, and heavily militarized. Yet the 
countries in this region continue to have incoherent, incomplete, and 
reactive migration policy regimes, as well as limited migration manage-
ment capacity. These migration governance systems would falter in the 
face of much simpler migration patterns than the high-frequency, often 
traumatized, and sometimes cyclical cross-border migrations in this region 
of South Asia.
Bhutan is not the only country in South Asia grappling with how to limit 
its def inition of rightful citizens on the basis of identity markers, which in 
turn mark others that are native to its territory or region as outsiders. A 
particularly stark example of a country paralyzed by its efforts to def ine 
the Venn diagram in which residence, ethnic identity, and paper trail come 
together to create a rightful citizen is Myanmar. The country’s controversial 
1982 citizenship law divides its population into four categories: citizens 
(those belonging to the 135 ethnicities the British say were there before they 
arrived in 1823); associate citizens (those who were there before the British 
left on 4 January 1948); naturalized citizens (those eligible for associate 
citizenship but who did not apply); and foreigners. Counted as foreigners 
are Eurasians, certain Chinese, Indians, Gurkha, Pakistanis, and, of course, 
the Rohingya (known inside Myanmar as ‘Bengalis’) – many of whom have 
lived in Burma for generations and have no other citizenship. While these 
so-called ‘foreigners’ were allowed to vote in the national referendum 
election in 2010, they were not permitted to vote in the country’s f irst 
national parliamentary election in 2015 that brought the long-persecuted 
pro-democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi to power. This issue came to a head 
when the government revoked the legal ‘foreigner’ status from 400,000 
Rohingya and required them to apply for citizenship as illegal immigrants 
in squalid ‘registration camps’, triggering an internationally scrutinized 
humanitarian crisis as thousands of people took to the seas in flimsy boats 
in the summer of 2015. An analysis of the 1982 citizenship law reveals it to 
be an exceedingly tortured exercise in def ining the psychic boundaries of 
a nation. And, as if the categories of belonging to the Burmese nation were 
not complicated enough in the letter of the law, they break down further 
in how the law is implemented. In Myanmar, it turns out that identity is 
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haphazard, erratic, and defined largely by prejudice, as I learned in nearly 
every conversation and encounter I had with locals of many backgrounds 
and statuses during my f ield research into citizenship and migration in 
the region during the summer of 2015. For instance, I met a young Muslim 
man in Mandalay who was the child of an ethnic Shan woman and a man 
whose grandparents had migrated from a state in contemporary India. His 
identity card reads that he is Pakistani – but he was naturalized because 
his mother is a full citizen. Another man I met identif ied (and was off icially 
identif ied) as Chin, but after a long chat admitted that he actually speaks 
a Chin dialect linguistically similar to an Indian language, which is not an 
officially recognized language of Myanmar. He believes that this would have 
designated him as an Indian, a foreigner, if he had mentioned it during his 
interview to receive his identity card. It should be noted that it is not just 
the small authoritarian states that struggle with this exercise: India also 
has a citizenship policy that has steadily narrowed its definition over time. 
I will return to this in the next section.
Although Myanmar has historically been considered a part of Southeast 
Asia and not South Asia, both the patterns of the country’s struggles to 
def ine rightful claims to citizenship for its multi-ethnic population and 
the Rohingya crisis compel us to view Myanmar as a part of South Asia. 
Sassen writes, ‘citizenship is an incompletely theorized contract between 
the state and its subjects. Further, it is meant to be incomplete […] this 
incompleteness makes it possible for a highly formalized institution to 
accommodate change – more precisely, to accommodate the possibility 
of responding to change without sacrif icing its formal status’ (2007: 277). 
What characterizes the central crisis of citizenship and exclusion in South 
Asia, and what formally links Myanmar with the citizenship problematics 
of Bhutan, Nepal, and India, is that it seeks to create a citizenship that 
does not accommodate change – that speaks to an eternal and true and 
rightful nation. This is not to say that citizenship in Europe or elsewhere 
was premised on the f lexibility of the nation, or intended to expand to 
accommodate growing and diversifying populations. Rather, as Bénéï writes, 
citizenship ‘was from the outset an arena of contested meaning in two ways: 
contestation and competition from different groups within this arena, and 
the exclusion of others (women, subordinate nationalities, slaves, colonial 
subjects, the urban poor, the working class and the peasantry) altogether’ 
(2005: 3). The Rohingya crisis further binds Myanmar to South Asia. Not 
only has Myanmar historically referred to the Rohingya as ‘Bengali’, but 
Bangladesh has also taken in over 600,000 Rohingya refugees in the latest 
resurgence of the crisis in the fall of 2017.
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South Asia is also the origin point of the most long-standing, global, and 
evolving diasporic networks in the world.6 While India is the origin of the 
world’s largest diaspora, emigration from Bangladesh is truly pushing the 
notions of belonging and citizenship both in the region and globally. For at 
least two decades, Bangladesh has been one of the world’s leading exporters 
of people, sending an estimated 8.6 million migrants out into the world to 
date. Demographers now project that Bangladesh will send at least 15 million 
so-called climate refugees overseas by 2050. Even these numbers are mere 
guesses; there are no off icial data on irregular migration in the world today, 
and total climate refugee projections range from 50 to 200 million. Between 
1990 and 1995, Bangladesh sent 1.2 million migrants into the world, and 
these numbers more than doubled to some 3 million between 2005 and 
2010 – outstripping both China and Mexico by more than one million people 
during this same time period. Approximately half of these migrants made 
their way to the Persian Gulf, primarily to the UAE and Saudi Arabia, and 
more than 600,000 crossed over into neighbouring India. But during this 
same time, more than 280,000 Bangladeshis migrated to Southeast Asia, 
primarily to Malaysia, and nearly 230,000 landed in Europe – more than 
60,000 of whom settled in Italy.
Bangladeshi migrants have mostly been called, and treated as, economic 
migrants. But the lines between economic migrant and refugee are blurring: 
as many as half of the people fleeing the 2011 war in Libya who landed in a 
temporary refugee camp just inside the Tunisian border were Bangladeshi 
migrant workers. Their stories revealed the layered complexity of today’s 
migrants: many had signed with ‘brokers’ who promised contracts for oil 
f ield jobs in a liberalizing post-2007 Libya, only to f ind that the country had 
no legal infrastructure for guest workers, and that they had in fact become 
undocumented workers, were traff icked persons, and were now becoming 
refugees. Today, migrants from Bangladesh are largely unaccounted for, 
travelling increasingly dangerous and hidden pathways, often traff icked 
alongside refugees, and are facing greater violence and discrimination 
where they land, often as undocumented workers, in societies with spiking 
Islamophobia. Climate change will exacerbate these already desperate 
crossings; some 634 million people around the world are today at risk of 
6  Minal Hajratwala compiled these statistics about the Indian diaspora historically and 
today: http://minalhajratwala.com/writer/leaving-india/stats/. Gaiutra Bahadur’s Coolie Woman: 
The Odyssey of Indenture (2013) narrates a history of indentured servitude from India in what 
eventually became a diasporic community, a history whose roots and later diasporic branches 
have been powerfully animated in literature, most notably in Amitav Ghosh’s Sea of Poppies 
(2008). 
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rising sea levels (Greenfieldboyce 2007). And as more and more countries 
seek to combat terrorism through immigration policy and closed borders, 
more migrants will only face greater challenges to finding safe havens outside 
of their homelands. Although many countries will be affected by climate 
change, it is the resilience and reach of diasporic networks originating in 
the northeastern corner of South Asia that will push its populations across 
borders – and further out across the globe. That a signif icant percentage of 
this migrant population will comprise Muslim Bangladeshis in a world that 
is increasingly hostile to migrants – and doubly hostile to Muslim migrants – 
promises to pose ongoing challenges to the social and physical well-being of 
these migrants, as well as to the long-term development and stability of both 
the sending and receiving communities (Etzold and Mallick 2015; Kibria 2011).
The f irst stop in Bangladesh’s diasporic network is India. Labour and 
climate migrants from Bangladesh comprise just a part of the pool of people 
seeking to immigrate to India, both from its immediate neighbouring coun-
tries and from elsewhere in the world, and yet India continues to have no 
comprehensive or systematic way for people to immigrate legally.7 At the 
same time, Hindu nationalist leaders regularly make inflammatory public 
declarations that the country has been overrun by upwards of 20 million 
‘illegal inf iltrators’ from Bangladesh (The Hindu 2014). This claim is nearly 
impossible to verify, but of far greater concern is its potential for inciting ill 
will and even outright violence against Indian-born citizens who are Bengali, 
Muslim, or from marginalized tribal communities. Further, as workers in 
India continues to experience widespread slavery and labour exploitation; as 
certain caste-based and tribal communities continue to experience systemic 
marginalization; and as high rates of rural-urban and internal migration 
upend existing social structures and diversify once homogenous local 
communities, questions of inclusion and belonging will intensify (Singapur 
and Sreenivasa 2014).8 Such trends suggest not only that India will continue 
to grapple with ongoing questions about citizenship and belonging, but also, 
7  A 2014 report by the Migration Policy Institute offered several statistics on immigration into 
India from neighbouring countries through refuge, asylum, and labour migration, observing that 
India had no specif ic law to address refugees and asylum seekers arriving without documentation 
(who are many), and asserting that ‘India arguably has long served as a destination for economic 
migrants and refugees from neighbouring countries. Yet policymakers and Indian society have 
yet to address head-on challenges related to illegal immigration from Bangladesh.’ (Abbas and 
Varma 2014).
8  According to Walk Free’s Global Slavery Index, India is home to the majority of the world’s 
enslaved people, many of them native-born and legal citizens of India. Some eighteen million 
people live in conditions of modern slavery in India, according to the foundation’s 2016 index, 
which considers bonded labour, various forms of unregulated domestic work and child labour, 
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given India’s place as a global power, that India could function as a global 
influencer and amplif ier of the more destabilizing aspects of twenty-f irst 
century migration: the justif ication of restrictive immigration policies 
with Islamophobia, failure to respond to evolving migration realities, and 
exacerbation of the globalization of undocumentedness.
A Story of and from the Borderlands: Shyam Rai
Lauded the world over as the happiest place on earth, a benevolent Bud-
dhist kingdom above the clouds in the lush green mountains of the eastern 
Himalayas, Bhutan at the end of the twentieth century undertook a massive, 
three-decades-long ethnic cleansing effort to rid itself of the people they 
called Lhotshampa (‘southerners’), who at one time constituted one-sixth 
of the national population. Lhotshampa have existed in the land that lies 
in present-day Bhutan for generations, but they speak Nepali instead of 
Bhutanese and practice Hinduism, or in some cases Christianity, rather than 
Buddhism. They number among the peoples of South Asia who represent 
the liminal nature of identity and belonging in a region traversed by porous, 
shifting borders; governed by incomplete and incoherent citizenship laws; 
struggling to align national territories with complex linguistic, ethnic, and 
religious groupings; and grappling with both tremendous geopolitical pres-
sure from outside the region and epochal hypermobility within the region. 
Their stories are among many that can begin to shed light on the complex 
realities surrounding citizenship and inclusion in this part of the world.
Homeless and stateless, the Lhotshampa were not taken in by the nation 
they saw as their own. Nepal was already hosting a large Tibetan refugee 
population and struggling to put down the Maoist rebellion that eventu-
ally toppled its monarchy, so it declined to integrate the new arrivals and 
declared the Lhotshampa citizens of Bhutan. Instead of granting work 
permits or other avenues for making a new life, Nepal called in the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), who placed them in 
seven refugee camps – and then began a decades-long and repeatedly unsuc-
cessful effort to negotiate their return to Bhutan. Nepal’s unwillingness to 
expend resources to deal with this population offered one silver lining: no 
Nepalese military or law enforcement were installed to guard the camps, 
so the Lhotshampa were free to come and go.
commercial sex work, and forced begging types of enslavement: http://www.globalslaveryindex.
org/country/india/.
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When he was a teenager, Shyam Rai, whose story opened this chapter, 
began joining his fellow Lhotshampa in crossing over into India in search of 
work. Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and India are separated by a protuberance 
of mountainous, landlocked, multi-ethnic, and relatively impoverished 
Indian states like Sikkim and Assam, and although the border between 
Bhutan and India is strictly controlled (there is only one off icial overland 
opening into Bhutan in its 434-mile-long border with India), India and Nepal 
have had an open border treaty since 1950. In the years since this treaty, this 
part of Nepal has received Tibetan refugees following China’s annexation 
of Tibet in 1959, Nepalese returnees from Burma following the enactment 
of Burma’s restrictive 1964 Citizenship Act, ethnic Nepalese fleeing anti-
foreigner violence in India, migrant labourers from the Nepali hills and from 
India seeking opportunities created by Nepal’s 1964 Land Reform Act, the 
Lhotshampa throughout the 1990s, and a steady stream of refugees fleeing 
natural disaster from all sides. Although the open border treaties laid out 
trade specifications, none of them provided border management stipulations, 
according to geographer and scholar Vidya Bir Singh Kansakar (2001). She 
identif ied 22 off icial transit and customs points between the two countries, 
as well as several more sub-customs posts through which the so-called illegal 
(a more accurate word might be ungoverned or perhaps informal) movement 
of goods and people can happen with no more than an informal agreement 
between those who wish to cross and the transit post’s personnel.
Asked how they managed to navigate the border, Rai says that the soldiers 
at the Indian border checkpoints asked questions designed to intimidate or 
impel tribute much more than to verify one’s nationality or enforce a law. 
‘If you answered right, they just waved you through’, he says, and the right 
answer had more to do with posture and temperament, with diplomacy 
and f inesse, than with facts. ‘They would sometimes ask for [an] ID but 
we had none. I used to say I’m from Sikkim, my house is just over there.’ 
Then he would enter India, into a state that had remained an independent 
Buddhist monarchy until 1975, where Nepali was still the lingua franca, 
and where the locals looked and spoke and in many cases prayed like him. 
Other Lhotshampa would work in the terraced rice or cardamom estates, 
or as street vendors hawking snacks and crafts to the tourists, but Rai often 
worked on construction sites, sleeping in a tent in the corner of a muddy 
lot. ‘Sometimes when it came time to pay, they’d run off, and where were 
we to look, who were we to tell?’
A stateless person, a refugee, a migrant worker, and an unauthorized migrant, 
Rai accrued a stack of outsider statuses over the course of his 22 years in Nepal. 
He and his by now more than 100,000 compatriots spent those years hanging 
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in extended limbo, the peculiar state of forced suspended animation in which 
protracted displaced populations must abide, denied statehood, livelihood, 
and, in many ways, full personhood (Bird 2012). And yet, despite the years of 
exclusion, the lack of opportunity, and the outright rejection he faced in Nepal, 
he thinks of himself not as Lhotshampa, not as Bhutanese, but as Nepali.
He and several of his relatives were resettled in 2013 to the US, to Utica, 
a frostbitten post-industrial town in the northern reaches of New York 
State. For the f irst time in his adult life, he was a legal migrant with rights, 
included in the social and economic fabric around him. As soon as his visa 
was f inalized and he could travel internationally, he returned to Nepal and 
married a Nepali citizen. Chatting happily about his new bride and his plans 
to bring her to the US as soon as he was naturalized as a citizen (a process 
that could take an additional f ive years), he said that she was waiting back 
‘home’ in Kathmandu, ‘in my country’. Rai has in essence constructed an 
identity narrative in the spaces between nations, in which borders are 
irrelevant, citizenship is f limsy, and belonging occurs independent of 
political participation and policy-based infrastructures of incorporation 
and integration. While we may gain some insight into his identity from 
Benedict Anderson’s famous conception of the ‘imagined community’, Rai’s 
faith in his collective identity and his belonging to a mythic nation that 
exists as much in his imagination as in reality, what he really represents is 
identity formation as a coping mechanism and survival strategy. Certainly, 
his self-identif ication as Nepali can be understood as a ‘cultural artefact’ 
that is ‘“modular”, capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of 
self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains’ (Anderson 1991: 4), but 
it also reflects an act of will in the face of outright rejection and structural 
exclusion, both by his state of residence and the nation he claimed. His 
chosen nationality is unidirectional and unreciprocated. What profound 
impacts must such a protracted and extensive experience of exclusion have 
on him and, therefore, on all the communities in which he participates?
These are important and perhaps necessary explorations for this new 
century, but the objective of this story, and of this chapter, is not to discuss 
the intricacies of identity formation or the nature of nationalism today. 
Rather, it seeks to illuminate the many more complicated features of identity 
and belonging in an age of both hypermobility and globalized migration 
than had previously been conceptualized or currently accounted for. When 
nationality becomes untethered from place through migration (including 
displacement and refuge); when it is carried across multiple cultural and 
national borders; and when it is embedded in and compounded through 
global diasporic networks, then the structures surrounding migration, 
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incorporation, and citizenship take on far greater signif icance. If these 
structures are incoherent, incomplete, or limited, then the migrant excluded 
from them suffers. If they are further eroded by xenophobia and nationalist 
political rhetoric, then entire communities become out-groups and experi-
ence not only incoherent or contradictory statuses, but are viewed as illegal 
and illegitimate, even when there is no real pathway or structure for them 
to pursue legal immigration. And in this era of mass, global migration, this 
experience becomes multiplied, compounded, and globalized.
Today, as the anthropologist and Utica-based refugee rights advocate 
Kathryn Stam describes in a 2017 paper with human rights scholar Lindsey 
Kingston, Rai is an example of someone ‘recovering from statelessness’; he and 
his fellow resettled refugees who are attempting to make a life in an economi-
cally depressed town, must overcome the systemic, lifelong marginalization 
and coerced dependence they have experienced in order to independently 
and agentically navigate schools and workplaces, manage their homes and 
family needs, and participate in the communities surrounding them. As the 
resettled Bhutanese Nepali populations interact with the growing, often 
undocumented, labour migrant populations from Nepal, their differential 
experiences of inclusion and exclusion, of citizenship and statelessness, of 
emigration and displacement, of immigration and resettlement, of forced 
passivity and necessitated agency come into play, extending and manifesting 
the complex dynamics of identity narratives from the borderlands of South 
Asia in a wholly new terrain. In this story, we can observe the liminal identity 
in motion, nurtured in the face of trauma, rigid national boundaries, limited 
citizenship laws, multiple layers of migrant status, and global migration 
pathways. Rai’s story – and the broader Lhotshampa story – is emblematic 
of the complications surrounding citizenship and belonging in South Asia, 
where borders cross through landscapes in which physical borders simultane-
ously have little practical and heightened symbolic meaning.
Hypermobility and Hegemony: Nationalist Rhetoric and 
Migration Realities in Contemporary India
Migration is complicating the already complex picture of belonging and iden-
tity in India. In addition to rapid urbanization and the rural-urban migrant 
f lows it presupposes, migrant workers are crossing intra-state borders as 
construction or cyclical workers in regions that are linguistically and socially 
different from their own. At the same time, India continues to struggle with 
deep f issures between social groups of native-born citizens – from systemic 
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and recurring communal and caste violence to ongoing and widespread 
labour exploitation, traff icking, and slavery. Against this backdrop, new 
forms of international migration are complicating the already complex 
picture of mobility and social change. Not only have India’s eastern borders 
long been characterized by porousness and fluidity – refugees and stateless 
persons from Nepal and Bhutan regularly join tribal cyclical migrants and 
economic migrants from Bangladesh and Myanmar in moving relatively 
freely through the unmanned swathes of the region’s border –, but India does 
not appear to have a comprehensive policy to allow low- and middle-income 
people from the region to legally immigrate and access citizenship.
Indian political rhetoric has, as in many countries worldwide, tacked 
toward the nationalistic and xenophobic in recent years. Indian Prime 
Minister Narendra Modi rose to national power on a campaign that, like 
the successful right-wing campaigns sweeping Europe and the US, spoke 
to economic anxieties plaguing the country’s middle class in an era of 
widening inequality and increased costs of living, inflected with heavy 
notes of religious and ethnic nationalism – saffron-washing the complex 
Indian social landscape. Modi has a long and intimate association with 
Hindu nationalists and ultranationalist militants, and although he was 
off icially cleared of any role in inciting riots and violence against Muslims 
in the city of Ahmedabad during his term as the state of Gujarat’s chief 
minister in 2002, a genocide and subsequent pogrom did take place on his 
watch. He has never issued a public apology or publicly expressed any regret 
or remorse over these events. In fact, his campaign continued to appeal to 
anti-Muslim sentiments, taking security and xenophobia from the universal 
nationalism playbook, and many of the local and state-level aff iliates of his 
parties have openly made anti-Muslim declarations.
Kamal Sadiq writes that ‘Indian citizenship began on a civic note, as 
a regime of jus soli, but has evolved into a more exclusionary citizenship 
regime’ (2008: 9), detailing measures taken to restrict citizenship in response 
to circumstances such as the refugee crises unleashed during the war for 
Bangladeshi independence and the Sri Lankan civil war, or the growing and 
increasingly influential Indian diaspora. Observing that Indian citizenship 
has increasingly come to be viewed as ‘precious’, or as in some way under 
attack, he writes,
The curtailment of Indian citizenship by imposing restrictive residential 
requirement, narrowly defining ‘persons of Indian origin’ to ensure their 
‘Indian’ nationality, security the political rights of Indian citizenship from 
the claims of the diaspora – all reflect a growing anxiety on the part of the 
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Indian state toward new and old outsiders. It seems that the nation has to 
be protected from an ever-ready stream of illegal immigrants waiting to 
contaminate the fabric of Indian citizenship. Central to these concerns 
have been the elimination of claims to Indian citizenship by Bangladeshi 
and Pakistani nationals (or their descendants). (Sadiq 2008: 11)
He then goes on to demonstrate how, despite prohibitive f inancial and 
structural barriers to legal immigration and naturalization, and despite 
the fact that the very concept of citizenship arises from a determination to 
prevent cross-border migrants from neighbouring countries from accessing 
that citizenship, millions of what he calls ‘document-bearing’ migrants 
regularly access the privileges of citizenship in India by obtaining local or 
municipal documentation, such as a ration card (Sadiq 2008).
Andrea Cornwall and Vera Schattan Coelho begin with the premise that 
the central challenge of democratic societies is ‘building democratic polities 
where all can realize their rights and claim their citizenship’ (2007: 1, 272). 
What they are describing underlies what human rights scholars describe as 
the rights-based approach to development. India, a post-revolutionary state, 
guarantees its citizens many and elaborate rights, which many are prevented 
from accessing due to poverty, custom, ill health, lack of education, and the 
lack of local capacities to govern, implement, and enforce those rights. Much 
has been written on efforts to connect farmers, women, and children to 
property rights, reproductive justice, and schooling, respectively – to name 
just a few. But many of traditional rights are tied to a specif ic place, and 
in an age of tremendous mobility these rights become even more elusive.
According to the 2007-2008 national household survey, more than one 
third of all Indians were internal migrants (Ministry of Health and Family 
Welfare 2010). Despite their status as Indian citizens, internal migrants live, 
work, and move as undocumented and unauthorized migrants. A June 2013 
UNESCO report documents that many internal migrants do not have proof 
of identity, residency rights, political representation, or home ownership 
where they live and work. While some internal migrants are professionals, 
the overwhelming majority are poor and low-income workers in insecure 
or informal work, living in slums or informal settlements, vulnerable to 
traff icking, and excluded from accessing social services provided by the 
state government, such as public health and education services. Many face 
discrimination on the basis of race, language, ethnicity, or caste (Faetanini 
and Tankha 2013). While the Indian government’s national household survey 
identif ies some 80 per cent of the country’s internal migrants as women, 
Abbas and Varma write that labour-driven internal migration is primarily 
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undertaken by men; internal migration as a result of marriage or contracted 
employment is dominated by women. They identify the rural-urban divide 
and quest for livelihood as the primary engine of internal migration, and 
yet they report that about 19 per cent of the Indian population (some 
191 million people) reported migrating long distances to other districts or 
other Indian states, according to the 2001 census data (Abbas and Verma 
2014). Given that India functions as a confederacy, in which each state has 
its own off icial language, political parties, social service infrastructure, 
identif ication regime, and governance structure, internal migrants across 
state lines face many of the same challenges experienced by international 
migrants moving across national borders – at least those moving across 
the porous, less militarized international borders in the region. Further, 
according to Australia-based human rights organization Walk Free, India 
has the highest number of enslaved people in the world, at eighteen million 
(Global Slavery  Index 2016).
Thus we see that local structures in many ways supplant or bypass na-
tional structures of citizenship, and in doing so, puncture the national idea of 
citizenship. If citizenship has less to do with status and more to do with the 
accessibility of rights, then entangling complexities of legality and illegality, 
formality and informality, participation and belonging both unravel and 
bind the processes of incorporation and inclusion in day-to-day life.
Conclusion
Nearly every country on earth has ‘unauthorized’ immigrants. Certainly, 
countries with rapidly expanding economies and increasing rates of immi-
gration must grapple with how to develop and implement a migration policy 
regime. But unauthorized, unaccounted-for migration touches on deeper 
questions that lie beneath the administrative talk of visas and customs in 
a globalizing world. Many of the so-called middle-income countries – the 
powerhouse economies in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that are becoming 
immigration hubs – are surrounded by countries embroiled in conflict or 
economic collapse, struggling with poverty, staggering inequality, endemic 
violence, and massive internal migration. Many of these countries have high 
rates of slavery or traff icking, and some have recently experienced civil war 
or genocide. If even citizens by birth or naturalization can be considered 
outsiders, found fundamentally undeserving by some kind of unspoken 
consensus, what does it mean to have a right to be somewhere, to deserve 
to work somewhere, or to belong somewhere?
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Questions of citizenship, identity, and belonging affect immigrants 
and native-born populations alike in most countries. These questions 
are all the more heightened in countries facing growing inequality and 
massive internal migration prompted by endemic poverty, recurring 
violence, and ultra-rapid urbanization. While many scholars have argued 
that the US and Europe should take a different, less costly approach to 
migration – one that starts with the realities and challenges of the local 
community –, it is all the more imperative that countries with vastly 
different political, social, economic, and military concerns should do 
so. Such an approach might not necessarily lead to perfect solutions 
and whole, healthy, and well-integrated communities, but it would 
not criminalize migrants or make them vulnerable to discrimination, 
exploitation, traff icking, or enslavement. In fact, a growing body of 
evidence, most starkly laid out by Tara Brian and Frank Laczko, suggests 
that the over-securitization of migration – a disproportionate investment 
in border security over efforts to incorporate immigrants, policies that 
treat migration status violators as criminals, systems focused more on 
detaining and deporting these violators than on adjusting or reforming 
immigration policy, policies that punish undocumented migrants far 
more harshly than the people who traff ic or exploit them – has not 
only contributed to a proliferation of global traff icking networks, but 
has also directly correlated with a spike in migrant deaths in transit 
worldwide (Brian and Laczko 2014). Indeed, the US and EU have actively 
pursued a strategy of death-as-a-deterrent to unwanted migration, a 
perspective that if adopted globally would undoubtedly have grave 
humanitarian consequences.
India is not only on course to become the most populous country in the 
world; it is also on its way to becoming home to the world’s largest Muslim 
population. It is home to one of the world’s largest persistent and growing 
diasporas and is a democracy and the hegemon in a region struggling with 
ongoing political conflict, religious nationalism, poverty, and the effects 
of climate change. India is in every way global, globalized, and globalizing. 
How India responds to migration realities could not only have a lasting 
impact on its own social stability and economic potential, but its actions 
could also echo globally to stabilize or destabilize social interactions, and 
could influence policymaking on a grander scale. Perhaps now is not the 
moment for India to reproduce the paralysis, stagnation, and myopia that 
have characterized US and EU migration policymaking to date, but instead 
to lead and create a paradigm for citizenship in a complex, interconnected 
region in a global age.
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Abstract
This chapter draws from case studies of undocumented Bangladeshi 
women who are engaged in various informal-sector occupations in 
Maharashtra to highlight the multiple vulnerabilities and threats that 
they face due to both their status as undocumented migrants and their 
gender positioning in the informal labour market. Women in Bangladesh 
have long dealt with patriarchal institutions in all spheres of their lives. 
This, coupled with stubborn levels of poverty, the lack of adequate employ-
ment opportunities, and regressive migration policies for women, has 
led to the proliferation of hidden and parallel pathways for migration. 
While Bangladeshi men mostly migrate to countries in the Middle East 
and Southeast Asia, India remains one of the dominant destinations for 
undocumented Bangladeshi women. Using a mixed-methods approach, 
the chapter highlights the vulnerabilities and agency of Bangladeshi 
women in the face of extortive labour relations, weak gender positions, 
and socio-political vulnerabilities.
Keywords: undocumented migration, Maharashtra, informal sector, 
gender, labour
Introduction
Taslima, an 18-year-old widow from Satkhira, is one of the many Bangla-
deshi women struggling to eke out a living in India.1 After her husband 
died of stomach cancer merely two years into their marriage, she and 
1  All names have been changed to protect the identities of the participants.
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her one-year-old son were shunned by her in-laws. One of her relatives 
introduced her to a dalal (‘broker’), who promised her employment in 
Mumbai for a fee of about US$65. She now works as a labourer at a con-
struction site some 300 kilometres away from Mumbai making a little 
over US$70 per month. Although the work is strenuous, she says that she 
prefers it to scrubbing pots and pans in exchange for meals at a relative’s 
house in Bangladesh. Women like Taslima display agency in deciding 
to migrate for employment, given that their choices are limited by their 
geographical, social, and economic positioning. However, since their 
migration experiences do not f it into the statist conceptualizations of 
traff icked, coerced, or at-risk women, their vulnerabilities remain largely 
unaddressed within the migration paradigm.
Migration in South Asia follows gendered binaries: while most males 
are considered economic migrants, women are often seen as dependent 
migrants accompanying males – especially because of the prevalence of 
systems like virilocal marriage. The stereotypes of ‘exotic mail-order brides, 
docile domestic workers, and/or distressed refugees and sex workers’ typify 
the image of women migrants within this region (Joseph & Narendran 2013: 
12). Although fallacious, these views are often ref lected in the domestic 
and global policy spheres, making women prone to multiple vulnerabilities 
by pushing their experiences of mobility into liminal spaces. Countries in 
South Asia routinely exert control over women’s mobility through gendered 
access to migration channels, as Andrea Wright explains in the next chapter 
of this volume. This control particularly manifests in the case of poorer, 
illiterate, and younger women who are denied legal opportunities for 
employment through age, skill, and guardianship-related requirements 
for migration.
This chapter engages with the interaction between agency and vulner-
abilities among undocumented migrant women who move from Bangladesh 
to India. Through an exploration of the multiple ways women renegoti-
ate their positions within migration networks, labour markets, societal 
structures, and cultural formations in the course of their engagement with 
informal sector employment in India, I examine how constrained choices 
result in multiple forms of vulnerabilities among undocumented women 
migrant workers. These multi-layered vulnerabilities manifest in both 
overt and covert forms that limit further agency formation among women 
migrants. Thus, an empirical verif ication of agency and vulnerability among 
women migrants can provide valuable insights for rerouting the gender and 
migration debate from its narrow consideration of economic progress and 
situating it within the larger human development narrative.
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Eroding Agency
The question of agency is essential to understand how women negotiate their 
role in relation to larger structures that constrain them within patriarchal 
societies (Gammage et al, 2016). The scope of women’s agency is determined 
by the collective structures of the society like societal norms, patterns of 
rules, property rights, and their positioning within the broader framework 
of the society. Agency is understood by Amartya Sen as the ability to set and 
pursue one’s goals and interests. This is not limited to only improving one’s 
own well-being, but also includes the furthering of the well-being of others, 
respecting social and moral norms, acting upon personal commitments, 
and pursuing of a variety of values (Sen 1977). When women are reduced 
to mere ‘recipients’ of the migration process, it obscures the very action of 
women undertaking arduous journeys to unfamiliar destinations in search of 
work (Sen 1985). Thus, understanding women’s agency within the migration 
process requires a closer look at the specif ic motivations and constraints 
under which they act (Peter 2005).
For decades, women from the southwestern parts of Bangladesh, particu-
larly Satkhira and Jessore Districts, have been known to migrate to India for 
employment (Blanchet 2010: 345-353). Such movements, where passports and 
visas are not important, has established a flourishing network of migrants, 
employers, and dalals who recruit and employ Bangladeshis in various infor-
mal sector occupations (Hujo & Piper 2010). Despite its proactive migration 
policy, the Bangladeshi government does not acknowledge the movement of 
women across the porous border between India and Bangladesh. Moreover, 
the Indian government terms such movement as ‘inf iltration’ and portrays 
such migrants as ‘terrorists’ in populist discourse (Ramachandran 2002).
The meta-narrative on South Asian migration does not capture such 
f lows and counter-f lows of people across borders. For instance, the Bu-
reau of Manpower, Employment and Training (BMET), the Bangladeshi 
government agency in charge of registering and clearing labour migrants 
for overseas employment, estimates that between 1976 and 2016 a total of 
10.2 million economic migrants have gone abroad to work, bringing back 
almost US$162 billion in remittances (Bureau of Manpower, Employment 
and Training 2016a). However, women have always constituted a marginal 
proportion of the total migrants. Until 2003, they comprised merely 0.3 per 
cent of the total migrant population. Despite the successive introduction of 
aff irmative policies aiming to promote women’s migration, this proportion 
remained merely 4.7 per cent in 2015 (Bureau of Manpower, Employment 
and Training 2016b).
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The dismal number of Bangladeshi women in the off icial workforce 
is a ref lection of the policies that do not allow women under a certain 
threshold age to migrate, restrict them to certain sectors of employment, 
or require them to depend on male guardians. This restriction on women’s 
choice and mobility forces them to take risks to circumnavigate these 
restrictions – which in turn renders them invisible within the migration 
process. The thin line between agency and vulnerability is evident in the 
case of Bangladeshi migrant women in India.
The exclusion of women from democratic decision-making processes 
presents a curious paradox where the state contributes to furthering the 
vulnerabilities of the very ‘subjects’ that it seeks to protect (Peter 2005: 
29). Instead of making migration a secure and dignif ied experience, such 
policies increase the vulnerabilities associated with the migration of women, 
as they are forced to use hazardous and undocumented channels to access 
employment opportunities abroad.
Invisibility and Vulnerability
It is rather diff icult to distinctly identify an individual as a Bangladeshi 
migrant in India. This study was conducted among 46 Bangladeshis 
employed in various informal sector activities – like construction work, 
f ish- and meatpacking, and domestic work – in two urban and peri-urban 
regions of the western Indian state of Maharashtra. Since Bangladeshis are 
linguistically and ethnically similar to migrants from the eastern Indian 
state of West Bengal, it is often diff icult to distinguish between them. For 
this reason, it is relatively easier for Bangladeshi migrants to assimilate and 
hide their identities in India. They remain concealed even in plain sight, 
unlike the organized Bangladeshi protestors of Antwerp described in the 
chapter by Malini Sur and Masja van Meeteren in this volume. Women 
from Bangladesh often adopt simple but effective measures to do this, such 
as taking up Hindu-sounding names or applying sindoor (‘the vermilion 
mark worn by married Hindu women’) in the parting of their hair. Even 
when they choose to retain their religious identities, they can easily pass 
for migrants from West Bengal, which has an almost 27 per cent Muslim 
population (Registrar General of India 2011).
These barriers to the identif ication of Bangladeshis among similar 
ethnic and linguistic populations necessitated the use of innovative 
methodologies. I contacted labour suppliers at both sites in Maharashtra, 
who then identif ied two individuals who were also dalals. It was primarily 
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the dalals who introduced me to the Bangladeshi migrants. After this 
initial contact, further interviews were conducted during the course of 
repeated interactions over a period of three months from June to October 
of 2014. All these interviews were conducted in absence of the dalals. 
These meetings often began in the evening after the migrants returned 
from work and continued late in the night. Although there were several 
hitches in the initial days with exaggerated rumours by the contractor about 
dangers of talking to me, the participants placed their trust in me little 
by little over conversations about their village and life at the destination. 
My position as a Bengali speaking woman whose grandparents had ties to 
Dhaka before the partition of India in 1947 also allowed some leeway. This 
enabled the participants to engage with me in-depth and allowed them to 
place their trust in the research. Although this study initially attempted to 
concentrate only on women migrants, it was diff icult to single them out 
since women are generally located in occupations like domestic work and 
the care industry that limit their visibility in the social sphere. Ignorance 
of local customs and languages at the destination also impedes women’s 
visibility, forcing many women to limit their interactions outside their 
spaces of work. Thus, out of the total 46 workers, only 20 (43 per cent) were 
women. Although men also face similar linguistic and cultural barriers, it 
is easier for them to become a part of their destination societies, as they are 
located in sectors that often demand greater social contact. Thus, although 
their mobility is also monitored, men are easier to locate than women at 
the migration destinations.
A majority (96 per cent) of the migrants from Bangladesh practiced 
Islam. Nine of the migrant women (almost 45 per cent) were less than 
25 years of age, and nearly thirteen (approximately 66 per cent) of them 
had not completed primary education. Fifteen (nearly 74 per cent) of 
the migrant women were married. Although national-level statistics 
reveals that almost 12.5 per cent of the households in Bangladesh are 
headed by a female, the proportion of such women in the present sample 
was around 9 per cent (World Bank, 2016). Female heads of households 
are particularly vulnerable; many of them are divorced, separated, or 
deserted by their partners and therefore dependent on male relatives or 
outsiders to assist them with the migration processes. Since Bangladesh 
mandates that a male guardian should accompany female migrants, 
this increases their vulnerability both during and after migration; in 
the absence of spouses or other males from their families, women can 
be victimized or duped into fake marriages by dalals or traff icked into 
bonded labour and/or prostitution.
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Women, Work, and State Policies
International migration from Bangladesh for work is a colonial phenomenon 
that continued even after the creation of East Pakistan. However, in the early 
years after Partition most of these migration routes were male-dominated 
and directed towards industrialized countries in the West. This phase was 
largely characterized by settler migrants (Sikder 2008). In contrast, the 
current phase of migration has drawn unskilled and semi-skilled workers 
to Middle Eastern countries as temporary migrants. The oil boom in the 
Gulf fuelled increases in the demand for labour, which was supplied by 
labour-surplus economies like Bangladesh and India.
Record keeping on this migration flow to the Middle East began only in 
1978, after the independence of Bangladesh (Bureau of Manpower, Employ-
ment and Training 2016b). Women, however, remained unaccounted for in 
mainstream migration data until 1991. This is particularly problematic since 
women are more likely to represent short distance migration flows owing to 
factors like proximity, cultural and linguistic similarity, and ease of f inding 
flexible employment at the destination (Asis 2003). Although Bangladeshi 
women might have gained access to certain migration channels in the early 
years of independence, a Presidential Order in 1981 barred semi-skilled and 
unskilled women from migrating alone to protect their dignity, following the 
demands of the Bangladeshi association of migrant workers in Kuwait. This 
was replaced with restrictions on the migration of unskilled and semi-skilled 
women workers in 1988, but exceptions were allowed in selected cases. In 
1997, a blanket ban on the migration of women across all skill categories, 
except for highly skilled professionals like doctors, engineers, and teachers, 
was instated in the name of protecting women’s dignity, but was lifted in 
December of the same year amidst heavy protests. It was argued that such 
policies were counter-intuitive to women’s protection and development, 
and were unconstitutional and discriminatory in nature (Siddiqui 2001).
Although unskilled and semi-skilled migrants account for nearly 90 per 
cent of Bangladeshi women migrants, the government has continued to 
impose skill-based bans on the migration of women (Islam n.d.). In 2003, 
the Ministry of Expatriates’ Welfare and Overseas Employment allowed 
semi-skilled and unskilled women above 35 years of age to migrate – but 
only after the agency recruiting them paid BDT f ive million (US$70,850) as 
a security deposit to the government (Migrant Forum Asia 2014). Human 
Rights Watch observes that, although Bangladeshi migrant women are 
legally required to pay up to BDT 20,000 (US$259) to the recruiter, in reality 
they often paid almost f ive times the amount (Human Rights Watch 2016). 
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This overcharging makes the cost of legal migration from Bangladesh one 
of the highest in South Asia.
In recent years, the Government of Bangladesh has tried to correct the 
existing gender biases in the labour market. Continuing the corrective 
measures started in 2003, the Employment Act of 2011 reduced the age 
requirement for unskilled and semi-skilled women migrants to 25 years. 
However, remaining regressive clauses such as the requirement for an 
accompanying male guardian and continued skill-based bans on domestic 
workers are counterproductive for the integration of women migrants. The 
failure of state policies to recognize women as signif icant actors in the 
migration process has resulted in the burgeoning of a number of parallel 
irregular forms of migration. In fact, policies that seek to securitize borders 
and increase the burden of the ‘illegality tax’ on migrant populations without 
reflecting on structural problems at the origin or persistent inequalities 
in income levels often fail to curb irregular migration, as seen in the case 
of Bangladesh.2
The presence of large and porous borders and a shared colonial history 
and religious, linguistic, and ethnic spaces has made South Asia one of the 
major hotspots for undocumented migration in the world today. According 
to the 2001 Indian Census, Bangladeshis comprised almost 61 per cent of the 
total foreign population in India (Registrar General of India 2011). Although 
the number of additional migrants from Bangladesh to India has been 
decreasing since 1981, the long-established and thriving social network in 
India has been utilized by a steady stream of undocumented migrants in 
search of economic opportunities. Although the dominance of India as a 
destination for Bangladeshi women has steadily declined from 89 per cent 
in 1990 to 61 per cent in 2015, global data indicates that it still is the single 
largest destination for Bangladeshi women.3
India is the preferred choice for women migrating from Bangladesh 
(Blanchet 2010). The perceived abundance of work opportunities in urban 
India is one of the main pull factors for migrant labourers from borderland 
areas of Bangladesh (Kabeer 2007: 1). In India, most of the Bangladeshi 
migrants had initially clustered in the border regions, mainly in West 
2  The illegality tax imposes the costs of migration on the employer recruiting migrants 
(Todaro & Maruszko 1987).
3  According to statistics from United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs 
(UNDESA), out of 260,000 women migrants from Bangladesh, 150,000 were in India in 2013. 
Although this proportion has seen a considerable decline since 1990, it remains substantial 
(United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2015).
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Bengal, Tripura, and Assam.4 This has resulted in the escalation of conflicts 
between the local and migrant populations (Weiner 2015, Cǒt̕e & Mitchell 
2017). In due course of time many of them migrated to urban centres like 
Delhi and Mumbai in pursuit of higher potential earnings. This path has 
been established over the years as a favoured destination for migration 
by many irregular Bangladeshi workers who easily f ind employment in 
the huge informal economy in India. They are absorbed into the labour 
market due to their malleability and flexibility, willingness to work longer 
hours at cheaper rates than locals, and inability to unionize or organize 
(Joseph & Narendran 2013). The vulnerabilities of the migrant women are 
multiplied when they seek to enter their work destinations without valid 
work permits, passports, or other documents and rely on extortive dalals or 
social networks for support (Hamada 2012). The lack of agency of Bangladeshi 
women relegates them to an inferior position even while they bargain for 
entry into the labour market in India.
Naila Kabeer notes that Bangladeshi women are often concentrated in 
informal-sector jobs like domestic work, rag picking, the garment industry, 
dance bars, and other entertainment-related occupations (Kabeer 2007). 
These sectors are typified by conditions of flexible specialization, organizing 
through sub-contracting, sweatshops, and home-based production systems; 
workers often do not fall under the purview of state regulations making 
them vulnerable and insecure in their occupations by not allowing them 
job and income security, inhibiting skill reproduction, and weakening their 
representation in the labour market (Chen 2012: 1). This has led to increasing 
casualization and contractualization, a rise in self-employment and home-
based activities, and the feminization of this labour force (Hensman 2011). 
When poor women enter such exploitative institutions, they usually have 
to depend on their physical labour to meet survival requirements. They are 
seldom offered the freedom to negotiate a price for their labour, or to opt 
out of the market if their desired wages are unmet. Instead, their inability to 
generate sufficient investible surplus keeps them locked in ‘inequality traps’ 
(Kabeer 2012). The presence of such inequality traps fragments the labour 
market, which are managed and f illed by cheap and docile undocumented 
women workers.
4  Various studies have highlighted the presence of Bangladeshi migrants in the Northeastern 
Indian states of Assam and Tripura and the eastern state of West Bengal. Assam and Tripura 
have also seen severe violence due to the influx of Muslim Bangladeshis popularly termed as 
the ‘sons of soil’ conflict (Weiner 2015, Cǒt̕e & Mitchell 2017).
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Migrant women often face ‘double segregation’ at their destination, as 
they are concentrated into more feminized jobs than either male migrants 
or local women, sedimenting them into the lowest rungs of the local labour 
market (Benería, Deere, & Kabeer 2012). This marginalization and invis-
ibility within the informal sector further brings in a range of stratif ied 
occupational categories which makes them work in dirty, dangerous, and 
demeaning jobs that critically accentuate the vulnerabilities faced by them. 
Migrant Bangladeshi women, thus, do not only face vulnerability in the 
process of migration, which renders them invisible; they are also rendered 
vulnerable at their destination, where they become ‘illegal’ alien workers. For 
undocumented migrant women, such vulnerabilities are mainly character-
ized by low and uncertain wages, long working hours, deplorable working 
conditions, the risk of sexually transmitted diseases, sexual harassment, 
physical and mental abuse, and susceptibility to human traff icking. The 
constant ‘race to the bottom’ in the economic, social, and political lives of 
undocumented migrants makes them one of the most vulnerable sections 
in the Indian labour force.
Disaggregating Vulnerabilities
Economic migration can be a harrowing experience for the poor. Studies 
have established that migration can have both oppressive and liberating 
consequences (Piore 1979, Deshingkar 2017). The present discourse around 
migration and development, however, exonerates the process of migration 
from any negative consequences through a myopic focus on its development 
potential (de Haas 2012). Women experience migration differently than 
men. While economic reasons predominate men’s migration decisions, 
for women, migration not only represents a way to escape poverty, but 
also implies economic empowerment, strengthened family incomes, and 
durable assets for the future (Siddiqui 2001). While men often f ind it easier 
to access legal and formal migration channels due to their relatively higher 
levels of social and human capital, women are often forced to depend on 
informal and circuitous routes due to limited human capital, low skill levels, 
and inability to cover the high costs of legal migration. Such problems are 
routine experiences for many undocumented women migrants, but the 
lack of institutional support means that most of these poor women have 
to fend for themselves in an alien environment. This section highlights the 
economic and non-economic vulnerabilities associated with migration by 
undocumented women.
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Economic Consequences
When policies do not recognize that women’s migration also has 
economic potential, they leave women to fend for themselves. With 
the ushering in of global commodity chains, women have increasingly 
been sought by the global labour market as productive and economic 
agents. However, many women are unaware of the consequences of 
migration. They rely on the stories from return migrants or dalals to 
form a picture of their destination societies. They hope to access better 
income opportunities, higher possibilities of savings, and make initial 
capital accumulation for asset building. These were also the main reasons 
for migration among sixteen women (78 per cent) of the present sample. 
Most of the women among the sample population expected migration 
to ease their f inancial diff iculties and provide higher and more stable 
incomes. Aspirations of being able to open their own businesses, build 
a house, save up for relatives’ marriages, or provide better lifestyles for 
their children were some of the major reasons for migration. Women 
also aspired to signif icantly contribute to the economic and f inancial 
security of their households, even in cases where women were associa-
tional migrants. Often the high costs of social reproduction in urban 
areas and aspirations of providing durable human and capital assets for 
their children were the underlying reasons for women’s entry into the 
informal labour force. Thus, for many women, even if migration across 
the border is a ‘forced choice’, it becomes one of the primary ways of 
ensuring a ‘positive opportunity to save, accumulate capital, or invest 
in assets’ (Mosse et al. 2002).
However, when such migration opportunities are accessed with incom-
plete or false information, women become susceptible to the various threats 
that are embedded within the process of undocumented migration. Return 
migrants and dalals tend to glorify the experience of migration by selectively 
narrating success stories. Women are often led on by false hope of a better 
life created by recruiting agents, or fall prey to the glitter of city lights. 
Sanara, a 28-year-old construction worker, stated:
I was led to believe that all my requirements would be taken care of 
in Mumbai. However, here I am only given bhaat-kapor [‘maintenance 
money’] on a weekly basis. I know my Seth [‘employer’] will only be able to 
pay me my wages after we f inish this slab, which will take at least f ifteen 
more days. My family back home needs money for a medical emergency. 
I don’t know what to do. This is only the curse of my fate.
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The jobs available to undocumented migrant women in urban India are 
mainly in the informal sector, where women often take up reproductive roles 
associated with caring and nurturing, or work as cheap labour in the manu-
facturing sector, where their work is characterized by neglect, violence, and 
the progressive erosion of labour rights (Arya & Roy 2006: 22). The marginal 
position of women in the stratified labour force is also reflected in the present 
sample, where seven women were found to be concentrated in construction 
(30 per cent), domestic work (30 per cent) and fish- and meatpacking (30 per 
cent) each, and two women in self-employment (9 per cent). Their working 
conditions and work-related vulnerabilities varied between the different 
occupations. While self-employed women were found to be significantly better 
off than others, with a mean income of INR 14,890 (US$230) per month, women 
employed in the construction sector earned the least, at INR 5800 (US$89) per 
month. Domestic workers earned almost INR 7800 (US$120) per month; women 
engaged in food packaging earned INR 8350 (US$128) per month. The stark 
inequalities in remuneration across the different sectors are a reflection of 
the ease of access to and gendered division of work in each occupation. While 
self-employment is obviously the most remunerative, it requires a strong base 
of financial and social capital, which might not be accessible to poor women. 
Packaging and domestic work largely draw on women’s labour because of their 
gender-differentiated requirements. While the ‘nimble fingers’5 debate (Elson 
1996, Crowley 2013) dominates the packaging industries, domestic work has 
largely been the domain of female workers. Women are also incorporated as 
secondary, cheap workers in the largely male construction sector, making it 
difficult for women to access skills training and higher wages.
During my research, I encountered evidence of gendered economic and 
non-economic coercion in the informal labour market in Maharashtra. It 
was found that women worked longer hours than men on average, with 
less time for breaks. The f lexible working hours for women engaged in 
domestic work are a reflection of their lack of control over their working 
lives. Razia, a domestic worker in Navi, Mumbai, examined her work life 
as follows: ‘Where will I go if I do not go to work when they [my employers] 
want me to work? I start work at 6 AM every morning and I am generally 
done by 2 PM. My mornings are extremely busy as I have to f inish work 
before my employer leaves for her work at 9 AM. I cook for my family only 
after I come back from work.’
5  The nimble f ingers debate refers to the docility of women and child workers especially in 
labour intensive occupations that require higher speed, greater attention to details and patience 
for monotonous jobs (Crowley 2013). 
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Among the participant sample, it was observed that domestic workers 
had the longest and the most f lexible work schedules, but they often have 
to be tweaked to suit the needs of their employers. Fifty-eight per cent of 
the domestic workers reported that they worked for more than eight hours 
per day without any signif icant breaks. It was relatively easier for women 
engaged in the construction and packaging sectors to anticipate their 
work routines, and they had f ixed lunch and refreshment breaks. Women 
in the packaging sector generally worked in eight-hour shifts in the early 
morning, afternoon, or night – but they had to agree to work during any 
of the shifts. The majority of women construction workers (94 per cent) 
worked for less than eight hours at f ixed times during the day, and also 
had an assured break of one hour for lunch and rest. The regularity of the 
work schedules in the construction sector is a ref lection of the stronger 
bargaining position that male workers have vis-à-vis women workers, 
while women-dominated sectors like domestic work have no f ixed hours 
for work and breaks.
Women-dominated sectors are also prone to drudgery, low skill 
enhancement, limited bargaining capacities, and fewer social security 
provisions. Since informal sector jobs are based on loose contracts, 
low protection from exploitation, insecure employment conditions, 
and limited upward mobility, women often are caught in vulnerable 
positions. In the sample population, most women workers (79 per cent) 
had a verbal contract with their employer. However, these contracts are 
only used to demarcate the duties of the workers and provide no scope for 
bargaining for their rights in the workplace. At least 19 per cent of all the 
sampled workers had no contract at all. None of the Bangladeshi migrant 
women had access to any written documentation of their employment 
contracts, making them particularly susceptible to malpractice by their 
employers, such as paying lower wages than agreed, or working odd and 
long hours. The lack of labour market security also extends to unpaid 
overtime, a lack of perks in the workplace, and an overall lack of control 
of their working lives. Out of the total sample population, only 28.3 per 
cent of the workers had received overtime payments. Most women had 
no control over deciding their wages or work schedule. In 34 per cent 
of the cases, the employer decided the wages; another 34 per cent used 
existing market information to determine how much to ask for. Women’s 
wages in the industrial sector were generally f ixed by the recruiting 
agents, and they were compelled to work at the given wages without 
any opportunity to bargain. Shanti, the recruiting agent for f isheries, 
explained:
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I make sure my girls are paid well. Girls working for packaging are given 
INR 6500 (US$95) monthly and for grading they receive INR 7500 (US$110). 
I have made sure that my girls also get paid overtime at the rate of INR 20 
(US$0.29) per hour. They are also given two pairs of dresses and hairnets 
by the company annually. After every ten months of work, the company 
pays them a month’s salary as bonus without doing any work so that they 
can go home. It also provides train tickets for the journey.
Her words, meant to portray the f irm’s benevolence, in fact bring out the 
politics of the industry and how the companies circumvent legal require-
ments to keep workers entrenched in informal work conditions by refusing 
to list them on their payrolls for more than ten months at a time – the 
period required by law to start providing social and employment benefits 
like provident funds, insurance, and gratuity.
In addition, undocumented migrant women workers often lack oppor-
tunities for collectivization and unionization because local labour unions 
rarely support their cause. This lack of access to basic labour rights often 
snowballs into other disenfranchisements, such as the lack of a proper 
savings mechanism, overt reliance on employers for health and other 
social benef its, and a lack of access to secure remittance channels that 
makes women depend on untrustworthy middlemen or social networks. 
Weak remittance mechanisms and hawala6 (‘transfer of funds through 
informal channel’) transactions remain the primary ways migrants remit 
their incomes. Since this process involves signif icant fees, many migrants 
among the sample population preferred to remit lump sum amounts at 
once, which makes them susceptible to larger losses if the transaction is 
not successful. Among the sample population, women migrants showed 
a greater propensity to save than their male counterparts. Women were 
also more likely to invest their savings in creating additional human 
capital and providing for their daily consumption expenditures than male 
migrants were.
Migrant women are often subjected to the whims and fancies of their 
employers who seek the feeblest excuses to discipline them. Arbitrary 
deductions in wages or non-receipt of payment are some of the biggest 
threats. Shabana, for example, was promised INR 300 (US$4.50) for every 
6  The hawala system of transfer of remittances from one country to another involves the 
migrant paying in one currency to an agent at the destination, which is paid to the intended 
beneficiary at the origin in the local currency by another agent. This transaction occurs informally 
and some scholars have termed it as money laundering. (Doherty et al, 2014).
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twelve hours she worked. However, she was paid only INR 7000 (US$103) 
at the end of the month; her employer told her that she had exceeded the 
allotted 30 minutes for breaks and therefore her wages had been cut. For 
many migrant women, the threat of arbitrary dismissal is an effective 
deterrent towards unionization or raising their voice against injustices 
at work. It also prohibits them from seeking wage advancements, as they 
cannot break the gender-differentiated ceiling of the wages at their 
workplace. For example, Fatima had been working for the same employer 
for the last three years, but her daily wage had only increased from INR 
100 (US$1.50) to INR 250 (US$3.70). Her husband’s daily wage increased 
threefold during the same period, from INR 200 (US$3) to INR 600 (US$9). 
Since no Maharashtrian trade union takes up the cause of undocumented 
immigrants, they become invisible workers and their grievances often 
remain unheard or are presented from the employers’ perspective where 
they are portrayed as ‘inf iltrators and criminals’ who come here to ‘loot’ 
the Indian economy.
Social Consequences
Migration results in overwhelming changes in the life worlds of migrants and 
exposes them to different realities through uprooting them from the social 
and structural ties of traditional society (Gardner 2009). The experience of 
migration also alters their perception of selfhood through entry into the 
workforce. Thus, migration brings not only economic vulnerabilities but also 
changes in the personal, social, cultural, and political aspects of migrants’ 
lives. Migration is, for example, the f irst time many women undertake 
paid work. The continued dominance of patriarchal beliefs in Bangladesh 
ensures that women’s participation in paid employment is frowned upon 
and considered a sign of the inability of a husband to provide for his wife 
(Blanchet 2010). When women undertake paid employment at far-away 
destinations, families can absolve themselves of any stigma that would 
normally be associated with using the income of female members of the 
households. This changes not only the intrinsic self-worth of women, but 
also their social and inter-personal interactions. This is evident from the 
words of Ruksana, a domestic worker, who stated:
I never thought I would be in Mumbai ever in my life. Here I go out to 
work and sometimes earn more than my husband [who is a construction 
worker]. He often cooks for me when I am too tired from my work. He 
would never have done this in the village.
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Among the participants in the present study, only 31 per cent of the women 
had work experience in domestic work, brick kilns, readymade garments, 
or agriculture before migrating to India. Even among these previously 
employed women, migration to Maharashtra denoted a greater and rela-
tively more regular source of earnings than was available in Bangladesh. 
Arshiya, a 19-year-old widow, recounted her economic condition after 
the death of her husband to me. With her mother-in-law refusing to feed 
her and her one-month-old son, she was employed as domestic help in 
her husband’s uncle’s house. She found this arrangement coercive and 
demeaning since she was bound by familial relationships and could not 
complain about lost wages or inconsiderate behaviour from her husband’s 
relatives. She says that she took that work because there was no other 
way to feed herself and her son. Although her job at a construction site in 
Maharashtra involved strenuous work, she felt that she enjoyed a greater 
degree of freedom and was much more in control of her life than she had 
been in Bangladesh.
Migration also brings about changes in the attitudes of migrants 
as they are exposed to new traditions and cultures. This is especially 
evident in the case of women migrants who have no previous experience 
of migration. For example, Fatima lived with her husband and three 
other young men from her village at the construction site where they 
worked. Since the other men did not have their families with them, she 
cooked for everybody for a small fee. She often rode pillion on her Seth’s 
(‘employer’s’) motorcycle to reach other sites for work, and she stated 
that her husband would probably not have allowed her to behave so 
freely in their village.
Migration affects the interaction between the individual and society 
in the most fundamental ways. A widely reported consequence of migra-
tion among the participants of this study was the sense of ‘not-belonging’. 
Migrant women are often forced into seclusion to make them invisible 
at their destinations. Such practices ensure their anonymity and keep 
them hidden, but also lead to signif icant risks as they are enforced through 
slave-like conditions and exclusion. For example, the women working in the 
packaging industry were provided with hostel facilities by their employers 
within the premises of the factory. They were accommodated in bunk beds 
in a big room and had access to free food and television in their spare time. 
However, they were not permitted to leave the factory premises except for 
two hours every week or in extreme emergencies. The recruiting agent 
ensured that all of the women complied with this rule, supposedly to keep 
them ‘safe’ at the destination.
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The sense of loneliness was strong among most of the women workers 
who migrated alone or without their families. This is evident in the case of 
Khatiba, a 24-year-old worker in the packaging industry who was away from 
her husband and children for the f irst time in her life. She was constantly 
anxious about the well-being of her family back in the village, but knew that 
worrying about them would not help. She instead chose to concentrate on her 
work and count the days until she could meet them again. For her, talking 
over the phone with her f ive-year-old son did not provide much comfort.
Although with the use of telephones migrants can regularly keep in 
touch with their natal and marital homes in Bangladesh, the sense of being 
away overpowers many. One migrant woman, for example, had to quit her 
employment in Maharashtra because she could not stay away from her 
daughter. Since most jobs in the informal sector do not provide crèches 
or other facilities for children, most women migrants have to leave their 
children back home. For undocumented Bangladeshi migrants, bringing 
their children would mean giving up on their education; admission in Indian 
schools requires a certif icate of birth in India or legal migration papers. Since 
these cannot be arranged for, children often grow up with their grandparents 
or other relatives in Bangladesh while the migrant couple or women remit 
money from abroad. Migration increases the distances between people 
and spaces. Most migrants cannot attend to sudden illnesses or deaths 
in their families in the villages. When Fatima, a construction site worker, 
learned that her mother-in-law had been diagnosed with cancer, she and 
her husband were unable to go back to the village until they managed to 
save BDT 150,000 (US$1900) to repay their debts taken there.
Most migrants are bereft of social lives such as those they enjoyed in their 
villages. Moreover, with exclusionary living conditions at their destination, 
they are barred from social interactions even in the destination societies. 
During the course of data collection, many participants in the study reported 
that they felt happy to talk to someone in Bengali in bidesh (‘the foreign land’).
Cultural Consequences
Linguistic and religious barriers are two of the main problems faced by 
migrant women. Most migrants from West Bengal and Bangladesh do not 
speak the local languages of the destination regions, and this becomes 
an additional factor in their exclusion there. Surekha, a domestic worker, 
previously lived in the southern Indian state of Andhra Pradesh. She recalled 
her initial diff iculties in communication: she was often left alone without 
the ability to have a conversation with anyone after her husband went to 
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work. By the end of her two-year stint in Andhra Pradesh, she had picked 
up some words because, as she put it, ‘it is impossible to survive otherwise’.
Most migrants also feel bereft of their religious practice. Since women are 
not allowed to enter mosques in Bangladesh, it does not generally bother 
them to live in remote locations where there are no mosques. However, 
many employers in Maharashtra are Hindu, and it is diff icult for them to 
practice Islam like they would at home due to the long working hours and 
the strenuous nature of their work. For example, none of the Muslim migrant 
women I interviewed were able to fast during the month of Ramadan, as 
doing so would make it diff icult to work. While most employers understood 
that Ramadan Eid (Eid-al-Fitr) and Bakri Eid (Eid-al-Adha), the two main 
Muslim festivals, had to be declared holidays, this in turn meant that they 
had to work on most of the Hindu holidays.
Political Consequences
The presence of a strong anti-migrant lobby in Maharashtra makes un-
documented migrants vulnerable in the political sphere. The refrain of 
‘inf iltrators’ and ‘terrorists’ used to refer to any Bengali-speaking Muslim 
often makes it imperative for Bangladeshis to hide their political views 
and become excluded politically (Rai 2014). In Maharashtra, according 
to a newspaper report, ‘any Bengali speaking Muslim is believed to be a 
Bangladeshi infiltrator’ (Vijapurkar 2016). This discourse about ‘infiltrators’ 
was brought to a different level altogether when the Chief Electoral Off icer 
of the state declared that Mumbai hosted 40,000 Bangladeshis – a number 
arrived at by looking at the number of people in Mumbai who failed to 
provide documents that could prove them to be Indian. Vijapurkar terms 
this a ‘tragicomic instance’ of the role of media (Vijapurkar 2016).
In the context of this ongoing diatribe against Bangladeshis, many of the 
recent migrants have managed to obtain original Aadhar cards by paying 
agents a fee of about INR 2000 (US$29).7 They understand that Aadhar is not 
the proof of citizenship, but it does still provide a documentary evidence of 
‘Indianness’. On the other hand, there are Bangladeshi migrant workers living 
in urban Maharashtra for more than 30 years without any documentary 
evidence of their citizenship in India. Although they claim that they are as 
Indian as anyone else, this lack of documentation makes them vulnerable 
to threats of arbitrary imprisonment and deportation.
7  Aadhar cards provide a unique identif ication number to their holders and link them with 
many social security provisions provided by the Indian government. 
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Conclusion
The working and living conditions of Bangladeshi women in India reveal 
that undocumented migration is a double-edged sword. While they become 
economically independent and are able to successfully contribute to the 
economic requirements of their households, they often also take on far greater 
risks than male migrants do. The vulnerabilities that women migrants face 
both in Bangladesh and India attest to strategies of state where the labour-
ing rights of individuals are overshadowed by the state’s concerns about 
legitimacy and border control. Developing countries like Bangladesh seek 
to create a niche for themselves in the global commodity chain as a source 
of cheap labour resources through migration, but at the same time coercive 
controls over women’s mobility do not allow women to access migration op-
portunities. This leads to conditions where the destination economies benefit 
from ‘the comparative advantage of women’s disadvantage’ (Pagaduan 2006).
As vulnerabilities are interspersed throughout the migration process, 
women migrants face a breakdown of their freedom of agency at multiple 
levels. Christine Koggel argues that women’s agency is vital not only for 
improving their economic and social positions, but also for challenging the 
embedded, patriarchal social values and practices that support long-term 
gender biases in the social sphere (2007). In the present era of globalization, 
undocumented women migrants comprise one of the numerous vulnerable 
social groups whose economic integration is predicated on their willing-
ness to forego a spectrum of socio-political and cultural rights. The role of 
the state in furthering this vulnerability is especially signif icant because 
its myopic vision of women’s ‘safety’ makes migration a highly gendered 
experience at both the origin and destination points.
Women’s agency in migration can be understood as a series of intercon-
nected threshold capabilities that reduce the gender gaps at both the societal 
and state levels to allow women to determine and choose which capabilities 
remain central to them. This can be achieved through overarching changes 
in the marginal position of women in accessing property rights, the gendered 
division of labour within the household, and the influences of patriarchy at 
both the origin and destination, all of which contribute to limiting women’s 
freedoms and capabilities. When such divisions are also upheld and reflected 
by political and economic institutions, they provide the starting point for 
injustice and limit valuable functions that would have been accessible to 
women otherwise. Women’s migration can be seen as a process that not 
only provides economic freedoms, but also strengthens women’s political, 
social, and cultural freedoms.
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Abstract
This chapter draws on ethnographic and archival research conducted 
in the United Arab Emirates and India to investigate how the Indian 
government developed and implemented emigration policies. The chapter 
is specif ically concerned with how the idea of ‘vulnerable subjects’ is con-
structed in conjunction with traff icking. Bringing together contemporary 
and historic narratives on traff icking, it examines how gender, sexuality, 
and religion influence contemporary laws. The chapter pays particular 
attention to how the British colonial administration used traff icking 
as a way to regulate both women’s labour and their movement, and it 
compares this approach with the attitudes of Indian nationalists. In the 
postcolonial period, it draws on a case study from the 1950s concerning 
the illegal traff icking of women. The chapter argues that these policies 
unevenly impact working class and, particularly, Muslim women. What 
emerges is the uneven distribution of state power as bureaucrats restrict 
emigration.
Keywords: traff icking, gender, Muslim, British colonialism, Indian 
nationalism, Persian Gulf
Introduction
The labour conditions of workers in the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf are under 
considerable scrutiny, and domestic workers are thought to be particularly 
vulnerable.1 Recently, Amnesty International found that some domestic 
1 The countries of the Arabic-speaking Gulf are Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the 
United Arab Emirates, and Oman.
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workers are abused, over-worked, and not compensated for their work (Am-
nesty International 2014). Transnational institutions, such as Amnesty 
International and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), 
argue that a central contributing factor to the abuse of domestic workers is 
the prevalence of traff icking in the Arabian Sea. Traff icking of persons to 
the Gulf countries, according to the United Nations, leads to the exploitation 
of workers’ physical and sexual labour (United Nations Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women 2014). In the worst cases, poor 
women from South Asia or the Philippines are recruited to work in the Gulf by 
people who promise them good paying jobs. In these scenarios, after women 
arrive in the Gulf, they are treated poorly by their employer and not paid for 
their work. They are unable to return to their home countries due to a lack of 
funds, the large amounts of debt borrowed to pay for their emigration, and/or 
physical restrictions on their movements from their employers. In discussions 
by Amnesty International and other nongovernmental organizations, the 
exploitation of traff icked women is often explained as largely the result of 
the practices used to exclude non-citizens in the Arabic-speaking countries 
of the Persian Gulf.2 In response to the potential abuse of domestic workers 
and building upon historic laws developed to protect ‘vulnerable’ migrants, 
the Indian government enforces emigration procedures that aim to decrease 
the number of trafficked persons travelling to the Gulf.
In 2009, I began a research project examining the migration of Indians 
to the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf.3 This project looks at how workers 
f ind jobs in the Gulf and how potential migrants negotiate emigration 
regulations. During the course of my research, I followed some of the almost 
one million workers travelling annually to the Gulf: I met them in villages 
in rural India and then followed them to recruiting agencies in Mumbai or 
Hyderabad, and onward to positions in the Gulf.4 Due to Indian government 
2 An increasing number of scholars have focused on the experiences of migrant workers and 
how these experiences are connected to citizenship practices in the Gulf. The unique relationship 
between citizenship and Arabness in the Gulf continues to be debated (Gardner 2010; Limbert 
2014; Vora & Koch 2015; Wright 2015).
3 This paper is based on ethnographic and archival research I conducted in India, the United 
Arab Emirates, and at private archives beginning in 2006 and continuing to the present. From 
2009 to 2011, I conducted continuous research in India and the United Arab Emirates funded by 
the Fulbright Hayes Doctoral Dissertation Abroad Award. I am also indebted to Aligarh Muslim 
University, the Dubai School of Government, and, especially, the University of Michigan. These 
universities provided additional f inancial and institutional support for this project.
4 In 2012, over 720,000 men who required emigration clearance migrated to work in one of 
the countries of the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf. Because only the least educated emigrants 
require emigration clearance, hundreds of thousands of additional migrants travel to the 
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regulations regarding emigration, most of the unskilled or semi-skilled 
workers I met found jobs through recruiting agents. These agents act as 
middlemen between companies in the Gulf and potential employees. To 
learn about the migration process, emigration laws, and the actors involved, 
I travelled throughout Mumbai and visited some of the over three hundred 
recruiting agencies located in the city. As I visited these recruiters, I realized 
that recruiting off ices were highly gendered spaces: most of the owners 
and employees of the recruiting agencies were men. What I found most 
surprising, however, was that there were no women looking for work abroad 
in these agencies. Postings for work in the Gulf would draw hundreds of 
Indian men for interviews, but I never, in over two years of research, ran 
into a woman looking for work in the Gulf at a recruiting agency.
As I met with recruiting agents, I learned that they were often reluctant to 
facilitate the migration of working-class women due to popular perceptions 
that working-class women are trafficked to the Gulf for sexual exploitation. 
This chapter examines how emigration policies are constructed as the Indian 
government attempts to protect vulnerable women and the consequences 
of these laws on women’s ability to migrate. To understand the multiple 
approaches to trafficking that impact current emigration practices in India, I 
look at how trafficking is perceived and publicly narrated in the contemporary 
moment. I then trace how the idea of trafficking was constructed historically. 
I pay particular attention to how the British colonial administration used the 
concept of trafficking as a way to regulate both women’s labour and their move-
ment, and I contrast this approach with the attitudes of Indian nationalists and 
later postcolonial bureaucrats. Using a case study from the 1950s concerning 
the illegal trafficking of women, I examine how the contemporary restrictions 
on emigration developed from colonial and postcolonial practices. I argue that 
these policies unevenly impact working-class women and, particularly, Muslim 
women. What emerges from this conversation is the uneven distribution of 
state power as bureaucrats attempt to restrict emigration.
Migration and Morality
The lack of women in the recruiting agencies I visited surprised me, given 
that approximately 20 per cent of the Indian workers in the United Arab 
Emirates (UAE) are estimated to be women (Zachariah, Prakash, & Rajan 
Gulf without obtaining emigration clearance and are therefore not counted in the Ministry’s 
emigration numbers. (Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs 2013). 
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2004: 2229). Having spent time in the Gulf, I knew that a common job for an 
Indian woman was working as an aaya (‘nanny’) or domestic worker. In an 
attempt to understand how women migrated to the Gulf, I began looking for 
and trying to meet women in India who were looking for jobs there. When 
I met recruiting agents, I asked if they facilitated the migration of women. 
This was not an easy topic to broach, and it required me to perform a certain 
tact so that agents would not think I was suggesting they participated in 
unsavoury business practices. For example, when I f irst began my research, I 
asked bluntly if agents helped place women in jobs as domestic workers, food 
servers, or salespersons in the Gulf. My poorly framed questions provoked 
offended responses from the recruiting agents, and they would express moral 
indignation that I would ask such questions of them. One of the reasons for 
this moral offense was the assumption that working-class Indian women in 
the Gulf must be traff icked persons. Agents explained to me that women 
who migrated in search of unskilled labour, in particular, were exploited 
and forced to work in the sex industry.
I had one such awkward conversation with Mr. Mohammad, an owner of 
a recruiting agency in Mumbai.5 I f irst met Mr. Mohammad at an associa-
tion meeting for recruiting agents, and he immediately invited me to his 
off ice. About a month later, I ventured to a small off ice park located in the 
suburbs of Mumbai. I sat drinking tea and Mr. Mohammad explained to me 
the current jobs for which he was interviewing workers. As we talked, we 
were repeatedly interrupted by men who wanted to drop off their resumes, 
receive updates on recent interviews, or learn if there were any upcoming job 
interviews. I asked Mr. Mohammad why there were never any women looking 
for work at the recruiting agencies I visited. He responded by explaining that 
only ‘unscrupulous’ agents work with women. The reason, he continued, was 
‘ve faydain utha raha hain’, or ‘they [unscrupulous agents] take advantage 
[of women]’. In particular, he said, it was commonly known that women 
would be sexually exploited while in the Gulf. Given the predominance 
of this knowledge, he assumed that a woman who wanted to work in the 
Gulf could best be characterized as achchhee larki ki tara nahin or ‘not the 
good type of girl’. This euphemistic expression was used not only by Mr. 
Mohammed, but also by other recruiting agents with whom I spoke. The 
phrase was meant to convey that women, and particularly uneducated 
women, who wanted to travel abroad must be sexually promiscuous.
5 The names of individuals, with the exception of politicians acting in their off icial capacity, 
have been changed.
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Newspapers also repeated this view that sexually promiscuous women 
migrate to work in the Gulf, and Indian women working in the Gulf as 
entertainers faced particular scrutiny. While I was conducting my research, 
newspapers frequently ran articles concerning Indian ‘dancing girls’ working 
in the Gulf (Lall 2009; DNA Investigations Bureau 2011). In these articles, 
reporters interviewed ‘concerned patrons’ who claimed that ‘girls ply the 
trade’ – meaning that women dancers were also selling sex. Patrons sup-
ported this claim by stating that performers were not allowed to take tips 
and, therefore, the only reason to dance well would be to entice clients. In 
these articles, the Gulf was portrayed as a place where unskilled women 
could make large amounts of money, but only by participating in the 
sex industry.
In both newspaper accounts and the stories told to me by recruiting 
agents, working as a sex worker was considered inherently exploitative, and 
working-class women were particularly vulnerable to this type of exploita-
tion once they travelled outside of India.6 This understanding of sex work 
and coercion is strikingly similar to the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) Act, 
which was passed by the Indian government in 1956 and amended in 1986. 
One of the original reasons for writing and implementing the Act was the 
United Nations’ work against traff icking. In the Immoral Traffic (Prevention) 
Act, ‘prostitution’, defined as ‘the sexual exploitation or abuse of persons for 
commercial purposes or for consideration in money or in any other kind’, 
is conflated with traff icking (Government of India 1956, section 2f). This 
association between traff icking, sexual labour, gender, and class means 
that recruiting agents are reluctant to help facilitate women’s migration, as 
they do not want to be seen as profiting from women’s sexual exploitation.
In the stories about women migrants to the Gulf related by newspapers, 
government bureaucrats, and agents, the emigration of uneducated women 
is linked to their potential sexual activity and the commercialization of sex. 
Even though there are a wide variety of experiences reported by women 
working in the Gulf, the intersection of sex work, class, and migratory status 
meant that women were left rapidly vacillating between an excess and 
absence of sexuality.7 This is seen in the two most common characterizations 
of working-class women migrants. The f irst is that these women are of ‘loose 
morals’, and they participate in sex work for f inancial gain. The other is that 
6 In her discussion of Indian women working in call centres, Reena Patel points out that educated 
women working in non-traditional jobs has not led to greater gender equality in India (Patel 2010).
7 For example, Anna Stirr discusses the wide variety of experiences of female performers in 
Dubai’s nightclubs (Stirr 2017).
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Indian women who are of a morally high character, and therefore generally 
sexually unavailable, are forced to participate in the sex trade when they 
travel to the Gulf.8 This tension between promiscuity and purity restricts 
the possibilities for female emigration. Because working-class women are 
thought to have limited options outside of sex work, all emigration by poor 
women becomes suspect. As working-class women are envisioned and 
treated as potential victims of sexual predation, their vulnerability means 
that the state needs to protect them by regulating the emigration process. For 
recruiting agents, government officials, and newspaper reporters, trafficking 
is the means by which women are coerced into sex work. The result is that 
the discursive power of traff icking both categorizes working-class Indian 
woman as vulnerable and constrains their ability to emigrate.
To protect vulnerable citizens, women who have not graduated from Class 
X face legal impediments to overseas migration. In fact, according to the 
Emigration Act of 1983, it is impossible for an uneducated woman under 30 
years of age to migrate to the Gulf for work. The order that prohibits these 
women from travelling abroad for work reads, ‘Women below the age of 
30 years may not be granted emigration clearance, who seek any kind of 
employment including employment as housemaids, domestic workers, hair 
dressers, beauticians, dancers, stage artist, labourers, general workers, etc. 
in any foreign country’ (Government of India 1983). This policy, according 
to Didar Singh, the Secretary of the India’s Ministry of Overseas Indian 
Affairs from December 2009 to November 2011, is not based on the Indian 
government’s desire to interfere with migration. Rather, Dr. Singh told me, 
emigration regulations are because the government ‘only wants to protect the 
most vulnerable of workers’. With the goal of protecting these workers, the 
Indian government regulates both emigration and recruiting agent activities.
In addition to these national policies, Indian states have recently at-
tempted to implement laws that would regulate emigration and discourage 
traff icking. During my time in Mumbai from 2009 to 2011, recruiting agents 
were particularly concerned about the Government of Punjab’s proposed 
Prevention of Human Trafficking Act, 2008. This proposed legislation placed 
the blame for traff icking on recruiting agents:
8 This construction of Indian women as innocent victims of traff icking neatly f its into what 
Diana Tietjens Meyers calls the ‘pathetic victim paradigm’. Central to this paradigm is the idea 
that these victims did not consent to their treatment. As Meyers argues, there are a couple key 
drawbacks to understanding victims in this way. First, the pathetic victim paradigm can only 
work if the traff icked women are passive victims and women lose their agentive power. This focus 
on innocence and passivity also does not permit an understanding of how more complicated 
actors are also victims (Meyers 2011). 
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Innocent/illiterate/gullible persons fall in the trap of unscrupulous persons 
who allure and induce such persons with false promises to send them 
abroad by charging heavy amount of money. But thereafter these persons 
are exploited by these elements for their illegal monetary gains by giving 
them false assurances for arranging their visas to foreign countries in 
general and advanced countries like Canada, USA, UK etc. [sic] particular. 
(Government of Punjab 2008)
This proposed state legislation has many similarities with the United Nation’s 
def inition of smuggling of migrants.9 Recruiting agents believed that the 
proposed act by the Punjabi state contradicted the Emigration Act in place 
at the federal level. The result was that the facilitation of some types of 
migration became fraught for agents. Agents feared the vague wording of 
the proposed state law would be used to imprison or levy large f ines against 
them because both smuggling and traff icking were thought to be caused 
by people who misled vulnerable individuals for their own f inancial gain. 
In this approach to traff icking, the problem is neither labour laws nor sex 
work. Rather, the recruiting agent or smuggler is the root of the problem.
In the view of many Indians, recruiting agents are central to the poor treatment 
of workers in the Gulf.10 My neighbours and acquaintances in India were surprised 
that I would spend time with such undesirable people. It was common to refer 
to recruiting agents as ‘racketeers’ who are ‘sending unskilled workers abroad 
for a life of misery’ (Banerjee 2010). Given the increased attempts (starting from 
2000 and continuing to the present) to stop trafficking at both the national and 
the state levels and the conflation of working-class women emigrants with sex 
workers, it is not, with the perspective gained by hindsight, surprising that the 
recruiting agents I met in Mumbai did not help facilitate the migration of women 
to the Gulf. Because large, established firms with connections to legitimate 
companies in the Gulf feared legal or moral reprisal, women who wanted to 
emigrate for work were left relying on less reputable f irms. This contributes 
to a cycle in which the women who do migrate are more likely to go through 
irregular means, thereby opening themselves to more possibilities of trafficking.
9 In 2001, the United Nations’ General Assembly passed the United Nations Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime. This resolution def ines smuggling of migrants as ‘involves the 
procurement for f inancial or other material benef it of illegal entry of a person into a State of 
which that person is not a national or resident’ (United Nations 2000, Article 13).
10 For example, S Irudaya Rajan et al. 2010 argue that corruption arises in the migration process 
from a ‘nexus formed between erring government off icials and recruiting agents.’ In addition, 
Nasra Shah f inds that workers who migrate without recruiting agents earn higher salaries and 
state they are happier with their jobs in the Gulf (2000).
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Discourses of Trafficking
Traff icking in the Arabian Sea is considered a pressing issue: the Gulf 
countries face scrutiny for their treatment of labourers, and South Asian 
countries, particularly India, are the source, destination, and transit 
countries of traff icked persons (US Department of State 2015). Despite the 
popular discourse that imagines traff icking as the movement of South 
Asians to the Middle East, most traff icking incidents are internal to South 
Asia. In 2015, the vast majority of traff icking cases that India’s National 
Crime Records Bureau reported were internal to the country or coming 
into India through its land borders with Nepal and Bangladesh (National 
Crime Records Bureau 2015). One way the Indian government addresses this 
traff icking is through international engagement. Indian laws draw heavily 
on international def initions of traff icking – most often from the United 
Nations or the United States. The UNODC defines human traff icking as ‘the 
acquisition of people by improper means such as force, fraud or deception, 
with the aim of exploiting them’, and the Indian government mobilizes 
a similar def inition of traff icking in the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 
2013 (United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
2000).11 To police traff icking, India implements suggestions found in the 
United States’ Trafficking in Persons Report. Central to the state’s definition 
and policing of traff icking is the perception that young, poor women and 
children from minority communities are at the greatest risk for traff icking.
Traff icking permeates contemporary international politics, and UNODT 
argues that ‘virtually all countries’ are impacted. Despite the prevalence 
of this discourse, the numbers of conf irmed cases of traff icked persons 
are relatively small. Further obscuring cases of traff icking are that when 
people identifying as survivors of traff icking come forward, their histories 
are questioned and their stories disputed.12 Furthermore, initiatives to 
help traff icking victims are often underutilized. For example, in response 
11 The Government of India def ines traff icking in a similar way: ‘Whoever, for the purpose 
of exploitation, (a) recruits, (b) transports, (c) harbours, (d) transfers, or (e) receives, a person 
or persons by using threats, or using force, or any other form of coercion, or by abduction, or by 
practicing fraud, or deception, or by abuse of power, or by inducement, including the giving or 
receiving of payments or benef its, in order to achieve the consent of any person having control 
over the person recruited, transported, harboured, transferred or received, commits the offence 
of traff icking’ (Government of India 2013:5).
12 Perhaps the most recent major dispute of a traff icking survivor concerns Somamly Mam, a 
Cambodian anti-traff icking activist. In 2012 and 2013, news stories that disputed Mam’s history 
were run f irst in Cambodia and then in the United States. As a result, she closed her foundation.
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to international pressure arguing the ubiquity of traff icked persons in the 
Arabic-speaking Gulf, safe houses were created in Dubai, UAE, as a place 
for traff icking victims to stay. These shelters, however, are usually empty. 
One shelter that could accommodate 150 people, for example, only housed a 
total of 21 victims in all of 2007 (United Arab Emirates National Committee 
to Combat Human Traff icking 2009: 17-19).
In discussions of traff icking, the horrif ic experiences of a few traff icked 
person are taken as signs of systemic and prevalent abuse. This is reinforced 
by traff icking’s slippery numbers and contested stories. In practice, traf-
f icked persons seem to be hard for law enforcement off icials to f ind and 
trafficking cases are diff icult to successfully prosecute. In India, for example, 
traff icking cases are prosecuted only 13 per cent of the time. Of the cases 
that are prosecuted, less than half of the people accused of traff icking are 
convicted of any crime.13 The diff iculty in locating and identifying trafficked 
persons stands in stark contrast with the prevalence of trafficking in popular 
culture. Pardis Mahdavi has pointed out the conflation of sex work and 
exploitation often underlies scholarly approaches to women’s sexual labour. 
In her work on Dubai, Mahdavi asks: ‘How do global conversations about 
traff icking (and media and journalistic representations such as Taken or 
MTV’s EXIT program) create an image of the experiences of migration, 
forced labour, and sex work in the minds of the public?’ (2011: 11-13). She 
approaches this question by exploring how traff icking is rooted not only in 
international policy, but in activist discourses in North America and Europe. 
She f inds that ‘traff icking’ means both ‘too little and too much’: the term 
collapses social, economic, and gendered differences (Mahdavi 2011: 11-13). 
As seen in the case of Indian emigrants to the Gulf, this discourse is also 
prevalent in social commentaries regarding female migration. Traff icking 
often appears vague and unspecif ic when viewed by law enforcement, but 
the discursive power of traff icking has a wide impact on emigration policies.
So how are we to understand this pervasive, yet hard to f ind problem? 
One approach taken by scholars is focusing on the role of policies originating 
in the United States and Western Europe to def ine and lend weight to the 
category of traff icking. For example, Simanti Dasgupta has examined how 
Indian policies are consciously constructed so that India avoids being 
downgraded in the United States’ annual Trafficking in Persons Report. 
The result, Dasgupta argues, is that sex workers in Calcutta, India, are 
‘rendered inaudible’ (2014). Both Dasgupta and Mahdavi f ind that narratives 
13 Out of 17,599 cases of traff icking, only 2284 cases were brought to court in 2014. These court 
cases resulted in 1029 convictions (National Crime Records Bureau 2014:106).
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of traff icking arise in Western Europe and North America, and then these 
discourses and their accompanying policies shape practices in South Asia 
and the Middle East. A central aspect of these international approaches to 
traff icking is that some people are more vulnerable than others. Martha 
Fineman argues that vulnerability is ‘inherent in the human condition,’ 
and, by examining vulnerability in this way, she argues a more responsive 
state (2008: 1). Prabha Kotiswaran explains that Fineman’s engagement with 
vulnerability means that scholars should not examine vulnerability through 
the lens of victimhood, but, rather, as a critique of liberalism. Through 
this critique, Kotiswaran f inds traff icking is not exceptional to sex work, 
but rather a systemic problem of vulnerable labour (2012). Kotiswaran’s 
approach highlights the power imbalances and ambiguities inherent in 
the discourse of traff icking.
In the case of Indian migration to the Gulf, the discursive strength of 
traff icking simultaneously builds upon and further entrenches the vulner-
ability of working-class women. The Indian government regulates emigration 
using the assumption that certain citizens face greater vulnerability when 
abroad, and the border is therefore a site where citizens who are considered 
vulnerable face greater scrutiny and restrictions. These restrictions arise 
out of an effort to stop traff icking at the border, but it is through this dif-
ferentiated citizenry that traff icking produces power imbalances. Often, 
this approach to traff icking is viewed as an extension of Euro-American 
anti-trafficking policies and incentives. However, attempts to stop trafficking 
illuminate how present practices by the Indian government are informed 
not only by Euro-American policies, but are also shaped by the history of 
Indian emigration procedures. Both historically and in the contemporary 
moment, some citizens are conceived of as vulnerable. Bureaucrats argue 
the nation-state must protect its citizens, even if protecting them entails 
curtailing their rights. Examining this context reveals how Indian women, 
and particularly Indian Muslim women, are seen as being particularly 
susceptible to sexual predation. In this analysis, gender, class, and religion 
are all central elements in def ining what restrictions a person faces while 
attempting to emigrate.
Vulnerable Subjects and Dependent Citizens
The assumption that some citizens are more vulnerable than others and 
require greater protection from the state can be traced back to British 
colonial laws overseeing emigration. The contemporary construction of 
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Indian emigrants as vulnerable builds on the Emigration Act of 1922, which 
was written by the British colonial government after indentured labour 
became illegal. The Emigration Act of 1922 outlined three types of emigrants 
that were similar to those specif ied in the Emigration Act of 1908, but in 1922 
the categories were def ined more broadly. According to the Emigration 
Act of 1922, the f irst type of emigrant category was composed of unskilled 
workers or labourers, such as agriculturalists, porters, and rickshaw pullers. 
These workers were prohibited from migrating to any country that was not 
approved by Parliament.14 The second type of emigrant were categorized as 
skilled workers ‘of a comparatively low order and status, belonging to classes 
of persons who by reason of their ignorance, were likely to be imposed upon 
or by reason of the number in which they emigrate were likely to create 
political or economic problems in the country of immigration’. This category 
included domestic servants, artisans, clerks, shop assistants, entertainers, 
and food servers (Ministry of External Affairs 1954a; see also the Indian 
Emigration Act of 1922, section 2). The third category of emigrant consisted 
of professionals, such as businessmen, doctors, lawyers, and students. 
These professionals were assumed to have a ‘higher degree of intelligence 
or knowledge’ and were thus left outside of the scope of the 1922 Act and 
not required to obtain ‘No Objection Certif icates’ from the government 
(Ministry of External Affairs 1954a; Ministry of External Affairs 1953b; 
Ministry of External Affairs 1954b). Women and minors faced additional 
impediments to emigration. Classif ied together, they were prohibited from 
emigrating unless the Protector of Emigrants, upon ‘examination’ of the 
potential emigrant, was ‘satisf ied that he/she can take care of himself/
herself in the country of employment’.15 Using the discourse of protecting 
vulnerable groups, these laws reduced the ability of women, children, and 
unskilled workers to migrate.
The Emigration Act of 1922 is one historical tendril connecting colonial 
policies and the discursive construction of traff icking. It is clear that the 
protection of vulnerable populations was central to the Emigration Acts, but 
the history of traff icking is also intertwined with colonial expansion. The 
British Raj was interested in not only moving, but also regulating populations 
14 Countries approved for migration by unskilled workers were printed in the Gazette Notif ica-
tion by the Central Government after receiving approval by Parliament (Ministry of External 
Affairs, 1954a; Ministry of External Affairs, 1953a).
15 Limitations on women’s ability to emigrate relates to their precarious citizenship status. 
As discussed by Vazira Zamindar, the domicile requirement for citizenship established in 1949 
formalized women’s statuses as citizens who were dependent upon their father or husband 
(Zamindar 2007; Ministry of External Affairs 1953a).
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(Limoncelli 2010). Within the context of regulating prostitution in India, the 
kinds of work in which women could legally and productively participate 
were reduced. In legislation written by the British colonial government, 
such as the Contagious Diseases Act and the Emigration Act of 1922, women 
were conceptualized as a vulnerable and dependent population. Centrally, 
women were defined through their relationship to men; when women were 
not acting as wives or mothers, they were thought to be participating in 
the sex industry.
The role of women in nationalist and anti-colonial discourses has also 
influenced India’s current attempts to stop human trafficking. For nationalist 
and anti-colonial thinkers, women – particularly middle-class Hindu women 
– became metonymically representative of the Indian nation (Sangari & 
Vaid 1999 [1989]: 14). The association between womanhood and the nation 
coincided with the re-imagination of the public and private spheres in India 
and entailed a split between the material and spiritual worlds in which 
the material, outer world was the realm of the colonized and the spiritual, 
inner world was the realm of the home and of women. The result was that 
women became not only symbolic of India, but also of the country’s morals. 
While Indian women were able to enter the workforce, they were expected 
to ‘remain essentially unwesternized’ and to participate in the reformation 
of ‘vulgar working class women’ (Chatterjee 1989). These projects to reform 
women were not only articulated by Hindu nationalists; Muslim women 
were also seen by the ‘ulama (‘Muslim scholars’) and Muslim nationalist 
leaders as a population in need of education and ref inement (Metcalf 2002; 
Minault 1982: 60-61).
In these nationalist and anti-colonial discourses, women were key f igures 
for def ining the future nation, but their roles were confined to the home. 
Women were envisioned primarily as members of their families, and the 
def inition of a woman was inherently tied to her role as mother and wife. 
Within this conception, the citizenship of women was dependent upon their 
husband, and the (re)production of future citizens was of more importance 
than a woman’s own citizenship (Rajwade 1938: 83).16 Motherhood was 
women’s primary role, and beginning in the late eighteenth century, and 
the idea of Bharat Mata (‘Mother India’), became increasingly popular. As 
Bharat Mata grew in popularity, India became representable pictorially 
and verbally as a woman (Ramaswamy 2010: 9; Gupta 2002). Through this 
16 The exclusion of women from political life was also lamented in Pakistan. For example, 
Kishwar Naheed’s poetry critiques the social structures that do not encourage women to ‘enter 
into the streets’ (Naheed 1985).
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repeated association, women came to not only represent, but also embody, 
the Indian nation.
In postcolonial India, working class women’s interactions with the state 
continued to be mediated by their relationships to men. As India and Pa-
kistan made the transition from one to two states, the Indian government 
was challenged to def ine who was a citizen of India and who was a citizen 
of Pakistan. Even before the Indian constitution was passed on 26 January 
1950, citizenship provisions were brought into force. As shown in Vazira 
Zamindar’s work on Partition, these citizenship provisions linked ‘birth, 
residence, migration, and citizenship’; a ‘“domicile” and birth “in the territory 
of India”’ were needed for a person to be a citizen of India.17 By following the 
legal doctrine of coverture and defining citizenship by domicile and birth, 
women’s citizenship became contingent upon their husbands (Grapevine 
2015). The close association between women, the home, and the nation 
meant that women needed to be located within a family if they were to 
make claims for rights. The nation took on a familial role as well, with the 
goal of protecting Indian women. The close association between women 
and the Indian nation also meant that traff icking and, particularly, sexual 
predation were affronts to the national honour and morality.
Managing Emigration in the Postcolonial State
These discursive constructions of women were reinforced by the policies 
enacted by the postcolonial state as bureaucrats in the Indian government 
debated and shaped emigration regulations and procedures. Beginning in 
the 1950s, the Indian government developed bureaucratic apparatuses to 
oversee the emigration of workers. In bureaucratic approaches to emigrants, 
two competing notions of Indian citizens were articulated. In one, citizens 
were vulnerable; in the other, citizens were rational liberal actors (Wright 
2015: 61-102). Indian bureaucrats shaped emigration regulations and practices 
in the attempt to ensure both the rights of Indians to emigrate and the 
rights of Indian citizens abroad. Furthermore, as questions regarding the 
nature of the state and citizens were debated and implemented, bureaucratic 
practices developed a conceptualization of the Indian state and its citizens 
that is still at play in emigration policies today.
17 Zamindar points out that this is derived from colonial law, and that the domiciles of children 
under eighteen are dependent on their fathers and the domiciles of women are dependent on 
their husbands (2007).
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India’s new status as an independent nation provided an important 
framework and context for this debate. One off icial wrote that the Indian 
government’s view was that ‘emigration from dependent British India was 
a source of embarrassment; emigration from free India may be a source of 
strength’ (Ministry of External Affairs 1954b). To ensure that emigration 
was a source of strength, any proposal for Indian emigration had to be 
considered on its own merits and would only be permitted if emigration 
was sure to be on ‘honourable terms, consistent with the dignity of India’ 
(Ministry of External Affairs 1954b). In such arguments, the honour of 
India was embodied in each migrant and it was the Indian government’s 
duty to oversee emigration and thereby maintain India’s reputation abroad. 
Also, in the 1950s, many members of the government considered migration 
to have been a problem in the past, but no longer a pressing concern. In 
postcolonial India, they argued, emigration affected only a ‘fringe’ of the 
Indian population (Ministry of External Affairs 1954b). Emigration was also 
understood to be a permanent activity, whereby Indians settled abroad for 
the entirety of their lives. Conflating emigrants with indentured labourers, 
many government bureaucrats characterized Indians abroad as having 
moved out of India between the 1850s and 1920s (Ministry of External 
Affairs 1954b).18
Emigration laws, assumptions about the permanence of emigration, and 
histories of coverture meant that Indian women were not envisioned as 
potential emigrants by the early Indian state. When women did emigrate, 
the assumptions were – and continue to be today – that they were either 
moving with their husbands or participating in ‘immoral activity’. This was 
particularly exemplif ied in a series of complaints brought to the Indian 
government regarding the ‘immoral traff ic in women’ in the 1950s and 
1960s. In 1950, the Indian government ratif ied the International Convention 
for the Suppression of the Traffic of Persons and of the Exploitation of the 
Prostitution of Others. In 1956, the government passed the Suppression of 
Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act, which lays out the legal penalties 
for the traff icking women and girls. While this Act was a fulf ilment of the 
Indian government’s commitment to the 1950 United Nations convention, 
the way in which the Act was and continues to be mobilized reveals Indian 
genealogies of traff icking.
Most tellingly, in the 1950s and 1960s, were the complaints received by 
the Indian government from Indian citizens regarding the marriage of 
18 For a more detailed discussion of indentured labour, see, for example: Carter 1995; Bates 
2000; Yang 1989.
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Indian Muslim women to Muslims from the Persian Gulf. Allegations were 
made that Gulf Arabs married these women, but then, once in the Gulf, 
their husbands threw off their marital ties and would ‘sell them’ sexually 
(Ministry of External Affairs 1961; Ministry of External Affairs 1963). These 
cases of ‘immoral traff icking’ were diff icult to track because Indian women 
travelled on their husbands’ passports after marriage (Sethi 1963; Embassy 
of India, Kuwait 1964). The result was that Indian bureaucrats were left 
responding to the individual petitions of concerned Indian citizens.
One case of the immoral traff ic in women was brought to the attention 
of the postcolonial Indian state through letters written from Rubiyabai, 
a Muslim woman from Bombay. In her letters, Rubiyabai was concerned 
because her daughter, Zuleka, had married a man she identif ied as ‘Arab’ 
and she was afraid that Zuleka had been forced into prostitution in Bahrain. 
Rubiyabai was illiterate, but she dictated letters to the Indian Government 
asking for help. One of these letters reads:
I have heard from people who are coming from Bahrain, that my daughter 
is kept in a sort of Jail under lock and key, and that the said Saba Bin Rashid 
[Zuleka’s husband] desires to make my daughter into a prostitute, and 
as such I am deeply grieved by this, and request you to be kind enough 
to make some special speedy enquiry into this matter and redress my 
grievances and save my daughter from the HELL that she is being put 
to, for which act of kindness I shall be much obliged, and it would be far 
better on my part if you could kindly arrange to send my said daughter 
back to India. (Rubiyabai 1961)
In response to this letter, the Indian Government asked the British Agent in 
Bahrain to look into the situation. In this and in the other cases I found in 
the archives, neither the allegation of forced prostitution nor the allegation 
of a wife’s ill treatment by her ‘Arab’ husband was substantiated. However, 
fears of the ill treatment of women and neglect of the marriage contract 
continued.
Rubiyabai’s fears were spurred by community gossip that circulated from 
the Gulf to India. Friends of friends with connections in the Persian Gulf 
told Rubiyabai that Zuleka was trapped within her home and Zuleka’s new 
husband was not honouring the marriage. They reported that the husband 
had misused Zuleka and forced her into prostitution. One reason Rubiyabai 
believed Zuleka was not free in Bahrain was because Zuleka began practicing 
purdah (physical segregation from men). The British political agent that 
visited the home found no problems with this arrangement and he also found 
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that Zuleka had embraced the practice of purdah (Rubiyabai 1961). Despite 
the conjectural nature of these claims of the ‘immoral traff ic of women’, 
in 1965 the Ministry of External Affairs still found – citing this case and 
similar ones – that ‘Arab nationals from the Persian Gulf area are connected 
with immoral traff ic in Indian women’ (Off ice of the High Commissioner 
of the United Kingdom 1961). This ‘immoral traff ic’ was the given reason for 
a series of passport requirements instituted in 1965 in collaboration with 
British Agents in the Gulf with the intention of regulating women’s travel 
to the Arabic-speaking Persian Gulf (Ministry of External Affairs 1965).
In the contemporary moment, women’s dependency on male relation-
ships for migration is most clearly seen in the process women who are over 
30-years-of-age must go through to migrate – particularly the ‘No Objection 
Certif icate’ that must be signed by a husband or father, and the need for 
those wishing to hire maids to be ‘vouched for’ by an Indian national (Consul 
General of India, Dubai 2016). This rule is meant to protect women and 
the reputation of Indians abroad. For men and women who are considered 
vulnerable to migrate legally, they must f irst receive permission from the 
Indian government via a local Protector of Emigrants (POE) off ice. At the 
POE off ices, the off icials are required to check the documents of migrants 
who have ‘Emigration Check Required’ stamped in their passports. The POE 
off icers ensure that the worker has a valid job offer with a company that is 
not blacklisted by the government. The stated purpose behind this form of 
checking is to reduce the exploitation of vulnerable Indians. When unskilled 
or semi-skilled workers migrate legally, it is the job of the recruiting agent to 
ensure that the government guidelines are followed and that the jobs they 
are going to meet the government’s standards. In the process of migration, 
women become imbricated in familial and paternal relationships that are 
mirrored by the Government of India.
Conclusion: The Contemporary Moment and Women’s Migration
The current policies regarding women migrating to the Gulf and the Indian 
government’s interest in the moral position or virtue of women in the Gulf 
are not new. Connecting concerns, shared by such people as Rubiyabai, 
concerning ‘immoral traff ic’ and the contemporary moment are the fears 
for women’s virtue, the assumed obligation of the Indian government to 
protect that virtue, and the subtle backdrop of class as an analytic space 
in which these gendered anxieties about virtue play out. Poor women have 
unequal access to migration and employment abroad, and this reinforces 
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the inequalities they face in India due to their gender and their economic 
position. This inequality is a marked contrast to the relative freedom that 
upper-class women have in moving abroad. For example, upper-class young 
women, such as daughters of recruiting agents, frequently go abroad to 
England or the United States to study. Recruiting agents would tell me 
proudly about how their daughters studied at American universities, and 
no one ever suggested that this was an immoral activity.
Traff icking discourses do not impact all Indian women equally. Some 
Indian Muslim women wished they could travel to the Gulf to mitigate the 
economic and social inequalities they experienced in India.19 One woman I 
met in the Gulf, Fahmida, told me that she loved living in the United Arab 
Emirates because she felt she was allowed to openly practice her Islamic 
faith. In particular, Fahmida said in the Gulf she could wear hijab (‘head 
covering’), without fear of harassment. The harassment she experienced in 
India, Fahmida told me, meant that she understood herself to be wrapping 
not only her headscarf, but also her jur’at (‘boldness’) whenever she left 
her home. She felt that this boldness was required so that she would not 
be intimidated by people’s negative comments when she walked down the 
road in India. For Fahmida, living in the Gulf allowed her to express her 
faith as she chose and avoid some of the stigma she experienced in India 
because she was a Muslim.
While upper-class women may travel with more ease, the barriers that 
poor women face when trying to travel internationally cannot be explained 
by simply a lack of certain skills or capital. The restrictions put on travel by 
the Indian government in an effort to protect the most vulnerable citizens 
create obstacles to emigration. As news articles highlight the potential for 
women to experience traff icking, less opportunities for Indian Muslim 
women arise. The conflation of India with Indian women permeates the 
contemporary moment and informs the restrictions on women travelling 
internationally. India’s reputation is located in the body of women abroad, 
and poorer women are constructed as unable to protect themselves. The 
effect is that working-class and most middle-class women are unable to enter 
the oil economy. Instead, women must rely on their fathers or brothers not 
only for legal status, but also f inancial support. Furthermore, the current 
implementation of trafficking policies calls into question how much the poli-
cies actually work to protect women. As emigration is currently regulated, 
19 This reason for emigration was shared by Indian Muslim men as well; social and economic 
discrimination are two of the reasons Indian Muslim men emigrate to the Gulf in dispropor-
tionately large numbers.
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young women who have not matriculated are unable to travel legally for 
work. This elides the ability of these women to migrate in order to inform 
their marriage decisions or access the larger salaries that are available in 
the Gulf. It also means these women may only work abroad illegally. Women 
are put in positions where they may be imprisoned by Gulf governments 
and are made vulnerable to violations of their labour rights, as they have 
no legal status in their host country. The invisibility of women to recruiting 
agencies means that the process through which women migrate creates the 
very problem that traff icking policies and procedures attempt to address.
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Abstract
This chapter tells the story of Akbar, a young Afghan man who left Kabul 
during the summer of 2015 to escape war and poverty. Three months 
later, after a torturous journey that included abuse by both smugglers 
and the authorities, Akbar arrived in Frankfurt, emotionally, physically, 
and f inancially broken. The authors frame a harrowing, f irst-person 
account of Akbar’s journey across Western Asia and Central Europe: f irst, 
recounting his parents’ refugee experiences during the Soviet-Afghan War; 
later, describing the circumstances that convinced his family to support 
Akbar’s journey; and f inally, explaining his family’s thoughts about 
Akbar’s future in Germany. The chapter concludes with speculations 
about the potential political ramif ications of the forced repatriation of 
(perhaps) tens of thousands of Afghans from Europe. This story of one 
young man and his family’s history helps to humanize the confusing and 
often impersonal accounts of the global migration crisis and provides 
necessary historical context for grasping the contemporary Afghan 
refugee crisis.
Keywords: refugee, Afghanistan, migration crises, human smuggler, 
Germany, oral history
At 11 PM on a hot summer night in the f irst week of June 2015, after weeks 
of delay, the call f inally came. ‘The game is on’, the smuggler announced. 
Akbar was told he had an hour to get across town to the Kabul central 
bus station.1 With US$250 hidden in the folds of his shalwar kameez and a 
knapsack containing two pairs of clothes, a sewing needle his mother had 
1  The names of the family are all pseudonyms to protect their identity. 
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taught him to use in preparation for the journey, dried fruit, hard-boiled 
eggs, naan, and an old Samsung phone, Akbar set off to begin a new life 
anywhere far from Afghanistan.
Akbar rushed emotional goodbyes with his mom and two sisters. Then 
Omar, Akbar’s older brother, accompanied him to the bus station. Akbar’s 
father and eldest brother were at work, unable to say goodbye in person. The 
two brothers sat at the bus station into the early morning, waiting until it was 
time for Akbar to board. Akbar was to meet his smuggler in Nimroz, a remote 
desert province on the Iran-Pakistan border, a lawless region notorious for 
smuggling and banditry. Fearful, Omar recounted his brother’s departure:
I hugged Akbar a few times, and I told him not to forget us. It is painful 
to watch your younger brother leave. I cried 100 per cent. He sat in 
the bus. I said goodbye two or three times, while the bus prepared to 
leave. This moment was very painful. If he goes to Turkey, and then 
somewhere else, when his life becomes better, he might forget us. My 
mom kept calling. We were afraid he would die, or be put in prison. He’d 
be lonely. He was very young, and never travelled. We did not believe 
he would arrive.
A few weeks before, Akbar and his father had met Aziz in Paghman to discuss 
the trip. Aziz’s family is well known locally for smuggling people to Turkey 
and Europe. US$1500 was deposited as collateral for the transit to Turkey. 
Aziz directed Akbar’s father to give that money to a third party, an agent 
on the second floor of a small money exchange shop in a bustling Kabul 
market. When the agent received a call from Akbar announcing that he had 
safely arrived in Turkey, the money would be released to Aziz’s associates 
in Kabul – at least, that was the pre-departure agreement.
This chapter recounts Akbar’s often-horrifying experiences crossing West 
Asia and Eastern Europe in the summer of 2015. After a 3-month ordeal 
he arrived in Germany where he sought asylum, and from where, at the 
time of this writing, he faces the growing likelihood of forced deportation 
(Strickland 2016). But our account here begins with Akbar’s parents, who 
were displaced in the early years of the ‘Afghan refugee crisis’ in the late 
1970s, when the Cold War f irst erupted on Afghan soil. At that time, Akbar’s 
(as yet unacquainted) parents were amongst the two to four million Afghans 
forced to seek refuge in Pakistan and Iran.
Across four decades, Afghan refugees have had to contend with har-
rowing journeys, uncertain receptions in host countries, family debt and 
destitution, and helpless dependence upon reluctant others after arriving 
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at their destinations. The geopolitical circumstances of the Afghan conflict 
have evolved, but the contours of the refugee experience remain mostly 
consistent. Akbar is one of millions who found waiting for the end of conflict 
at home intolerable in 2015, who took to their feet seeking a better life 
across international borders, who were imprisoned and abused en route, 
and who escaped complex conflicts at home for precarious receptions 
in host countries (BBC 2017). Meanwhile, in Europe, the migration crisis 
vexes political relations between the states of the European Union and 
their bordering countries, as Marta Zorko describes in the next chapter of 
this volume.
This chapter draws upon face-to-face interviews conducted with Akbar’s 
entire family in December 2015, a series of Skype interviews with Akbar 
(speaking from a German refugee hostel) in early 2016, and life history 
interviews conducted with Akbar’s parents during the summer of 2005. We 
narrate some of the diff iculties and costs of the journey, and describe the 
tedious circumstances encountered in the German refugee hostel where 
Akbar currently resides.2 Readers will f ind that the narrative changes into 
the f irst person when describing Akbar’s experiences between Kabul to near 
Frankfurt. The earlier and later sections, which are based upon extensive 
interviews with family members, are conventionally told from the authors’ 
perspective. But Akbar’s journey is written in the f irst-person, and draws 
solely on his account of his experiences in transit. In the conclusion, we 
consider the implications of the present influx of refugees for Europe and 
the potential for the forced deportation of Afghans to further destabilize 
the already fractured social and political environment in Afghanistan.
Third-generation Migrant: Akbar’s Family History
The authors’ relationship with Akbar and his family began in 2004, when he 
was nine-years-old. His parents were the live-in caretakers at an American 
NGO in Kabul where James was based while he conducted f ieldwork for a 
dissertation in cultural anthropology, and where Rohullah was employed 
after years as a refugee himself in Iran. Many afternoons, the authors joined 
2  In 2005 James Weir conducted life history interviews with Akbar’s parents, which is the 
primary source for the biographical information in the family history section. The later sections 
draws upon family interviews conducted in Kabul in late 2015. The f irst person account that 
follows is an edited version of the journey told from Akbar’s perspective, based upon Skype 
interviews conducted in early 2016, while Akbar was in a German refugee hostel. This account 
has been reviewed with Akbar.
170 James Weir and rohullah amin 
Akbar and the other neighbourhood kids in football matches organized inside 
the grounds of the compound. Akbar was the youngest boy, and I (James) 
was the most senior player, so we were often paired when playing on our tiny 
pitch. My memory of Akbar is as a quiet, respectful boy, sometimes brooding, 
and often looking bewildered by the extravagant lives of the foreigners that 
passed through the compound. In a photo of Akbar from 2004, the boy stands 
awkwardly before a large spread of hors devours while inebriated Afghan 
and foreign men and women dance to a live Quawalli band.
In November 2015, I returned to the NGO-cum-guesthouse. Akbar’s 
father, Ghahreman (a nickname meaning ‘champion’), greeted me at the 
fortif ied steel gate. After friendly inquiries, grinning while serving pastries 
and green tea, he asked if I wanted to arm wrestle. A decade older and half 
a foot shorter than me, and after a life immeasurably harder than my own, 
he remains f it and playful. He won handily. He then told me that Akbar, 
his youngest boy, had walked to Frankfurt.
As I settled into a two-month stay in Kabul, Rohullah and I began 
informally asking Akbar’s family about the young man’s experiences and 
circumstances. The troubling story that emerged often contradicted our 
expectations. The expenses, in the end nearly US$7000, and the abuses 
Akbar incurred en route, culminating with a beating by the Bulgarian 
police – which broke both Akbar’s hand and his trust in European authori-
ties – were worse than we had imagined. Long acquainted with the family 
and with our interest and concern now piqued, we asked if we could conduct 
formal interviews. Our goal was to document the family’s role in the decision 
and preparations, Akbar’s experiences in transit, and his circumstances in 
Germany. The family graciously agreed to let us interview them. We decided 
it was best to keep the identity of the family anonymous, despite the family 
all saying that it was unnecessary.
Akbar, like a few million Afghan millennials, is a third-generation refugee. 
He is the middle child of f ive siblings, all of whom were born as refugees 
outside of Afghanistan: his two older brothers were born in Pakistan; Akbar 
and his two younger sisters, in Iran. His parents escaped the Soviet-Afghan 
War in the early 1980s as young adults with their separate families. They 
met and married while in exile in Pakistan.
Akbar’s father Ghahreman is from Ghazni: a town that was once a thriving 
Buddhist centre in the seventh century and, a millennia ago, the centre of the 
Ghaznavid Empire, which stretched from North India across Afghanistan to 
include most of present-day Iran and swathes of Central Asia (Patan 2007). 
As of late 2016, this multi-ethnic city of 150,000 residents, a dangerous three-
hour drive south of Kabul, was contested by insurgents. Both the Taliban 
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and the Islamic State (IS) target the large local Shia population (who are 
ethnic Hazaras) in an effort, common in many Middle Eastern countries, 
to provoke civil conflict by fomenting sectarian divisions (Al Jazeera 2015).
Ghahreman was a young man in 1978. He would have been around Akbar’s 
age when the Soviet military entered Afghanistan to support its beleaguered 
Communist central government. Ghahreman recounted this period to us 
as: ‘the mullahs said that the Russians were our enemies, and we must 
rise against them’. He emphasized the threats his family received if he 
and his brothers did not join the resistance: ‘the Mujahedeen would have 
killed us; we had to join them’. Like a tsunami originating from the two 
great adversaries of the Cold War, money and weaponry washed across the 
impoverished country, breaking the social and political order in its path. 
Ghahreman and his companions fought an insurgency against Soviet and 
Afghan government forces, armed with US and Saudi resources that were 
distributed by Pakistan. Ghareman’s insurgent group ‘went to the hills’, 
hiding in the mountainous countryside and often forced to survive without 
basic supplies (Linschoten and Kuehn 2012: 56).
As an untrained foot soldier on the frontlines of a popular yet disorganized 
and deadly war, Ghareman grew disillusioned as he watched what had been 
at f irst deemed an honourable ‘jihad’ in defence of Islam and Afghanistan 
descend into corruption, local rivalries, and rampant lawlessness. The 
value of his sacrif ice then is unclear today. He complains: ‘We stayed in the 
mountains, hungry and thirsty, feet bleeding, sleeping on the rocks and in 
caves. Sometimes the villagers fed us, and our leaders conducting the war 
grew fat and wealthy sitting comfortably out of harm’s way in Pakistan and 
the Gulf States’. Like many former Mujahedeen foot soldiers, he is careful 
to distance himself from the notorious abuses perpetrated by most of the 
Mujahedeen leadership (Barf ield 2010: 251-52).
After four years, he escaped Afghanistan to become a refugee in Pakistan, 
and later Iran. ‘When I got married to Jamila, we had nothing. I was pen-
niless.’ This was an economic reality that tarred his image as a man in a 
male-dominated society. ‘We stayed at my in-laws’’, he continued. ‘Without 
work, I was ashamed to go home. I borrowed money and we went to Iran.’ 
And that is where they remained, living in poverty, until 2002.
The corruption, cronyism, and lawlessness that took root in the early 
days of the ‘jihad’ worsened as the Mujahedeen parties took up arms against 
each other (Barf ield 2010: 255). After the Soviet military retreated in 1989, a 
vicious civil war ensued – and eventually resulted in the emergence of the 
Taliban. The experience of watching the Afghan resistance to the Soviets 
become corrupt and then turn against each other has left many Afghans 
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distrustful of national politics, and most leaders in general. This distrust in 
and frustration with national and international political processes has only 
been compounded over the past f ifteen years, as extraordinary international 
expenditures of blood and treasure have had minimal influence on the 
security and economic welfare of ordinary Afghans. Instead, civilians 
continue to be caught between a deadly array of anti-government and 
government actors pursuing a confusing mix of political aspirations and 
material enrichment (Weir and Azamy 2015). Ten years before Akbar’s 
departure, Ghahreman concluded his life history interview by saying, ‘I 
hope my children can get educated, become good men, and be able to feed 
their mother when I am not alive’. Ten years later, his son Akbar, now a 
refugee in Germany, echoed his father’s aspirations regarding his future in 
Europe, stressing the need to take care of an ailing family and his interest 
in obtaining a good education.
Akbar’s mother Jamila is from a rural village in Paghman, a mountainous 
farming area on the outskirts of Kabul. She began her life story tersely, ‘There 
are so many problems in life. Where should one begin?’ paused, and then 
continued, ‘When I was about seven or eight my father died, a car ran him 
over, and we were alone’. As a fatherless girl, her life shaped by violence 
and poverty started when Soviet soldiers entered her village months later.
When the war began, her family risked their lives to support the resistance 
f ighters. Her eldest brother left home to join the Mujahedeen. Young Jamila 
secretly took food to their hideouts in the mountains. Islam demanded that 
she support the f ight against the communists; she explained, ‘Cooking for 
the Mujahedeen meant rewards in the afterlife’ – although she also said 
that she was never sure what the Russians wanted in Afghanistan.
But with young Jamila and her sisters maturing, war and lawlessness 
made their family of women increasingly unsafe: they became more and 
more vulnerable to abuse from the men in the Mujahedeen resistance, the 
Afghan government, and the Soviet forces. Three years into the war, Jamila’s 
mom decided they had to leave; after months of thwarted efforts, the family 
succeeded in crossing the border on foot into Pakistan. Soon afterwards, 
Jamila was introduced to Ghahreman, who was fourteen years her senior, 
through an arranged marriage. Three years later, Ghahreman asserted his 
role as the head of the family to move the family of four from Pakistan to 
Iran against Jamila’s wishes in search of work as a labourer. The journey 
involved long walks, with two infants in tow, across deserts and dangerous 
border crossings – a route that young Akbar would retrace three decades 
later when he began his journey to Europe. The family returned to Kabul 
shortly after the Taliban were forced from power in 2002.
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Many factors combine to make Afghans fearful about the future. Despite 
four decades of nearly continuous conflict, there is no indication of a political 
or peaceful resolution in the foreseeable future. At the time of this writing, 
the top US general in Afghanistan had recently warned the US Congress that 
billions of US dollars and thousands of soldiers were needed to break the 
stalemate in the country (Ewing 2017). After the initial high hopes of the early 
years of the 2001 US intervention in the country, the US and NATO withdrew 
the bulk of their forces in 2014 without defeating the Taliban. As a result, 
the economy tanked, unemployment surged, and an emboldened Taliban 
increased its attacks and territorial reach (Sidahmed and Akerman 2016).
Meanwhile, the 2014 Afghan presidential election was marred by 
widespread fraud, leaving an ineffectual and distrusted ‘National Unity 
Government’ that was divided between oppositional leaders (Gall 2014). 
The success of the military operation (Zarb-e-Azb3) in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan forced militants across the border 
into Afghanistan (Zahid 2015). Current estimates list at least twelve and 
as many as twenty insurgent groups operating on Afghan soil (S. Jones 
2016). The most recent, the Islamic State (IS), commenced indiscriminate 
bombings and kidnappings in 2015, forcing ordinary Afghans to anticipate 
futures even more dreaded than the return of the Taliban. At the level of 
individuals, the emergence of IS further radicalizes some Afghans and 
attracts the desperately poor. IS’ global aspirations and successes in Iraq 
and Syria promise people agency and reward in places where little of either 
exist (Azamy and Weir 2015).
Beyond security concerns, inadequate infrastructure and a surging popula-
tion challenge life in Kabul. The capital city, designed nearly f ive decades 
ago for 700,000 residents, is the f ifth fastest growing city in the world, with 
an estimated six million people (Rasmussen 2014). Garish indicators of inter-
national influences on the cityscape are the enormous fortif ied compounds 
containing mansions of the corrupt elite, who are among the few evident 
benef iciaries of the mismanaged international largesse. Akbar’s sisters 
explained that simply walking to school is dangerous: to move through the 
city, they must f ind groups of people they trust. Military convoys frequently 
block traff ic for hours at a time, creating insecurity for bystanders because 
insurgents frequently target those same convoys. Like their mother, these 
girls have matured amidst lawlessness and conflict, with the threat of abuse 
challenging their freedom of movement and the family’s honour.
3  This is the Urdu name of the operation, which means a sharpening and cutting strike, and 
also it refers to the sword of the prophet Mohammad.
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Life without the promise of an adequate education, without basic health 
care for an ailing mother, and absent the rule of law on Kabul’s streets or in 
government transactions, all contribute to Akbar’s family’s desire for a future 
anywhere else. Thus, when both the ‘word on the street’ and the international 
media confirmed that tens of thousands of Afghans were successfully entering 
Europe, Akbar saw an opportunity. In 2015, nearly 20 per cent (180,000) of the 
asylum seekers in the European Union originated in Afghanistan (BBC 2017).
But despite the multiple political factors that conspired to propel Akbar 
from Kabul, national conflicts and international failures were only the 
backdrop for an even more troubling reality: a problem with two conservative 
uncles, which became the decisive factor in the family’s decision. After the 
Taliban fell from power in 2001, Akbar’s family returned to Kabul, finding work 
and shelter at the American NGO. The authors f irst met the family there and 
Ghahreman remains employed at the NGO today. The entire family had lived 
in the institute’s compound, where Akbar’s mother made a living cooking and 
cleaning, until growing pressure from two uncles had forced her to leave the 
job. These two fundamentalist uncles have threatened the family for years, 
calling them kafirs (‘inf idels’), ‘slaves of Americans’, and, worse, accusing 
Jamila of being a ‘prostitute’ simply because she worked with Americans.
As Akbar grew into manhood, these confrontations grew more heated. 
After one particularly intense altercation between Akbar and these two 
uncles who were former Mujahedeen (and locally regarded as drug addicts 
with Taliban mentalities) nearly turned violent, the family determined that 
it was time to support Akbar’s asylum efforts. Jamila explains, ‘the Taliban 
is threatening because we work for Americans, the boys can be killed if they 
join government, but these two uncles are even more dangerous’. This factor, 
likely the most urgent amongst many, convinced the family to support and 
f inance the young man’s decision to leave home. Jamila explains: ‘In the 
weeks leading up to his decision to go, Akbar had become quite diff icult. 
He was f ighting with his family, especially with his older brother, Masood. 
He would shout and say how dissatisf ied he was with life here. So, when he 
decided to go after about a week, we decided to support him.’
Akbar’s father, Ghahreman, remains a live-in employee at the American 
NGO, despite his family having to move away. He earns US$250 a month 
working as a guard by night and caretaker by day. Between the amount 
required for the smuggler’s fee and the travel expenses, the family committed 
US$1,750 – seven months of Ghahreman’s income – for Akbar’s journey, 
believing that this enormous investment would be enough to get Akbar to 
Europe. Ultimately, the trip would cost the family nearly US$7000, creating 
a debt that is likely impossible for them to repay.
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The Journey
Akbar was eight when he f irst set foot on Afghan soil. Twelve years later, 
with the bulk of US and NATO forces recently withdrawn and the Taliban 
and Islamic State expanding, Akbar became a refugee again, this time 
crossing his birthplace of Iran for prospects in Europe. In this section, we 
shift from Akbar’s family history and pre-departure circumstances to narrate 
his journey from Kabul to his current residence in a German youth hostel. 
Separated from his family for the f irst time, having made his way across 
Western Asia and Eastern and Central Europe, we recount his journey below 
in the f irst person: a chronological account of his experiences as gathered 
through multiple Skype interviews.
Kabul to the Iranian Border
i thought travel across southern afghanistan would be the most dangerous, 
but i was wrong. The Taliban stopped and searched our bus multiple times 
along the way from Kabul to nimroz. in nimroz i had to find aziz, the smuggler, 
who arranged things. on the first day, i met ali, from Baghlan. he is a little 
younger than me. he was scared. We talked and began travelling together. 
Figure 7.1  Typical Afghan Transportation
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We took care of each other all the way to the Bulgarian border. he is in austria 
now, and we still stay in touch.
aziz (the smuggler) explained the route, put one guy in charge of us, and 
then left. after that, he coordinated everything by phone, and we never saw 
him again. That first night we were walking in a dangerous desert towards 
iran. it was so hot. i called my brother omar and told the family to pray for 
me. The iranian border police shoot people.
suddenly, Toyota pickup trucks drove out of the darkness towards us. 
dark-skinned people with black hats pointed guns at us and told us to lie 
face down and recite the Quran. We waited, expecting them to shoot us. 
They robbed us and drove away.
Three days in, US$150 stolen.
Iran
Two days later we were in iran. Baluch smugglers took over.4 They began 
with the rules: ‘1) obey us at all times; 2) don’t speak; 3) pay in advance; 4) 
stay with the group; 5) or die alone’. They had three Toyota pickup trucks, 
each crammed with about 20 passengers in the back. They drove too fast 
across the desert; we bounced in the back and became so caked in dust. We 
couldn’t tell who was who. our mouths were coated dry with dust. at stops, 
they didn’t let us clean.
one boy was weak, vomiting, and with bad diarrhea. When we told the 
smugglers, they said that if he couldn’t travel he’d be left in the desert. usually 
we travelled at night, from near midnight until just before dawn. during the 
day, we were hidden in basements, farmhouses, stores, and petrol stations. 
at each location a new set of people took over. They made us clean toilets 
and carry stuff. We never had enough food or water. When i resisted, they 
beat me. about five days into the trip, one guy complained and they beat 
him nearly to death. after that we became quiet.
sleeping was scary, we were so tired but anything could happen. We 
slept on the floor; sometimes they gave us straw mats. someone stole my 
phone and us$100 from my pocket while i slept, and it was probably the 
other passengers. We worried they’d abuse (rape) us while we slept, ali 
especially.
near the border, they locked me and ali up in a stable with cows, sheep, 
and donkeys. They gave me a phone and made me call my family to tell the 
agent in Kabul to release the us$1500 to aziz’s people. at the Turkish border 
4  The Baluch are a large tribal community who live on the dry mountainous Iranian plateau 
between western Pakistan, southeastern Iran, and southern Afghanistan. 
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we waited three days. Finally, when they had more passengers, ahmed, aziz’s 
brother, came from Turkey to connect with us and took over.
23 days in, cost US$1,750, including the security deposit released from the 
Kabul agent.
Turkey
Travel in Turkey was easier than in iran. We didn’t have to hide so much, but 
ahmed, the new smuggler, was stingy and cruel. he gave us less food. he would 
lock me up, force me to clean toilets, and beat me if i complained. he was always 
grumbling about the cost of my food. he told my family to pay us$800 more: 
us$200 for a new phone, us$200 for food, and us$400 for travel. he got me a 
cheap phone and kept the extra money they sent him. one night, after waiting 
too long in Turkey, i got into an argument with ahmed. i was weak and don’t 
remember clearly, but i was ready to die. after this, i left the group along with rafiq.
rafiq is a little older than me, about 25 years old, and he is very smart. he 
speaks english, some Turkish and norwegian, and had a good phone with 
Gps. he had lived in norway illegally for five years, but made the mistake of 
coming back to afghanistan for a wedding. We found two afghan Turkmen 
smugglers, arif and Bashir, who demanded us$2500 to get me into Bulgaria. 
my family was told to pay this amount to an uzbek carpet dealer in Kabul. 
after days of waiting at the border, two days before eid (18 July), the money 
had been paid and we left for Bulgaria.
48 days since leaving Kabul, US$4950 spent. Akbar’s family in Kabul, fearing 
for his life, are now at the whim of random human smugglers.
Bulgaria
in a small village in Bulgaria, some young guys came up, threatened us and 
took our valuables; they even got my second phone. i wanted to defend our 
stuff, but arif stopped me. later, i refused to pay him all the money. he was 
supposed to protect us. The smugglers pointed us to a track through a field.
We walked four days through the forest until we got near sofia, where 
we were arrested and were driven by the police for the rest of the way. The 
police fingerprinted all ten of my fingers. They asked us why we were there 
and whether we would stay in Bulgaria. We knew if we said we would keep 
going, they would let us go. Then they filled out a form. people told terrible 
stories about the Bulgarian police.
The police put us in a huge prison in the middle of a field with bars and 
razor wire, full of refugees from syria, iraq, afghanistan, and iran. at least we 
had regular food and mattresses, but the potato soup tasted like they had 
peed in it.
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after about 28 days, the guards collected us and asked if we wished to 
continue. When we said, ‘yes, to Germany; we will leave’ they released us. 
rafiq and i decided to travel alone, to take taxis, to try to blend in. my family 
wired us$370 for a taxi. Two days later we got to serbia.
We got arrested as soon as we crossed into serbia and we were deported 
by train back to sofia, Bulgaria. We rested there for about three days. This time, 
we took a taxi through the mountains to a bus station in a serbian village. 
From there we hitched a ride to Belgrade.
78 days and US$5365.
Serbia, Hungary, and Austria
a taxi driver said he could take us to the hungarian border for 200 euros. he 
asked us to turn off the Gps, and drove around for some time before dropping 
us at some smelly water. he told us to cross. When we turned on the Gps, 
we saw that he had just driven us around in circles because we were still in 
Belgrade. eight or nine syrians and iraqis came towards us, refugees who had 
just been robbed. They were cold without clothes, and they looked abused.
We didn’t realize this was about to happen to us. after crossing the pond, 
we saw the police waiting. We ran, but they unleashed dogs. i fell and almost 
drowned. The dogs bit us a lot but did not break the skin. some really big 
guy sat on my chest and punched me. rafiq told them he knew european 
law and that he would report them. This made them angrier.
They hung us upside down from a tree, stripped us naked, and beat us. 
They broke my hand.
my hand is still crooked and hurts. my jaw hurts too. The police, our at-
tackers, searched our bags for money, and said we are evil afghans coming 
to destroy their country. after some hours of abuse, they released us. We 
walked into a small village and fell asleep on the side of a street, exhausted. 
an old lady found us and brought us food.
We were arrested shortly after crossing into hungary, driven to Budapest, 
and each of us had all ten of our fingerprints taken. after two days in prison, 
we were released. We got a cheap hotel.
after a while we got a ticket that took us almost all the way across austria. 
We did not know where we were. We thought we were still in austria and 
when the train stopped, i hid under the seat. a fat policeman picked me up 
using just three fingers. i had never been so afraid; i thought my heart would 
stop. When the police said we were in Germany, we were happy and relieved. 
suddenly i felt more tired than i had ever known.
The entire journey took 93 days and cost $6815.
A flight from Kabul to Frankfurt takes fifteen hours and costs less than $1000.
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Life in Germany: Tedium and Trauma
From this f irst-person account of Akbar’s life in flight, we return now to the 
third-person as we describe his adaptation to life in Germany. He arrived 
in Frankfurt three months after leaving Kabul, and was placed in a refugee 
hostel with other Afghans, Syrians, Iraqis, and Somalis. He takes German 
classes twice a week and plays soccer once a week. Summarizing his trip, 
Akbar said, ‘If I had known Europeans were so unfriendly, I would never 
have left Kabul. Bulgarians, Hungarians, and Serbs are the cruellest people 
in the world, worse than any Afghan, even the Baluch. They are thieves 
and smugglers’.
He sounded depressed and traumatized, especially in the earlier inter-
views. His accounts jumped abruptly from topic to topic. He constantly 
worries about deportation, and most of the time he endures uncertainty, 
regret, and boredom, with nothing to do. Relations with his few friends at 
the hostel can be tense; with some others, they border on combative. He 
has nightmares and eats irregularly. He sleeps most days.
The trip was a mistake, he explained, at times bitterly blaming his parents 
for allowing him to come. The debt his family has incurred – enough, he 
believes, for his family to have bought a house – seems impossible to repay. 
He had planned to f ind work as a carpenter, but his broken hand makes 
Figure 7.2  Akbar’s Route to Europe
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that career uncertain. He shakes hands cautiously, using three f ingers, to 
avoid pain. Over the three-month course of interviews between January 
and April 2016, his emotional state somewhat improved.
The shame of resuming life with his family in Kabul after failure and debt, 
especially in the honour-based Afghan culture, is too diff icult for him to 
entertain for long. If forced to return to Kabul or to witness his two uncles 
abusing his family again, Akbar is not sure what he would do. Although 
these two uncles appear not to be active Taliban, they are thought to have 
associations with them, and continue to grow bolder in their demands and 
threats. Akbar says that returning to the insecurity of daily life in Kabul 
after the hardships and costs of his journey is impossible. Meanwhile, if 
given an opportunity to work and study in Germany, Akbar believes that 
he would one day prove himself and thrive.
In early April 2016, a representative of the German off ice that coor-
dinates refugees gathered a group of twenty refugees from the hostel. 
They took a train to an immigration off ice, which Akbar described as a 
police station. Akbar was f ingerprinted and photographed, his height 
and identifying features were recorded, and he responded ‘yes’ to the 
only two questions: ‘Are you from Afghanistan?’ and ‘Are you a Muslim?’ 
The process took ten minutes. He explained, ‘I was so nervous, my hands 
were shaking, but when I was given that card, it felt like they gave me 
a million dollars’. He believed that the card meant that he would not 
be deported.
His family in Kabul was tremendously relieved that he made it to 
Germany, and deeply concerned about the prospects of his asylum 
application. Unlike previous generations of Afghan refugees, digital 
technologies make it possible for the family to be in frequent contact 
with Akbar en route, which is emotionally reassuring but f inancially 
devastating: continuous contact gives smugglers the upper hand, forcing 
the family to obtain more and more money in their efforts to keep their 
son safe.
His sister Kosar explained, ‘We were worried about him, but we were also 
happy he might get a good education and better employment. Now that we 
know he is there, we are happy for him, though we know he might still get 
deported’. Both sisters say, without hesitation, that they would have gone if 
their family had allowed it. The whole family emphasizes the importance 
of the education that they believe Akbar will be able to get in Germany, an 
advantage of being there that rises above all others.
Masood, his older brother with whom he often fought, sometimes 
intensely, described Akbar since arriving in Germany as ‘transformed’, 
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saying: ‘Before he left he was a boy, but now he is sophisticated, polite, deep, 
and optimistic about the future. He gives advice to his brother and sisters, 
telling us how to treat our parents, and how to make the most out of life’. 
The authors believe that he has been more honest with us than he has been 
with his family about the hardships and dangers of the journey, and about 
his troubled state of mind.
Conclusion: Uncertainty and Instability
Statistics, images of refugee camps, and stories about European political 
tensions frequently appear in the media, but the family history and transit 
experiences of people who make the journey mostly escape the public eye 
and policy analyses. As a quarter million Afghans contend with uncertain 
futures in Europe, and a mass deportation of Afghans from Europe is in 
its early stages, we conclude this chapter with two arguments: f irst, that 
contemporary Afghan refugees need to be understood in reference to the 
duration of their national historical experience with conflict and displace-
ment; and second, that the decision to deport large numbers of Afghans 
from European countries will further destabilize the volatile political 
circumstances in Afghanistan.
The European reception of refugees, particularly Afghans, grows colder 
by the day. Afghans were the second largest group of asylum seekers in 
Europe in 2015, with 196,170 applications.5 However, policy and legal 
questions intertwine with a growing fear of Muslims, security concerns, 
and xenophobic visions of Europe’s non-white, non-Christian future. A 
central debate surrounding the growing discomfort with refugees in Europe 
turns on whether this influx of people are war refugees escaping violence 
and persecution, or economic migrants pursuing a better life. Accord-
ing to the 1951 Refugee Convention, a refugee cannot be sent back into 
circumstances where their life and freedom are threatened – the so-called 
non-refoulement principle (R. Jones 2016). But this simplistic binary has 
become outdated, and obfuscates both the multiple motivations of asylum 
seekers and the borderless movements of geopolitical problems in the 
early twenty-f irst century; consider as examples the multiple instigators 
of conflict in Afghanistan, or the borderless challenges posed by climate 
change (Parenti 2011).
5  This f igure is from the Eurostat database, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database.
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In mid-February 2016, central European countries began to deny Afghans 
access, creating backlogs and resentment. Soon after, Macedonia announced 
that Afghans would be classif ied as economic migrants and denied access, 
leaving thousands stranded at the Greek border. Serbia announced in late 
February 2016 that it had begun a policy of only accepting refugees from 
Syria and Iraq (Strickland 2016). Serbia, Slovenia, Austria, Croatia, and 
Macedonia then signed a joint statement restricting the flow of refugees, 
envisioning tighter restrictions over time.
Finally, in October 2016, the European Union and the Afghan government 
signed an agreement that allows the unlimited deportation of Afghans, with 
the EU using funding to leverage the Afghan government into compliance. 
The Afghan President Ashraf Ghani said dispassionately, ‘I have no sympathy’ 
for Afghan migrants (BBC 2016). Beyond the individual suffering, however, 
if tens of thousands of young Afghan men were to be abruptly and forcibly 
repatriated it would add kindling to a political environment that is already 
in f lames, where the Taliban prey upon vulnerable and disenfranchised 
youth. The prospect of resuming life in Afghanistan is economically and 
emotionally devastating for deportees. Initial studies indicate that the 
majority would leave again, while some of those who remained would 
become addicted to drugs or involved in criminal/insurgent activities for 
money and opportunities (Siegfried 2016).
The EU-Afghan deal also raises questions about the non-refoulement 
obligations of European Union countries to house people at risk until the 
danger passes. In Afghanistan, the conflict is approaching a four decades 
since the Soviet intervention, and a decade and half since the US one. As 
we write, the Taliban possesses more territory than at any time since 2001. 
Kundoz City in the north fell briefly in late 2015. Lashkar Gah city, the capital 
of Helmand province in the south – where, not coincidently, nearly half of 
the world’s opium is produced – has the Taliban at the city’s edge and in 
control of most of the province. Suicide attacks, IEDs, and recent IS incursions 
challenge physical security and wreck conf idence in the future, even in 
places where the government is f irmly entrenched. The Asia Foundation’s 
2015 survey of the Afghan people found nearly 70 per cent of Afghans fear 
for their personal safety, the highest percentage since the survey began in 
2006 (Asia Foundation 2015). In a war that all of the parties involved agree 
will get worse before it gets better, repatriating Afghans contradicts the 
EU’s non-refoulement obligations.
The particulars of Akbar’s story are unique, but most Afghan asylum 
seekers in Europe share the basic arc of his experiences. A family history 
of displacement due to past wars is the norm amongst Afghans. The high 
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costs and abuses suffered while being smuggled across borders is also 
common. In particular, those who travel alone lose the emotional support 
of their family while adjusting to an unfamiliar culture, learning a new 
language, and feeling pressure to f inancially support their family – or 
repay the debt of the trip – as the possibility of deportation looms. And 
the journey itself can be psychologically devastating. Akbar was beaten 
multiple times, hung upside down naked, robbed, punched in the face, 
had his hand broken by policemen, and jailed, before he was settled into 
a building full of broken spirits existing at the whim of the German state’s 
policy decisions on asylum.
The media tells a mostly Eurocentric story focused on water crossing, 
border defences, and international relations. Their photographs freeze 
victims in time. The dead wash ashore. Refugees cannot report crimes 
committed against them by the same authorities from whom they beg 
asylum. Following the life experiences and history of one Afghan family 
complicates the simple migrant/refugee divide, while reminding us of the 
duration of the Afghan conflicts and the complicated geopolitical origins 
of a ‘war on terror’. By presenting the circumstances of a single family’s 
struggle to survive across decades of conflict, our conceit is to keep the 
realities of war victims from being submerged by the abstractions of national 
interests and policy debates. In the end, after a harrowing and expensive 
journey, and despite a life in Germany def ined by tedious uncertainty, 
regret, and loneliness, Akbar wants to stay in Europe. He says he would 
again risk his life to do so, at least until Afghanistan becomes secure: ‘I 
am changed since I came to Europe; if I am deported back to Kabul, I will 
not stay.’
References
Al Jazeera (2015). Taliban threaten second Afghan provincial capital as insurgency 
spreads. Al Jazeera, 12 October.
Asia Foundation (2015). A Survey of the Afghan People. https://asiafoundation.org/
resources/pdfs/Afghanistanin2015.pdf
Azamy, H. and Weir, J. (2015). Islamic State and jihadi realignments in Khorasan. 
The Diplomat, 08 May.
Barfield, T. (2010). Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
BBC (2016). President Ghani: ‘No sympathy for Afghan migrants’. British Broadcast-
ing Corporation, 31 March.
184 James Weir and rohullah amin 
BBC (2016). Migrant crisis: Migration to Europe explained in seven charts. British 
Broadcasting Corporation. 4 March.
Ewing, P. (2017). Thousands more troops needed to break Afghanistan ‘stalemate,’ 
general warns. National Public Radio, 9 February.
Gall, C. (2014). In Afghan election, signs of systemic fraud cast doubt on many 
votes. The New York Times, 24 August.
Jones, R. (2016). Violent Borders: Refugees and the Right to Move. New York: Verso.
Jones, S. (2016). U.S. commander: 12 terrorist or ‘extremist’ groups now operating 
in Afghanistan. The Christian Science Monitor, 29 July.
Linschoten, A. and Kuehn, F. (2012). An Enemy We Created: The Myth of the Taliban-al 
Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Parenti, C. (2011). Tropic of Chaos: Climate Change and the New Geography of Violence. 
New York: Nation Books.
Patan, M. (2007). Ghazni: Land of Mystics. Ghazni: Governorate of Ghazni 
Publications.
Rasmussen, S. (2014). Kabul – the f ifth fastest growing city in the world – is bursting 
at the seams. The Guardian, 11 December.
Sidahmed, M. and Ackerman, S. (2016). Afghan forces lose ground to Taliban despite 
delayed US troop withdrawal. The Guardian, 29 July.
Siegfried, K. (2016). What became of 25 young Afghan deportees? IRIN News, 6 April.
Strickland, P. (2016). Serbia ‘denying entry’ to Afghan refugees. Al Jazeera, 
21 February.
Weir, J. and Azamy, H. (2015). Economic impediments to a Taliban peace process. 
The Economics of Peace & Security Journal, 10(2), pp. 75-84.
Zahid, F. (2015). The successes and failures of Pakistan’s operation Zarb-e-Azb. 
Terrorism Monitor Journal, 13, pp. 5-6.
The Journey To europe 185
About the Authors
James Weir has a Ph.D. in cultural anthropology from the Graduate Centre 
at the City University of New York. His dissertation ‘We Went to the Hills’: 
Four Afghan Life Stories uses life narratives to examine the lived histories 
and emotional legacies of the Soviet war period. His interest in the region 
began over two and half decades ago as a US Peace Corps volunteer in 
Balochistan, Pakistan and he continues to write on and work in the region.
Rohullah Amin is a medical doctor and psychologist by training. He con-
ducts independent social psychological research focused on war and peace 
psychology in the context of Afghanistan and the impacts of the conflict 
on the collective psyche. Amin studied applied psychology at New York 
University (2011-2013); before that, he studied at Kabul Medical University 
(2004-2010). He is currently serving as the director/senior research fellow 
at the American Institute of Afghanistan Studies. He has also taught at the 
American University of Afghanistan.

8 Hardening Regional Borders
Changes in Mobility from South Asia to the European Union
Marta Zorko
Jones, Reece and Ferdoush, Md. Azmeary (eds), Borders and Mobility in 
South Asia and Beyond. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2018
doi: 10.5117/9789462984547/ch08
Abstract
This chapter provides an overview of how European Union states on the 
migrant route deal with migrants from South Asia. The militarization, 
securitization, and hardening of borders in Europe influenced all types of 
migration and changed the perception of migrants from many different 
regions of the world. The return of physical barriers and border controls 
created new geopolitical patterns of movement. The chapter analyses how 
and to what extent these processes have affected migrations within Europe 
and from South Asia to Europe. The aim is to show both quantitative and 
qualitative changes by analysing the trends and presenting an overview 
of migration patterns, problems, and challenges from the perspective of 
migrant rights, chances, and possibilities.
Keywords: geopolitics of migration, European migration crisis, securitiza-
tion of borders, migration patterns
Introduction
In 2016, the refugee crisis demonstrated new trends that highlighted crucial 
issues for future migration processes in Europe. My f irst encounter with the 
crisis itself was in 2015, when I was at a conference in Budapest, Hungary. 
Rumours about refugees from South Asia and Syria arriving in the Budapest 
city centre and off icials closing the railway stations circulated among the 
conference participants and guests. Soon the story was confirmed, when 
refugees began to march towards Germany over the Erszebet Bridge because 
of the closed railways and the lack of organized transport to their destination 
(Hardman 2015). A few days later, Hungary closed its borders and erected 
razor wire barriers on its borders with Serbia and Croatia. With the way 
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from Serbia to Germany through Hungary closed, the main flow of people 
was redirected towards my home country, Croatia. The f irst transit camp 
was built in Opatovac, next to the Šid-Tovarnik border crossing between 
Serbia and Croatia. Although there was a lot of information about them 
in the Croatian media, the refugees themselves were not visible in other 
parts of Croatia. Later, when a new transit camp was built next to Slavonski 
Brod due to the weather conditions and inability to house more people in 
the existing camps, the possibility of meeting or even seeing a refugee was 
limited to off icials and volunteers in the camp. There were many different 
stories in both the Croatian and world media about the living conditions 
and human rights of the refugees in the camps along the Balkan route. As 
horror stories about the conditions in Greek and Macedonian camps reached 
their peak, I began to research the situation in the refugee camps along the 
Balkan route, from Greece to Germany via Croatia.
I made a f ield visit to the transit camp in Kilkis, Greece in the middle of 
February 2016 and another to the transit camp in Slavonski Brod, Croatia 
two weeks later, at the end of February 2016. I then made a third visit to 
Fürstenfeldbruck, Germany in late September 2016. All of this f ield research 
consisted of reconnaissance into the living conditions in and the models 
of organization of the settlements. During the f ield visits, I conducted 
semi-structured interviews with ten state off icials.1 The f irst research trip 
included part of the Balkan route from Croatia, via Serbia and Macedonia, to 
Greece. The second was focused solely on transit camps in Croatia: Opatovac, 
which was already closed, but kept on standby in case of need; and Slavonski 
Brod. The focus of the third research trip was to compare the refugees’ living 
conditions in the destination countries, rather than solely the transit ones.
Differences in organization and patterns of behaviour were immediately 
visible between the different sites. In Greece, some refugees were settled 
in off icial guarded, organized, and closed camps with mostly adequate 
infrastructure; others were living in unofficial, randomly erected settlements 
1  The f irst interview was with a policeman on the border between Serbia and Macedonia; the 
second was with a customs off icer on the border between Macedonia and Greece. My requests 
for interviews in Greece (at the gate of the Kilkis camp and from the taxi driver outside the camp, 
waiting in the line to take the refugees to the border) were refused. During the second f ield visit, 
I conducted f ive interviews: two with the county spokespersons of the Ministry of the Interior 
of Croatia; one with an individual from the National Protection and Rescue Directorate; and 
two with volunteers inside the transit camp in Slavonski Brod. I conducted three interviews in 
Germany with military personnel employed at the Fürstenfeldbruck military base, part of which 
has been transformed into a detention camp. Since a majority of the interviewees requested 
anonymity, only their functions will be mentioned in this chapter.
Hardening regional Borders 189
of tents. In absence of infrastructure next to the roads, gas stations often 
served as hubs of these unofficial settlements, providing electricity and water 
supplies. The refugees were often seen walking along the roads and highways 
towards the north. The situation was similar in Macedonia, where refugees 
settled themselves in unofficial camps near the border crossing. In Croatia, 
however, the experience was quite the opposite: the ongoing organized transit 
to and from the transit camp made the refugees virtually invisible to the local 
population. This is why, I propose that the Croatian example of handling the 
crisis could be named ‘the silent transit’, a concept explained in detail below.
Several trends are already evident from the 2016 European Union crisis. 
First, the off icial state responses to such a human crisis almost uniformly 
took the form of using security mechanisms to harden regional borders. 
Second, the securitization and militarization of the crisis, the negative 
discourses about migrants, and the lack of solidarity between the member 
states of the EU will have an important influence on further migrations to 
Europe. Third, off icial state policies show clear geographical patterns that 
appear to be related to the proximity of the member state to the refugee 
flow: sites of transit, targeted (destination) countries, and those which were 
indifferent to the crisis. States’ willingness to respond to the crisis depended 
upon their exposure and geographical proximity to the migrant flows.
This chapter analyses these geopolitical patterns of behaviour to develop 
categories of EU member states in terms of their actions and the mechanisms 
they utilized (which reveals the importance of territorial proximity and 
geography in this case), and the lack of solidarity between EU member 
states. Both factors will impact future migrations to Europe. The behaviours 
of transit countries are examined through the comparative analysis of two 
responses to the arrival of refugees: building barriers and creating a system 
of off icial transit. These two responses are starkly different approaches, but, 
somewhat surprisingly, produced similar results. In this chapter, the focus 
is on South Asians’ migration experiences as they passed through these 
new routes in search of a different life in Europe.
Geopolitical Patterns of Migration
Jakub Marian argues that the refugee crisis has not yet significantly changed 
the overall picture of migration in Europe (2016). Prior to the refugee crisis, 
migration mainly consisted of internal movement between European 
countries and within EU member states. With the exception of the United 
Kingdom, which saw the highest influx from South Asia (India is the most 
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common country of origin of the foreign-born population in the UK), the 
foreign-born population in Europe comes from countries on the European 
continent or in its close neighbourhood. A geographical pattern that could 
be called ‘one step ahead’ sums up European inner migration trends, which 
mainly move from east to west. This means that neighbouring countries are 
the most usual destination for migrants. For instance, the most common 
origin country of the foreign-born population in Poland is Ukraine, while 
in Germany it is Poland. A second pattern visible in Eastern Europe is part 
of the legacy of the Cold War. Russia stands out as the country of origin of 
most migrants in a wide bloc spanning from the Baltic States to Ukraine 
and Bulgaria. In Western Europe, traditional relations create more patterns, 
such as migration from Morocco to Spain, and from Algeria to France. There 
are also some cyclic migration patterns visible in regional dynamics, mostly 
on the Balkan Peninsula, Scandinavia, and the German-speaking areas 
that were historically called Mittleuropa. Despite the refugee crisis, these 
longstanding patterns still prevail; the most frequent countries of origin 
have remained mostly the same (Marian 2016). Although the dynamics of 
regular migrations in Europe have not seriously changed, the refugee crisis 
has created tensions between EU member states and their neighbours. 
The crisis has def ined new patterns of action and generated geopolitical 
discourses that will influence future perceptions of migration in Europe.
The refugee crisis has sparked the hardening of internal European borders. 
Since the external European Schengen border is not yet f inal (Croatia is EU 
member state but not yet member of Schengen Agreement), the discontinua-
tion of the Schengen space caused a domino effect of razor wire building and 
tightening border controls between EU member states. Inside the Schengen 
zone, different groups of states reacted to the refugee crisis in different ways, 
most commonly through a temporary suspension on the Schengen agreement 
and the imposition of strong control on their own national borders. Such 
processes could be explained through both contemporary theories on borders 
as a social phenomenon and as a question of securitization. Borders as social 
phenomenon implies their possibility to transform in social interaction while 
securitization implies change towards the hardening of border regimes in 
the time of crisis. Anssi Paasi defines borders not through the postmodern 
understanding of the world, but as phenomena that occur in practice. In 
this sense, borders cannot be understood as f ixed and stable, but rather as 
processes embedded in social activities and discourses (Paasi 1998). If we 
understand borders as a process that changes, the change can easily be 
shifted in other directions. Once softened, borders could be hardened again. 
The hardening of borders and reversing to the traditional understanding 
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of borders2 is often seen in times of crisis or changes in power relations 
in the wider region3. During the refugee crisis, some countries actually 
experienced a decrease in migration – which can be explained through 
their implementation of isolating and nationally oriented border politics 
as a response to the crisis. One example of this is Hungary, where the rate 
of migration is falling below the average before the recent refugee crisis.4
The so-called5 ‘return of geopolitics’ (Mead, 2014), in Europe was evident 
from geographical divisions and power relations. In the current refugee crisis, 
geographical and geopolitical patterns of the phenomena are more than visible 
and will be further elaborated. In addition to security concerns, however, the 
willingness to help also shows patterns related to power and geography. The 
first geographical division is between EU member states and non-EU member 
states. Although the European Union territory is otherwise rather compact, it 
is discontinuous in the Balkan Peninsula. This geostrategic weak link has been 
recognized in this and other cases (not only in terms of criminal activities 
and migration paths). Second, and specifically with reference to the refugee 
crisis, European countries can be divided into three major categories based 
on the perspective of the refugees: transit countries, targeted (destination) 
countries, and indifferent countries. Each of these categories demonstrates 
a strict geographical pattern based on their proximity to the refugee flows.
Transit Countries
The transit countries are primarily countries in south and southeast Europe, 
namely Turkey, Greece, Macedonia, Serbia, Croatia, Hungary, and Slovenia. 
All of these countries in the Balkan route reacted in similar ways to the 
refugee crisis: by dealing with the crisis without helping to solve the wider 
problem. These countries were not the destinations of the refugees, as they 
never meant to stay or seek asylum there. Nevertheless, some of them reacted 
in a way that no one could predict – by closing their borders and building 
2  Traditional understanding of the border implies that they are strict formal lines between 
two states strongly depending on bilateral relations and international odrer in particular time. 
Contemporary understanding of the borders goes beyond such an narrow def inition, including 
borders as processes instead of f irm lines of demarcation between two entities. 
3  The Concept of the Wider Region refers to the regions inclining to the Region in question. 
Since regions often overlap, the neighboring regions are also under the inf luence of power 
relations in question.
4  International Organization for Migration, Hungary website, www.iom.hu, 9/1/2017.
5  The term so-called Return of Geopolitics is used because Geopolitics never left the academic 
scene or political arena. Even in the decade of Endisms (Huntington, 1989) geopolitics never 
lost its importance. 
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fences to redirect refugee flows out of their territory. Razor wire fences are 
not new in this part of Europe; in 2012, Greece built such a fence at a rather 
popular crossing point to block migrants arriving from Turkey (Almukhtar, 
Keller, & Watkins 2015). This barrier redirected the migrant f low in two 
directions: by sea towards the Greek islands, and by land towards Bulgaria. 
Bulgaria reacted in a similar way, by building fences on its own border with 
Turkey in 2014 (Almukhtar, Keller, & Watkins 2015). In 2015, at the very 
beginning of the refugee crisis, Hungary also built a razor wire fence, f irst on 
the border with Serbia, and a month later on the one with Croatia. Hungary’s 
plans for building a fence on the Romanian border are currently on standby, 
since the overland Balkan route is temporarily closed. Slovenia also reacted 
by building fences with a razor wire barrier along the border with Croatia.
The second model of reaction by transit countries was what could be 
termed ‘fast transit’. Macedonia, especially after the police crackdown6, has 
focused on quickly moving migrants north, to Serbia (Almukhtar, Keller, & 
Watkins 2015). Serbia has reacted in a similar way by transferring them on 
to Croatia. In both instances, the governments created transit camps and 
provided transportation services to move people through the country and to 
the next border on their route to Germany and other destination countries.
Croatia, as a member of the EU but not yet a member of the Schengen 
system, became one of the main transitional routes for the migrant f low. 
Hungary’s construction of a razor wire fence on its borders with Serbia (a 
non-member state) and Croatia (a member state, but not yet a Schengen 
country) closed one of the main migration routes. Slovenia also installed a 
razor wire fence on the border with Croatia. Together, these fences shifted 
the focus of the migrant crisis towards the Croatian borders. Croatia did 
not build a fence (although it was frequently mentioned in Croatian public 
debates as plan B, or even plan C), and instead did everything to make the 
transit of people as invisible as possible. In this case, it could be called ‘a 
silent transit’. The refugees arrived by train at an old industrial complex on 
the border that had the needed infrastructure, they stayed there for a few 
days or even less, and were quickly transferred to the Slovenian border. The 
transit camp was situated far from the main roads or local people; other than 
through the media, the refugees had no contact with the local population 
or any opportunity to impact the discourses surrounding their movement.
6  The police crackdown in Macedonia happened between police and migrants upon the 
state decision that only migrants from the war zone in Syria would be allowed to pass. After 
the physical encounter in 2016, there were over 50 Afghans trapped in no-man’s land between 
Serbia and Macedonia (Cook, 2016).
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The Croatian experience as a transit country was twofold. In the context 
of off icial state policies and international politics, as well as regarding the 
relations with its surrounding European states, Croatia was considered a 
‘success story’ (European Economic and Social Committee 2016: 7). Crisis 
management experts agreed that the refugee crisis was handled successfully, 
considering the circumstances.7 Despite the sometimes-high numbers, the 
flow of refugees caused neither major problems in the state’s functioning nor 
any reports of human rights violations. Refugees entered Croatia by train, 
were registered and taken care of, had the possibility to request asylum in 
Croatia or look for their family members if lost, and left Croatia by train 
towards Slovenia border. The transit camp was organized and functioned 
at a high level of order and discipline, and provided all the supplies the 
refugees needed: food, water, clothing, shelter, if wanted, and free internet 
connection. The key characteristic of the transit camp in Croatia was the 
speed of the transit. The majority of refugees spent no more than a few 
hours in the camp. Only a limited number stayed overnight, and even fewer 
for a few days.8 Such procedures seemed to suit both the off icials in the 
Croatian camp and the refugees, since they were transferred as quickly as 
possible towards their desired destination countries. Also, there were no 
major incidents or problems in the camp.9 From the perspective of security, 
off icial discourse, and public opinion the refugee crisis was handled well in 
Croatia. Croatia imposed no border walls or physical obstacles, controlled 
the flow of people, and transferred them as soon as possible towards their 
desired destinations.
Nevertheless, from the perspective of human rights and human dignity 
a few questions could be raised. The location of the winter transit-reception 
centre in Slavonski Brod could seem logical due to the border proximity 
and the direction(s) of the refugees’ f low. The camp was situated in an old 
industrial complex in Bjeliš, several kilometres from Slavonski Brod. Bjeliš 
has all of the infrastructure needed for transportation, most importantly rail 
lines. It is also an isolated and sparsely inhabited area, which ensured that 
the local population would have no contact with the refugees whatsoever. 
Such isolation prevented potential negative reactions from local population 
and diminished the feeling of a ‘state of emergency’ experienced by some 
7  Interview with individual associated with the National Protection and Rescue Directorate, 
February 2016.
8  Interview with a spokesperson from the Ministry of Interior for Brodsko-posavska County, 
February 2016.
9  Except for a few attempts to escape from the camp. Interview with a spokesperson from 
the Ministry of Interior for Brodsko-posavska County, February 2016.
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other transit countries. On the one hand, this ‘invisibility of the refugees’ 
prevented the proliferation of negative discourses about the migration crisis 
in the public sphere; on the other, information was limited to that presented 
in the media or gained from off icial state sources. Such isolation would not 
be helpful in the long term considering the possible future integration or 
assimilation of the refugees in Croatia.
Before Slavonski Brod was introduced as a transit camp for the refugees, 
an ad hoc camp existed in Opatovac, near the border-crossing town of 
Tovarnik. At that site the Croatian army, Red Cross, and National Protection 
and Rescue Directorate built a camp that could host up to 4800 people 
at once.10 This camp was temporarily closed in November 2015 due to 
the need for more space, weather conditions, and off icial state politics 
(Patković 2015). The new transit camp in Slavonski Brod has a capacity to 
host up to 5000 people at once, but during times of the highest f low up to 
9000 people went through the camp every day.11 Altogether, over 660,000 
people went through Croatia from September 2015 to February 2016. It 
is estimated that over 350,000 people went through the transit camp in 
Slavonski Brod, while 314,400 people went through Opatovac during the 
f irst three months of the crisis.12 During my f ield visit to Slavonski Brod 
in February 2016, the daily influx rate was between 1000 and 3000 people; 
at the beginning of the refugee crisis, it had ranged from 6000 to 9000 
people.13 The largest number of refugees processed in a single day was 
11,670, on 24 October 2015.14 Statistical data of the registered refugees 
who entered Croatia in Vukovrasko-srijemska County showed that they 
were mainly (62.5 per cent) male.15 During the time of crisis, the top f ive 
countries of origin of the refugees registered in Croatia were Syria (51.32 
per cent), Afghanistan (28.73 per cent), Iraq (13.53 per cent), Pakistan (2.39 
per cent), and Bangladesh (0.4 per cent). Other nationalities together made 
10  Interview with National Protection and Rescue Directorate person, February 2016.
11  Interview with a spokesperson from the Ministry of Interior for Brodsko-posavska County, 
February 2016.
12  Interview with a spokesperson from the Ministry of Interior for Vukovarsko-srijemska 
County, February 2016.
13  Interview with a spokesperson from Ministry of Interior for Brodsko-posavska County, 
February 2016.
14  Interview with National Protection and Rescue Directorate person, February 2016.
15  This sample consisted of 33.1 per cent of the total number of refugees who entered and 
registered in Croatia. Among the total number of 115,158 people, there were 71,930 men (62.5 per 
cent); 15,088 women (13.1 per cent), and 28,140 children (24.4 per cent). Interview with National 
Protection and Rescue Directorate person, February 2016.
Hardening regional Borders 195
up 3.63 per cent.16 The problem with the off icial data is that only around 
20 per cent of the refugees had any kind of identif ication cards or travel 
documents.17 Of those that did have documents, over 30 per cent were 
from South Asia.
The transit camp in Slavonski Brod was closed in April 2016, and the remain-
ing refugees were taken through a detention camp in Ježevo and hotel Porin 
in Zagreb. Official numbers show that Croatia was definitely not a destination 
country: the total number of people seeking protection in Croatia in 2015 was 
only 152 among whom the number of refugee asylum seekers were even lower.18 
The official data for the first three months of 2016 shows the influence of the 
crisis and pressure on the Balkan route, but not significantly in the sense of 
changing the amount of interest in seeking asylum in Croatia.19
Some cases of the asylum seekers could truly describe the emotional and 
human components beyond the discourses of the securitization of migration 
and borders. The camp in Ježevo, named the ‘Reception Centre for Foreigners’ 
was used for persons with legal issues before the crisis. It is a closed and 
isolated institution.20 Other locations were the hotel Porin in Zagreb and 
the receiving centre for asylum seekers in Kutina. As a part of European 
Union and future Schengen member, Croatia had started to build detention 
centres for migrants in Trilj and Tovarnik with EU funds. Croatia has received 
120 million euros from the Schengen Facility to meet the standards for the 
16  The numbers are as follows: Syria 59,097 people, Afghanistan 33,092 people, Iraq 15,557 
people, 2748 Pakistani, and 425 people from Bangladesh. With the number of 4219 people of other 
nationalities it makes a sample of total 115,158 people that entered Croatia in f irst two months 
of the crisis. Statistical data from the National Protection and Rescue Directorate, provided in 
interview with National Protection and Rescue Directorate person, February 2016.
17  Interview with National Protection and Rescue Directorate person, February 2016; confirmed 
by spokespersons from the Ministry of Interior. They list this issue as a top challenge for the 
off icial statistics.
18  There were 135 male and only seventeen female protection seekers. The top ten countries 
of origin of international protection seekers (by number of individuals) in 2015 in Croatia were: 
Algeria (21); Syria (18); Nigeria (11); Morocco (9); Serbia (7); Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and Turkey 
(6); and Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Iran, and Ukraine (5). Twenty more countries of 
origin had less than f ive international protection seekers. Off icial Ministry of Interior Statistics. 
19  In those three months, 379 people sought international protection in Croatia. The male-
female ratio also improved, to approximately three-to-one. The top ten countries of origin 
also changed, pointing to the effect of the refugee crisis. The top ten countries (by number of 
individuals) were: Iraq (134); Afghanistan (76); Syria (49); Iran (31); Algeria and Morocco (17); 
Somalia (11); Pakistan (10); Turkey (6); and Lebanon, Nigeria, and Serbia (4). Eleven more countries 
each had less than three international protection seekers. Off icial Ministry of Interior Statistics.
20  It was where foreigners who had been denied asylum waited for deportation. Off icial 
Ministry of Interior website.
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supervision and control of external borders of the European Union (Pavlić 
2016). Some of those funds were used for building closed detention centres 
for migrants. However, these reception centres are often called ‘prisons’ by 
civil society networks, since foreigners have limited movement possibilities 
(even after receiving asylum) and are guarded by police or security forces (No 
Border Initiative Zagreb 2016). Ježevo is often called just another detention 
prison and it is listed in the Migreurop ‘Close the Camps’ Initiative.21
Meanwhile, the off icial statistics show that it is not easy to get interna-
tional protection in Croatia. In 2015, only 36 out of 152 asylum requests were 
granted, which is 23.7 per cent. Together with seven subsidiary protections 
it makes 43 cases out of 152 positively solved. The numbers for the f irst three 
months of 2016 are even more dramatic: from 379 requests for asylum, only 
two were granted.22 My informal discussion with asylum seekers housed 
at the Hotel Porin in Zagreb showed that there were multiple issues with 
their treatment on all levels, including housing, life conditions, hate speech, 
physical abuse, raids, right of movement, and other granted human rights.
Regardless of the positive or negative impact of such policies towards 
refugees in terms of creating or decoding the discourses about them, the 
geographical position of Croatia as a transit country between the integrated 
and the non-integrated parts of Europe influenced the selection of these 
actions and policies. The historical position of periphery and the current 
position of ‘double borderlands’ affected the measures and actions in this 
case as well (Zorko 2015).
Target (Destination) Countries
The targeted or destination countries for the migration of the refugees were 
the Scandinavian and central European countries, primarily Germany. 
These countries accepted the refugees through the implementation of 
more or less successful policies and procedures. However, the refugees’ 
integration into these societies remains a huge challenge. My f ield visit to 
Fürstenfeldbruck (Germany) in late September 2016 showed that integration 
is a time-consuming process for both refugees and the local population. 
Situated in a converted military base, it became obvious that this camp 
21  Migreurop is a network of associations, activists and researchers from countries in the 
European Union, Sub-Saharan Africa, North Africa, and the Middle East founded in 2002. The 
network deals with human rights issues regarding the exclusion of migrants in Europe. They 
have been mapping detention prisons and camps in wider Europe.
22  Off icial Ministry of Interior Statistics.
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was only a temporary solution. The lack of communication and contact 
generated discourses that cannot fade away easily.
Indifferent Countries
The third group of countries consists of those that were not affected by the 
current refugee flow, mostly located in southwest (specif ically Portugal and 
Spain) and northeast (The Visegrad Group and Baltic countries) Europe. 
These countries did not show the will to act, or interfere, in the refugee 
crisis unless it was absolutely needed. Although Spain and Italy are under 
pressure from different migration paths, they were excluded from this 
particular refugee crisis. The former Visegrad countries acted along with 
Hungary offering help in protecting the southern border and closing the 
possible path through their territory (Kasnota 2016). This is another proof 
of the lack of European solidarity, and could be interpreted as a European 
failure to act unanimously in a crisis.
Regardless of the geopolitical imaginations embedded in the terms of the 
North, South, East, and West, the geographical pattern in this case is strict 
and nation-state oriented. Adding power and politics to this geographical 
equation, the countries can again be classif ied into two major categories and 
several subcategories as stated in abovementioned geographical patterns. 
The countries of Eastern Europe closed themselves to the migrants’ f low 
through different alliances and declared themselves closed to cooperation 
through, for example, the installation of razor wire fences. Among the target 
countries, some EU non-members (Switzerland, Lichtenstein, Iceland, 
and Norway) requested quotas and had a will to engage with the crisis. 
The transit countries, especially the non-Schengen countries, managed 
the crisis on their own through numerous plans and policies declared at a 
national level. These plans mainly involved national security and led to the 
militarization of the issue. A lot of tensions undermined any attempt on a 
coherent and united plan at the level of the EU. The non-affected countries 
stood aside, watching the implosion and building of the fences between 
member states. The project of ‘Europe Without Borders’ failed when it was 
most needed. Instead, in the time of crisis, European (dis)unity showed its 
true face once again. The solidarity as an idea some member states relied 
on, failed completely for the second time in a very short period.23 Both times 
it failed on important issues of European unity and identity.
23  The f irst time that european solidarity was tested during the 2008 f inancial crisis. Lack of 
burden-sharing in case of PIIGS countries is similar to lack of solidarity with destination countries 
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South Asian Migration to Europe
There are two major patterns of migration from South Asia (primarily India, 
Bangladesh, Pakistan, and Afghanistan) to Europe: regular migrations that 
have been ongoing for decades; and those related to the current crisis.
Of the South Asian migratory flows to the Global North, ‘the one to Great 
Britain has the longest and most distinctive history. The 1948 Nationality Act 
in Britain, passed at a time of labour shortages within the country, allowed 
unrestricted entry to Great Britain for the citizens of the realm’s former colonies’ 
(Kibria 2011). While British immigration policies became increasingly restrictive 
in the 1960s and 1970s, large populations from former colonies had already 
settled in the UK. In the United Kingdom, ‘the average number of acceptances 
for settlement in the 1970s was 72,000 per year; in the 1980s and early 1990s 
it was about 54,000 per year’ (Migration Watch UK 2017). In the late 1990s, 
the numbers increased rapidly, reaching 156,000 by 2004, after which there 
was a slight decline. It has been argued that most early ‘New Commonwealth 
migrants’ were British settlers and colonial officials with their descendants 
returning from Britain’s former colonies (Migration Watch UK 2017). India, 
Poland, and Pakistan are currently the top three countries of birth for the 
foreign-born population in the UK.24 Moreover, India is the country of birth 
for 9.3 per cent of all foreign-born persons living in London; other South Asian 
countries – Pakistan (4.3 per cent), Bangladesh (3.1 per cent), and Sri Lanka 
(2.3 per cent) – fall in the top ten countries in terms of the birth of migrants 
currently living in London.25 The historical and geopolitical gravitation of former 
colonial relations is noticeable in the case of India, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.
The refugee crisis of 2015 also influenced the traditional and regular 
migration f lows in United Kingdom. Not geographically included in the 
flows of the migration crisis, and not even politically obliged any more, ‘UK’s 
historically distinctive position within the EU has deepened in part due 
to migration concerns’ (International Organization for Migration 2015: 4). 
Migration issues were highly relevant in the BREXIT debate as well: the 
in the 2015/2016 migration crisis. The difference is only in the reasons, or the background, for 
the lack of solidarity between member states.
24 ‘[A]ccounting for 9.2, 9.1 and 6.0 per cent of the total population, followed by Ireland and 
Germany. India and Poland remain the top two countries of citizenship of foreign citizens, 
with Poles being the biggest group, accounting for about 15 per cent of the total’ (Rienzo and 
Vargas-Silva 2015).
25  Exceedingly, ‘Poland, Romania, Ireland, and Italy are the four European countries in the top 
ten. With the exception of Italy, Romania, and Jamaica, the remaining top-ten countries of birth 
for migrants in London are also top-ten countries at the UK level’ (Rienzo and Vargas-Silva 2015).
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UK’s decision to ‘opt out of the European relocation mechanism for migrant 
and refugee arrivals in 2015, its selective participation in EU migration-
related policies and the referendum on EU membership itself in June 2016 
demonstrate the UK’s ongoing efforts to negotiate migration concerns in 
relation to the EU’ (International Organization for Migration 2015: 4). The 
New Immigration Act came into force in 2016 and introduced new measures 
intended to prevent irregular migrations (International Organization for 
Migration 2015). Later on, the Strategic Plan introduced the relocation quota 
for up to 20,000 refugees from Syria by the year of 2020.26
Outside of Commonwealth connections, regular migrations from South 
Asia to Europe have its strong connection in Bangladeshis migrating towards 
Italy. The number of Bangladeshi migrants living in Italy has reached 84,000 
in 2009, while the number of (regular) Bangladeshi migrants was projected 
to reach 232,000 by 2030 (Blangiardo 2009: 35, 49, quoted in Rahman & Kabir 
2012). After Britain, Italy has the second largest Bangladeshi community in 
Europe, counting 140,000 in 2016.27
The pattern of South Asian migration to Europe during the 2015 refugee 
crisis primarily featured origin countries of Afghanistan and Pakistan. These 
movements followed the same path as others during the refugee crisis, but 
the numbers and statistics are not yet transparent and final.28 Migrants from 
Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh made up more than one third of the 
total people transferred through Croatia towards the destination countries.29 
The official data on asylum seekers in Croatia in the first part of the 2016 showed 
that there were more Iraqi and Afghan than Syrian asylum applicants. The main 
reason for such a high number of asylum seekers from Afghanistan in Croatia 
could be rationalized through Croatian involvement in NATO International 
Security Assistance Force mission. The crisis highlighted a new pattern for South 
Asia migrants to Europe, as well as new destination countries for the future.
26 ‘Despite anxieties over immigration, in response to the volatility in the Middle East and the 
large-scale movement of Syrian refugees across Europe, the British public called for an increase 
in resettlement of Syrians. In September 2015 the UK Government announced the expansion of 
the Syrian Vulnerable Person Resettlement scheme to resettle 20,000 Syrians from the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region by 2020’ (International Organization for Migration 2015:5).
27  Migration from Bangladesh has been ongoing since the country’s formation in 1971. The 
reasons are explained in economic dimensions: ‘the high oil prices in the 1970s boosted indus-
trialization in the Middle East, and created a new migration system drawing mostly on north 
African and south and southeast Asian laborers’ (Von Rohr and Delaney 2016).
28  The issue of migrants and refugees entering Croatia without proper documents leave 
room for statistical errors and miscalculations. Interview with National Protection and Rescue 
Directorate person, February 2016.
29  Interview with National Protection and Rescue Directorate person, February 2016.
200 Marta Zorko 
Instead of a Conclusion: Real-life Chances for Integration
The Schengen space has become a powerful symbol of European unity and 
success after the division of the Cold War. It seemed that a united space of 
inner mobility could not be questioned, regardless of the challenges beyond 
that firm wall. The Schengen project was a symbol of accomplishment 
from within, and the object of jealousy and desire from without. Siniša 
Kuko even calls it ‘The Crystal Wall’, since it was f irm and transparent 
so that the ‘Others’ would be able to see the greatness of the European 
Union (2006). Regardless of such strong symbolism, however, the refugee 
crisis negatively affected European unity and solidarity. The temporary 
abolishment of the Schengen agreement, the hardening of Europe’s inner 
borders, strong border controls, and even fence building have shown that 
in times of crisis a nation-centred discourse will prevail over international 
unity and common values.
The f irst and most important outcome was the process of hardening the 
internal borders between the EU member states. The process of reshaping the 
borders undoes decades of rethinking the concept of the border from a criti-
cal perspective, which had diminished the importance of national borders 
in Europe. Hardening the regimes of border security led to militarization 
in two ways: f irst, the visible militarization of soldiers guarding razor-wire 
fences at the borders; and second, the securitization and militarization of 
the refugee crisis in everyday discourse. The latter will have much deeper 
consequences for the future perception of migration processes in Europe.
The refugee crisis also led to a redefinition of laws, practices, and mecha-
nisms in the European Union. The discourse of crisis led to the securitization 
and militarization of the issue itself. The suspension of positive legislation 
in the EU (the Schengen agreement and the Dublin criteria), pointed out 
that such laws have had never really been tested and were not the results 
of real intentions and a true will of the member states in the f irst place. 
Since they were never designed for this type of crisis, they were not able to 
function properly. Moreover, there were legal and technical obstacles and 
a lack of will: the member states behaved as if some aspects of the crisis did 
not concern them and closed the shells of their respective national security 
frameworks rather than tackling the issues.
The securitized and militarized refugee crisis evoked even more negative 
discourses towards migrants. The question of migrant rights versus real 
chances and possibilities of integration into European societies will be the 
key issue of the future migrations to Europe. Discourses of Others in Europe 
are not new ones. The changing perspective of who represents Others might 
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change, but discourses and attitudes towards the Others will remain the 
same. The real issues that Europe will face are questions of inclusion and 
integration, as well as questions related to the new and old minorities in 
Europe. Even in the UK after BREXIT, questions on migration, migration 
policies, and the Commonwealth remain unanswered – despite the vital 
place of migration issues and EU regulations in the BREXIT debate prior to 
the referendum. A balance between acceptance, asylum, regulations, and 
rights will def ine the future of migrations within and towards Europe. For 
example, the Hungarian referendum on the abolition of EU quotas for the 
resettlement of asylum seekers was unprecedented in European affairs, 
and was sparked by the refugee crisis – it was even named a ‘referendum on 
migrants’ by the media. The conditions of life in and around the five hundred 
detention camps for foreigners in Europe and future perspectives for new 
migrants still need to be discussed and solved by the EU member states.
Further, the differences in the actions and policies of member states could 
influence the future of the Union itself. The next phase will relate to issues 
of social inclusion; this is going to be the real test for the member states and 
the European Union in general. The ability to cope with such challenges will 
def ine future migration flows both within and towards Europe.
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Abstract
This chapter draws on the experience of Bangladeshi men in Belgium 
to argue that integration should be conceptualized not as the outcome 
of ideal-type national models of citizenship and integration, but as the 
product of the intersection of migrant aspirations and strategies with 
regulatory frameworks. It argues that a comprehensive engagement 
with identity theft and new forms of paperwork that straddles South 
Asia and Europe offers insights into what integration entails, and how it 
materializes through everyday practices and dilemmas. The struggles for 
paper documents and processes that establish the paper identities and 
civic participation that are foundational to integration provokes us to 
rethink what such processes and policies entail. In other words, integration 
is also about the struggle to integrate. Such struggles include troubled 
border-crossings and anxious arrivals, and moral claim-making, civic 
participation, and collective protests in the re-settled context. The chapter 
suggests that the everyday aspirations and prolonged disappointments 
of people in resettled contexts are foundational to comprehending what 
integration implies. The processes and dilemmas that enable and disable 
people to integrate in Europe rely on ‘paperwork’.
Keywords: citizenship, belonging, undocumented migration, civic 
participation, deservingness
In the twenty-f irst century, undocumented border-crossings have made 
historical anxieties surrounding nations and citizenship resurface. They 
have also generated new humanitarian dilemmas. While contemporary 
humanitarian efforts resonate with old nationalist agendas in ways that 
reinforce the distinctions between refugees and migrants – f ixing the former 
208 Malini Sur and MaSja van Meeteren 
in narratives of persecution and needing asylum, and the latter in rational 
economic choices –, the precarious circumstances in which people continue 
to be displaced and move across borders make these categories porous. Given 
the diversity of contemporary displacement and resettlement, Nicholas De 
Genova’s reminder that the study of undocumented migration has been 
lost in the struggles between demography, policy studies, and criminology 
holds true. In showing how undocumented migrants do not live in isolation, 
but in proximity to and engaged with citizens and documented migrants, 
De Genova illuminates the intellectual paucity of migration studies. He 
compellingly argues that such investigations on international migration 
seldom treat the migrant as a subject of ethnographic enquiry, and instead 
remain content to frame migrants as either ‘illegal’ or ‘immigrants’ (De 
Genova 2002). His observations hold true for the large numbers who are 
f leeing western Asia’s war ravaged zones, along with those from regions 
like South Asia who have been displaced for other reasons, and who seek 
asylum in Europe.
Indeed, the questions that contemporary migration scholars encounter are 
more daunting than those of a century ago, when investigations primarily 
focused on migration from Europe to North America (Lee et al 2014). As 
Richard Alba and Nancy Foner have recently cautioned, all wealthy western 
societies will be undergoing transitions toward increasing diversity in the 
coming decades. They advance that, due to massive demographic changes 
that are largely fuelled by migration, rich nations will increasingly rely 
on young non-natives and minorities to thrive economically, socially, and 
culturally. Therefore, they argue that successful integration is central to 
ensuring that migrants are not marginalized into becoming disadvantaged 
minorities (Alba and Foner 2014).
In the light of the contemporary humanitarian crisis in Europe, and its 
implications for those who were already seeking asylum in Europe, this 
chapter explores the relationships between undocumented migration and 
Europe’s integration policies. We argue that ethnographic attention to the 
everyday predicaments of asylum seekers in Antwerp, a city in the Flemish-
majority area of Flanders in Belgium, and the accompanying collective 
actions, offer new ways of thinking about resettlement and belonging. 
We especially followed migrant lives in the context of a wide-raging regu-
larization campaign that aimed at integrating undocumented migrants in 
Belgium. In particular, we consider the challenges that Bangladeshi asylum 
seekers face in Belgium, their struggles to procure new documents and 
their efforts to convince a distant world of their capability and worthiness 
of civic participation and residency.
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The visibility of undocumented Bangladeshis living in Antwerp who 
marched in Brussels on 17 June 2006 with more than f ifteen thousand 
protestors to the beat of drums and chants, holding placards demanding 
regularization, assumes greater political significance today as states violently 
police undocumented border-crossings (Sur 2014; Kalir, Sur and Van Schendel 
2012). On that day, as the protestors marched, music blared from a small van 
with oversized speakers. Families gathered on their balconies to get a glimpse 
of the large procession. Having arrived in Belgium from various parts of the 
world, the protesters were mensen zonder papieren (‘people without papers’) 
– commonly portrayed as ‘illegal’ migrants. This demonstration in Brussels 
was the grand f inale to a regularization campaign initiated in December 
2005 by NGOs in Belgium, such as the Progressive Council for People without 
Papers. The Progressive Council argued that since these people had lived 
in Belgium for several years, embedding themselves within Belgian society 
and acquiring language skills, they deserved rights as residents and workers 
under the clauses of integration promoted by the Belgian state.
This collective protest, the demands of Bangladeshi asylum seekers and their 
Belgian supporters, provide a useful starting point to ethnographically probe 
the efforts of mensen zonder papieren to integrate in Belgium. Adrian Favell 
and Gary Freeman argue that integration should be conceptualized not as the 
outcome of ideal-type national models of citizenship, but as the product of the 
intersection of migrant aspirations and strategies with regulatory frameworks 
(Favell 2010; Freeman 2004). In ethnographically exploring the struggles that 
surround integration, we suggest that not only macro demographic demands, 
but also the uncertain circumstances under which people move and are 
compelled to make a living, make questions of integration critical to the social 
sciences. We contend that the events that structure integration as a means to 
enable inclusions within Belgian society, and the everyday uncertainties of 
Bangladeshis who sought to resettle in Belgium, foreground both the efforts 
and the dilemmas that surround it. We posit that integration is also about 
the struggle to integrate. Such struggles include troubled border-crossings 
and anxious arrivals, moral claim making, civic participation, and collective 
protests in a resettled context. We argue that the prolonged disappointments 
and everyday anxieties of people in relocated contexts are foundational 
to comprehending what integration implies. The processes that establish 
paper identities and civic participation which are therefore foundational to 
integration – invite us to rethink what integration actually entails.
The processes that facilitate and impede people’s integration in Europe 
rely on what we call ‘paperwork’. In what follows, we ethnographically and 
comprehensively engage with identity theft and new forms of paperwork 
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that straddle Bangladesh and Belgium. From 2006 until 2011, we conducted 
participant observation and interviewed Bangladeshis who were at various 
stages of asylum appeals, as well as those who had stayed on in Belgium 
after their request for asylum had been rejected. Unlike the asylum seekers 
from Africa and Latin America, undocumented Bangladeshis were all men.1 
Their specif ic predicament as men and Muslims demonstrate how gendered 
and religious identities reinforce racial stereotypes that cast Muslim men as 
criminals. Since the presence of foreigners in Europe (both with and without 
documentation) is at the centre of contemporary debates on citizenship, the 
lives of Bangladeshis in Antwerp offer valuable lessons into the everyday 
enactments of integration policies, their potentials, and pitfalls.
Paperless Lives in Belgium
Following the Second World War and through the 1950s, the presence of 
foreign workers recruited through guest-worker policies and from former 
colonies transformed Europe’s social landscape. By the 1970s, family reunifi-
cation schemes ensured that this foreign work force established communities 
with strong institutional bases and political aspirations. The presence of 
foreign workers widened the political horizons of citizenship from being 
uniquely and singularly premised on shared nationhood to alternative 
emancipatory interpretations, such as post-national citizenship. Yasemin 
Soysal makes a compelling argument that post-national citizenship occurs 
when the logic of universal personhood replaces nationhood and universal 
human rights replace national rights. However, she also acknowledges that 
there is a dialectical tension between national citizenship and universal 
human rights, where the nation-state continues to act as the primary media-
tor and guarantor of both types of rights (Soysal 1994).
The consequences of this tension between national citizenship and uni-
versal human rights are evident in Belgium. Belgium was one of the main 
migrant-receiving countries in the post-war period (Moch 2003). Workers 
from Southern Europe, Northern Africa, and Turkey could travel freely to 
Belgium and formalize their stay after they had started to work (Martiniello 
and Rea 2003). These migrants were considered welcome ‘guests’, as Belgium 
needed them to alleviate labour shortages. A decade of economic prosperity 
followed, during which migrants settled in urban conglomerations. The host 
population perceived them as docile and honest (Martiniello 2003). However, 
1  We have changed all names to protect the identities of our interviewees. 
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when labour shortages decreased due to the economic downturn in the 1970s, 
migration policies became more restrictive, and efforts were increasingly 
made to prevent migration (Martiniello 2003). The economic crisis of the 1970s 
negatively impacted Bangladeshis in Europe. Like other migrants who did 
not have relevant educational skills, they were unable to look for alternative 
employment. The rising numbers of immigrants on welfare benefits set a 
new negative tone to public opinion on immigration, in which non-European 
immigrants were seen as depleting the welfare state. Bangladeshi migrants 
sought asylum after the end of labour recruitment in 1973 and continued to 
legally arrive in Western Europe to work in the 1980s (Knights and King 1998).
In Belgium, however, other forms of migration persisted even after guest 
workers were no longer being recruited: in the 1980s, family reunif ication 
was on the rise, and since the beginning of the 1990s, a growing number of 
asylum seekers have arrived (van Meeteren, van San, & Engbersen 2008). 
At the end of the 1990s, irregular migrants occupied churches and went on 
hunger strikes to demand regularization. As a response, the Belgian federal 
state instituted a regularization campaign in 2000 as an attempt to end the 
marginalization of migrants without documents. The number of asylum 
applications submitted as part of this campaign was 42,691 – the highest ever 
recorded in Belgium. There were several grounds on which migrants could 
be regularized, including special ties to Belgium or Belgians – commonly 
interpreted as ‘integration’ (COM 2004). In practice, this meant that ap-
plicants would try to prove their special ties by adding all kinds of paperwork 
to their application. This paperwork, for example, would include letters from 
Belgian citizens who acknowledged their friendship with the applicant, or 
from Belgian children who stated that they were friends of the applicant’s 
children. Proof of school enrolment and membership in social organizations 
were other criteria for integration. Undocumented residents frequently 
invoked these and supplied papers in their regularization applications.
After this round of regularization in 2000, Belgium escalated border 
controls for irregular migrants while making it easier for regular migrants 
to obtain Belgian nationality. This marked the beginning of new Belgian 
immigration policies based on the twin pillars of stringent rules about 
immigration and asylum aimed at newcomers, and an integration policy 
for older migrants who were already present in the country. Over a period 
of time, the integration framework expanded to, perhaps unintentionally, 
also to include services for people without papers.
Although illegal entry and stay is considered a criminal offense punish-
able by a f ine and/or detention of up to three months under Belgian law, 
Belgian authorities detain to deport, rather than imprison, irregular migrants 
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(van Meeteren, van San, & Engbersen 2008). Furthermore, the police do 
not deport individuals who have on-going regularization applications (van 
Meeteren 2014). One way of legalizing an irregular status is to apply for 
regularization under ‘exceptional circumstances’. The criteria for these 
special circumstances are unspecified. We observed that people made efforts 
to learn the native language, procured letters from citizens they know well, 
placed their children in school, and had long lengths of stay. Each of these 
factors was sometimes considered exceptional for regularization. However, 
the chances of regularization are invariably slim – only about 300 people per 
year are granted regularization based on exceptional circumstances (van 
Meeteren, van San, & Engbersen 2008). Most lawyers and NGO activists 
who give legal advice recommend that irregular migrants claim integra-
tion as a ground for regularization. Although unspecif ied by the law, the 
organizations that interact with irregular migrants argue that integration 
is a valid criterion. Since ‘integration’ is not a clear-cut concept and can 
be interpreted in different ways, these applications are, in legal terms, 
trial-and-error exercises. Many irregular migrants try, and some try more 
than once. On average, 15,000 irregular migrants apply for regularization 
in Belgium each year (van Meeteren, van San, & Engbersen 2008). Since the 
possibilities for individual regularization are limited and uncertain, often 
the only chance of legalization is through general and collective campaigns.
Throughout 2006, Bangladeshis and others occupied churches, dem-
onstrated in the streets, and engaged in hunger strikes all over Belgium. 
These actions began in response to a series of events in 2005, when a group 
of 130 irregular migrants occupied a church in a district of Brussels. After a 
prolonged hunger strike, the Minister of Internal Affairs conceded to their 
demand for residency, which in turn sparked similar actions all over the 
country. The UDEP (Union pour la Défense des Sans-Papiers) a collective 
of irregular migrants organized these. With the support of several NGOs 
and semi-governmental organizations, the ‘pro-regularization movement’ 
managed to influence government debates about the reform of asylum 
procedures. Further, it managed to get the government to formalize some 
of the criteria for individual regularization that had been used informally 
since the previous collective regularization. For example, the criterion 
used during the campaign in 2000 that migrants who had been enrolled in 
asylum procedures for an unusually long period of time would be granted 
regularization, now became formal policy. However, migrants who have 
been involved in crimes, served jail sentences, or caught using false identity 
papers or providing a false name are denied regularization (van Meeteren, 
van San, & Engbersen 2008).
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Papers and Lives
The contemporary migration of Bangladeshis to most European countries 
ref lects recent migration pathways between countries that have little 
historical association. This is symptomatic of the new globalization of the 
migration process, which sees ethnic communities establishing themselves 
with enormous rapidity in different parts of the world (Knights 1996). 
Upon their arrival in Belgium, Bangladeshis and other undocumented 
people become subject to state scrutiny. This is not only because they are 
compelled to use the services of migration agents and brokers for travelling 
but also as they arrive without documentation. Belgium has responded to 
the presence of undocumented people with a combination of regularization 
measures that depend on a pre-determined set of conditions and punitive 
responses, including deportations. Like other mensen zonder papieren, those 
Bangladeshis we followed during the regularization campaign and after, 
were quick to realize that they were not welcome in Belgium. Moreover, 
being Muslim men, their religion and gender further marginalized them. 
For Belgians, Bangladesh is internationally discredited as an example of 
high corruption and is considered part of the Islamic terror frontier. In 
addition to race, Islam and crime are seen as representative of the migrant 
threats that haunt Western Europe. Because of these public perceptions, 
Bangladeshis in Antwerp conveyed that Belgians aligned them with Turkish 
and Moroccan migrants with whom they have no historical or cultural 
links, except for supposed connections to crime, delinquency, and shared 
religious beliefs. However, their legal status and predicaments in Belgium 
are vastly different from these earlier settlers.
With the exception of Minaz and Karim, who had been residing in Europe 
for over twenty years, most of the Bangladeshi men we spoke with had been 
completely clueless about their f inal destination in Europe when they left 
their villages in Bangladesh. They travelled cramped in the bellies of cargo 
ships, and partly by roads, navigating complicated routes, aided by migration 
brokers who guided them to Europe. These brokers, commonly referred to 
as ‘visa dalals’, manage the business of the ‘European dream’ an illustration 
of what David Kyle and Christina Siracusa designate a ‘migrant-exporting 
scheme’ (Kyle & Siracusa 2005). In most instances, the brokers emphasized 
wage differentials between Bangladesh and European countries as the 
selling point, concealed legal requirements and differences in actual costs 
of living. Visa dalals in Chittagong, Dhaka, Mumbai, and Dubai swiftly 
dispatched them to Europe. Spanning airports and seaports were other 
collaborators – customs off icers, immigration services, and navigators 
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who let them pass with false names and forged documents. Occasionally, 
brokers coached them to assume false identities that they could convey to the 
immigration authorities. After arrival in Europe, there were sympathizers 
who had arrived earlier under similar circumstances and provided shelter, 
employers who hired them for below-minimum wages, ‘co-illegals’ who 
supplied information, migrant support organizations, and lawyers who 
aided them to make appeals for asylum. In several instances, women in 
Belgium offered to marry Bangladeshi men for a high fee, to enable to 
prove that they had emotional connections to the country. Each industry 
had cashed in on the basic aspirations for stable resettlement. Like state 
agents in Bangladesh, ones in Belgium too, ignored, restricted, regulated, 
and in several instances, supported these acts.
While for some Bangladeshis who were part of the public call for a 
regularization campaign in 2006, Belgium was the f irst port of entry; 
others had been circulating through Europe for anything between seven 
and 25 years. Bangladeshis in Belgium found themselves aligned with 
second-generation Muslim migrants who Belgians equated with asylum 
seekers, and regard as riding on the benefits of the welfare state. In contrast 
with ‘post-national’ guest workers and their descendants, mensen zonder 
papieren are uniquely located at what we designate a territorial paradox. It is 
especially important to acknowledge this category today, with the massive 
border fortif ication programs that European nation states are undertaking 
to prevent refugee movements in the light of recent air strikes and wars 
in western Asia. War and devastation across western Asia along with 
migration brokerage are likely to ensure the persistence of mensen zonder 
papieren as a category that oscillates between the clear-cut def initions of 
refugees and migrants.
Bangladeshis in Belgium are simultaneously situated within a territorial 
vacuum and intensely shaped by territoriality. Paperwork that includes 
the loss of original passports and identity papers confiscated by migration 
agents and the quest for new documents underscores this territorial tension. 
Both people displaced by wars and those depending on predatory migration 
brokers fall outside the labour regulatory structures of labour-sending 
and receiving nation-states. In the absence of a sending nation-state and 
documentation that espouses nationality and labour connections, mensen 
zonder papieren also contrast sharply with former guest workers who 
have resettled in Europe. Upon their arrival in Europe, such unauthorized 
migrants are entirely dependent upon border-patrol agents, humanitarian 
agencies, the regulatory framework of the nation-state they manage to get 
a foothold in and others who share similar predicaments.
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Mannan, who left Chittagong in 1998, was unaware of the papers he 
needed to travel to Europe. For him, paperwork – or the actual implications 
of having a paper document – started in Dubai when his broker confiscated 
his passport. Mannan who had newly acquired this, could barely relate to it 
as an identif ication document. Upon his arrival in transit destinations such 
as Dubai and Morocco, unknown brokers controlled his movements. These 
brokers destroyed his passport and other identity papers, and they compelled 
Mannan and other travellers to camp for months in concealed places while 
they secretly arranged routes of travel to Europe. During his confinement 
in one such secret camp in Dubai, Mannan stayed with a group of Indians 
and Pakistanis for a month. After this, the broker arranged their travel in 
batches to mitigate the risks of being associated with illegal entries. Some 
were made to travel via Eastern Europe, and some via Morocco. Mannan 
told us that the f inal group of 41 South Asians left for Turkey a few days 
after him, but had never arrived in Europe; all of them had died from their 
injuries after their truck overturned.
Karim purchased a fake United Arab Emirates passport for 4000 euros, 
obtained by selling his only plot of land in Feni district in Bangladesh. From 
Dubai, a broker arranged his place as a crewmember in a cargo ship with 
seven Indians and Pakistanis. He was supposed to load sugar and sail to 
Jordan, but he jumped ship in May 2002. He left his false passport in the 
cargo ship at the Antwerp harbour. He had no idea about Europe; he was 
only acquainted with stories of England, where his brother had lived for 
over twenty years. Upon his arrival in Antwerp, Karim walked through 
the streets and found a shop owned by a Bangladeshi who advised him to 
destroy his passport. He was sheltered there for twelve days, too scared to 
venture outside. During this time, he wrote his f irst asylum appeal and 
travelled to Brussels to register his f ingerprints with the immigration off ice. 
Having no recourse to legal employment, Karim submitted a request for 
asylum on the grounds of political persecution (coinciding with political 
upheavals in Bangladesh).
The Belgian state places Karim and Mannan in the category of ‘bogus 
asylum seekers’, ‘rejected asylum seekers’, and those whose asylum pleadings 
are in various stages of consideration. With no passports, they continued 
to inhabit the grey zone between asylum and criminality, living through 
several appeals and judgements for more than ten years. At the f irst stage of 
asylum, when their claims were being considered, they were given a white 
identif ication card, which entitled them to receive social welfare. If their 
asylum hearing ends on a positive note, they would receive an orange card. 
This confers on them the right to work. For those who held orange cards, the 
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aspiration was what they called a plastic card – a residence permit, which 
allowed them to travel back and forth to their country of origin. Finally, many 
dreamt of a red passport, which would confer on them Belgian nationality, 
marking their entry into Belgian citizenship. In this way, state systems of 
registration that includes graded identity cards, embrace citizens and bring 
them under state surveillance and control (Torpey 2000). Only after landing 
in Europe did Mannan and Karim realize the enormous importance of 
having new papers – through repeated asylum pleadings, visits to asylum 
lawyers, and appeals for regularization. For four years, their inconsistent 
testimonies had made their asylum claims weak, judges had rejected their 
appeals and struck them off social welfare. When we met them they were 
always agitated, pensive – awaiting regularization.
Tanveer, who managed a telecommunication shop, was not as perturbed 
about his irregular status, unlike Karim and Mannan. Speaking to us over the 
faint tune of Bollywood music while he cheerfully managed irate customers 
complaining about faulty connections, he conveyed that he had resigned 
himself to a life of uncertainty. A highly reluctant migrant, Tanveer’s father 
had cajoled him to enroll in a management course at the University of Paris 
in 1993. In Tanveer’s self-depiction, he aligned himself with people from his 
district, Bogra, whom he argued were exceptions to footloose Bangladeshis. 
To substantiate this claim, he stated that in the past years he had not met 
anyone from his district anywhere in Europe: ‘Even gnawing poverty does 
not push us to leave our hometown; we would rather sell betel leaves on the 
streets than leave’. Within six months of his arrival in Paris, Tanveer’s father 
died, causing the flow of funds that Tanveer relied on to dry up. Without 
completing his management course, he tried to f ind work in Paris and 
failed. Acquaintances asked him to apply for asylum. He sought asylum as 
an activist victimized due to his political beliefs and was rejected. Within 
the next two years, he moved to Cyprus and then Belgium.
When Tanveer’s asylum appeal had reached its f inal stages in Brussels, 
however, he distanced himself from his own testimony. To the complete 
disbelief of his asylum lawyer, he informed the judge that he was repulsed 
by Bangladeshi politics as a student, had no political aff iliations, and was 
neither a persecuted Awami League activist nor a Bihari refugee from Bogra, 
as his asylum papers had stated. He informed the court of his diff iculties 
in being a student without funding, being away from Bangladesh for over a 
decade, and not acquiring any skills that would help him to gain employment 
in Bangladesh if he were to go back. Tanveer pleaded for support. The judge 
– although sympathetic and touched by his frank testimony – responded 
that he did not ‘f it’ into any schemes for support in Belgium, which were 
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limited to asylum claims. Since then, Tanveer has stayed on in Antwerp, 
managing a telecommunication shop for a Pakistani employer. His ambigu-
ous predicament shows the limitations of integration policies that assume 
people can only arrive in Europe as victims of fear and persecution as well 
as disregard how circumstances compel legal immigrants like students to 
become irregular.
The Right to Reside
Whether mensen zonder papieren like Tanveer, Karim, and Mannan will get 
the rights to residence and work in Belgium is decided by a combination 
of factors: the Belgian state and its asylum, integration, and regularization 
policies; the Bangladeshi state, its international rankings for democracy, 
corruption, fundamentalism; facts and f igures that match crisis databases; 
and, f inally, the oppositional discourses of Islamophobia and pro-migrant 
solidarities in Western Europe. Additionally, mensen zonder papieren are 
juxtaposed between the politics of the pan-European multiculturalism – 
with which Belgium aligns – and discourses on integration, which speak 
to sub-nationalism in Flanders. They benefit, for instance, from an asylum 
framework that is guided by humanitarian agendas and international 
covenants such as the 1951 United Nations Convention relating to the Status 
of Refugees. Outside the asylum system, some of their human rights are 
guaranteed by civil society organizations. Integration policies in the Belgian 
federation are organized along linguistic divisions (communities): Dutch, 
French, and German. Brussels, where all three languages are accommo-
dated, has its own integration policy. Flemish integration policies have 
persistently emphasized the ability to master the Dutch language, amongst 
other criteria (Bulcaen & Jaspers 1999, cited in Coffé & Tirions 2004, 34). 
This is an expression of Flemish sub-nationalism, which emphasizes that 
the language (historically) spoken in the region should be spoken by all 
residents of the region, in order to constitute a collective identity group 
(Coffé & Tirions 2004). The Flemish sub-nationalist consciousness started 
to grow in the early 1990s after the electoral gains of the extreme-right 
Vlaams Blok (later known as Vlaams Belang), and has remained high ever 
since (Billiet, Coffé, & Maddens 2005).
Mensen zonder papieren from Bangladesh feel that they are rejected by 
the Belgian state, which denies them residency and permission to work, and 
by Belgian society, which treats them as unwanted aliens. This perception 
of un-wantedness is reinforced by anti-immigrant politics, which are not 
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only aimed at undocumented migrants but also at former guest workers, 
their children, and those who have been granted asylum. This is especially 
so in the cities in the Flanders, where Vlaams Belang’s has obtained massive 
electoral victories over the past f ifteen years. For instance, in local elections 
in October 2006, almost a third of Antwerp’s inhabitants voted for this party, 
whose rallying cry was to ‘put our own people f irst’, weed out criminals 
among migrants, and get all migrants to integrate into the Flemish sub-
national culture. The mainstream parties initially agreed that they would 
not form a coalition with Vlaams Belang because of this anti-immigrant 
discourse. Although the parties have stuck with this agreement, however, 
there has been a convergence in the immigration discourse over the years; 
several mainstream parties now echo the views of the extreme-right wing, 
albeit in softer tones (Billiet, Coffé, & Maddens 2005).
Armed with a degree in Chemistry from Jagganath College in Dhaka, and 
organizational skills gained as the head of the Flemish Bengali Association 
(FBA) – an association of Bangladeshis – Warsi argued that Europe has 
failed to understand the human conditions that persuaded him and oth-
ers to cross several diff icult and violent borders. He felt that the ground 
rules for humanitarian concerns should be rooted in the human condition. 
Hunger and death should determine the causes that deserve shelter and 
social support – whether these are fuelled by war or poverty should be 
immaterial. But the European framework fails to understand that the basic 
human condition is death – and the specif ic events that trigger it should 
not influence asylum policies. The system should not, therefore, privilege 
war over famine or economic crisis. He justif ied his presence in Belgium as 
a response to the political crimes perpetrated by developed countries upon 
nations like Bangladesh after depleting their resources.
Warsi never failed to remind us that he did not work because he wanted 
to be on the ‘side of the law’. He denied that his entry was ‘outside’ the law; 
his carefully crafted story of religious persecution as a Ahmadiyya minority 
explained and justif ied his presence in Belgium. Warsi felt that illegality 
was essentially a western condition that was used as a tool when countries 
wanted to close their borders. He referred to a circular issued by the Belgian 
state in 2005 directing its nationals not to travel to Bangladesh as tourists for 
security reasons. The same country, he declared, turned away asylum seekers 
from Bangladesh without any remorse! Unike Warsi, Shahidul proactively 
sought employment since he needed to remit money home for his family. 
Once, he was caught by the police in a shop where he was working in the 
back. The police asked him to leave the country within f ive days. However, 
like Warsi, he argued that since he was not a criminal, he would not leave 
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the country. He produced his asylum papers. He stated that: “I knew and 
they knew that formally, since I did not have work permit, it was illegal to 
work. But that did not make me into a criminal, did it?”
Influenced by Warsi’s leadership, several Bangladeshis in Belgium await-
ing hearings for their asylum appeals reiterated his political views. Shahidul 
explained his presence as circumstantial and nothing more. But no one, he 
claimed, had made any attempt to know either the circumstances which 
compelled his displacement as an unemployed youth from Bangladesh or 
even his current precarious existence in Antwerp as a person who did not 
belong here. He hated participating in the charity dinners organized by 
their Belgian supporters, and was acutely conscious of being declassed. He 
compared these dinners to the kangali bhojon in Bangladesh, where affluent 
and charitable Bangladeshis distribute free food to the poor.
Jeroen, a Belgian off icial who works for the Ministry of Integration in 
Antwerp, emphasized the state’s off icial position on irregular migrants. 
He lamented the large presence of ‘adventure cowboys’ who snatched 
rights away from genuine asylum seekers. He further argued that, as a 
city, Antwerp displayed a complete lack of political courage and was unable 
to deal with migrants without papers. Although he was closely involved 
with regularization campaigns as a part of his off icial duties, he remained 
sharply critical. He found the campaign idealistic and estranged from 
reality: ‘They believe very much in the vision that those people should 
have the right to stay here, while the starting point should always be that 
we should investigate whether these people do in fact have the right to 
reside here’, he remarked in indignation. He attributed the primary cause 
of migration to economics, aided by courage and f inancial capacity. ‘This 
is in fact a perverse system that causes the real political refugee to have 
less and less chances to come here, and the courageous, the cowboys […] 
people from Africa, Asia, South America, those cowboys, they come here.’ 
He bitterly recalled from a recent church asylum visit that none of the 
migrants could even speak Dutch – the opposite of the image promoted 
by activists that such migrants are linguistically integrated. He predicted 
that Belgium’s immigration system would collapse if migrants were to be 
regularized. Instead, he argued that the system should reject un-integrated 
migrants, saying, ‘Sorry but you are not integrated, you have been here for 
six years, and you do not speak even f ive words of Dutch, wouldn’t you 
start thinking of going back?’ He advanced that a high premium should be 
placed on return migration, rather than resettling migrants in Antwerp. The 
everyday complexities that surrounded migrant belonging def ied Jeroen’s 
precise thresholds of inclusion and exclusion.
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Protests and Participation
The main problem is that they present us as illiterates – and criminals. 
They think we are thieves – there are enough working class white people 
who will even steal bicycles, but we will always be tainted as thieves.
Shahidul, 14 May 2006
Bangladeshi men had camped in Antwerp’s churches in 2006 with other 
migrants from all over the world. While city residents and Belgian citizens, 
including asylum activists, journalists, and pastors, arrived in the churches 
to support the campaign, outside them, right-wing groups like Vlaams 
Belang held press conferences opposing the campaign.
Warsi was at home in a small protestant church in Antwerp. Over endless 
sexist Bollywood jokes, he brewed coffee, gargling once with it before speaking 
into our tape recorder. Even though his numerous appeals for political asylum 
had been rejected, Warsi was not a dejected man. He marched along with 
the others and sought out journalists as the head of the FBA – a registered 
organization of Bangladeshis without papers funded by the Flemish com-
munity. Marijke, a Belgian national in her early sixties, is the most vocal 
Belgian supporter of this organization, which mostly functions out of her 
house and the blue spiral f ile that Warsi keeps close at hand. The FBA was 
started in 2004, when Marijke’s friend who was working with integration 
services suggested that Warsi should organize the Bangladeshis in Antwerp 
to integrate them into Belgian society. In the past, Marijke had supported 
migrants without papers by sheltering and providing for them in her house. 
Warsi has been residing with her for the past seven years; during this time, 
they wrote several appeals for regularization that have all been denied. When 
we interviewed her, Marijke was glad that the regularization campaign was in 
full swing – and that Warsi was pre-occupied, not sitting at home and clumsily 
helping her with household chores. Warsi occasionally dipped into the bulky 
blue file as he spoke to us. Sometimes he pulled out documents that were filed 
in a random order and encased in polythene sheets. Warsi always kept the 
file next to his mattress in the church. In a separate green folder, he kept a list 
of his several private petitions seeking a regular residency status in Belgium.
The Belgian state dealt with Warsi and his associates in several ways: 
rejecting their numerous asylum appeals, sheltering them through its civil 
society network (mostly with government funding), and f inally, doling out 
funds to the FBA through the Ministry of Integration for the hosting of 
cultural events. The state therefore extended a helping hand to migrants 
who could not be deported for reasons like not having passports, while 
the BorderS of integration 221
simultaneously labelling them as illegal. When FBA was founded, Warsi – 
who conveyed that he had been living a life of self-imposed seclusion from 
his fellow Bangladeshis in Antwerp for reasons he did not elaborate – called 
upon Zakhir, whom he had befriended at a camp run by the Red Cross. 
Within days, Zakhir spread the word through visits to the shops and telecom-
munication centres where Bangladeshis mostly worked. Bangladeshis with 
citizenship and residency rights distanced themselves and chose to stay away 
from FBA’s activities as the latter comprised of undocumented Bangladeshis. 
The f irst few gatherings were self-funded by FBA’s 54 members, and the 
Flemish community, i.e., the local government, funded subsequent events.
In one of the cultural events organized by the FBA and funded by the 
Ministry of Integration, Warsi hosted a two-hour cultural show addressing 
an audience of Bengalis with a scattering of Belgians, reading aloud from 
written notes. Between songs, dances, and a documentary on Bangladesh, 
Warsi made numerous announcements of the regularization procedures in 
various European countries. Although in the audience at this event were several 
Bangladeshis who had settled in Belgium, but did not align with the FBA. They 
were members of a Bengali Association that is comprised entirely of people 
who had acquired legal rights of residence. They often employ their paperless 
co-nationals, but maintain social distance. The FBA members criticized the 
organizational politics of the main Bengali Association, which, according to 
them, reflects matobbori (‘feudal politics’) – replicating the patronage and cor-
ruption widely prevalent in Bangladesh. The members of the FBA complained 
that the Bengali Association imbibes nothing from the uncorrupted climate of 
Belgium; instead, they replicate all that is politically decadent about Bangladesh.
For Warsi, this forum, which def ines his existence in Belgium, does 
not just orient Bengali people in Belgian society, but also more forcefully 
conveys information to Belgians about Bangladesh. When Bangladeshis f ind 
themselves in a country like Belgium where they have no historical links, 
they are faced with a people who are ill equipped to understand them. They 
perceive themselves to be lumped together with other migrants and seen 
as making an illegal living by flooding the streets of Belgium.
Back at the protest, Warsi passionately spoke to news-hungry journalists 
about how Europe needs to redeem its colonial past. Natives, he argued, had 
embraced colonizers with civility. This was not reciprocated for migrants 
who arrived at the doorstep of Europe. The journalists reporting on the 
asylum demands in the sleepy city of Antwerp lapped up his words and 
reproduced them almost verbatim the next day.
On 27 June 2006, we helped Warsi, Mannan, and others shift from one 
church to another. While we walked in a large procession on the street, 
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the police kept watch to ensure that we did not disrupt the thin traff ic on 
the roads of Antwerp. Warsi spoke to the police who were monitoring the 
procession, assuring them that Bangladeshis were not lawbreakers and 
criminals. We silently walked alongside, the drizzle slowly washing away 
the paint from our banners. Rofique, another member of the FBA who was 
initially disinclined to speak to us muttered that he had travelled enough 
from Iran to Russia, after starting out in Mumbai. Now he was fed up. He 
grumbled that he was suffering from monetary losses after paying 1500 euros 
to a Belgian national for pretending to be his partner. ‘The bitch did not tell 
me that they would come to inspect our bedroom, nor did she even warn 
me that I would need to pretend to live with her, no! My money is all gone 
now.’ His angry narrations called attention to the heavy monetary losses that 
he had suffered not only during his multiple journeys but also in Belgium.
We unloaded mattresses from vans and lined them up in their new 
destination, and then walked into the new church. At the door, a few men 
dressed in smart grey suits and representing the Vlaams Belang chanted 
slogans against illegal migrants and blocked our access to the church 
temporarily. The journalists who had been following our procession, 
and who had interviewed Warsi now scurried forward to record footage. 
The opinion of politicians, especially ones that were anti-migration, that 
journalists reported fed into prior public biases. We waited for the small 
group to disperse before accessing the church premises. Close to the altar, a 
makeshift podium had been created for the speakers. A group of Congolese 
drummers broke into thundering beats before the speeches began. The 
pastor spoke to his audience of mensen zonder papieren and activists. A 
kindergarten teacher pleaded on behalf of her Belgian six-year-olds who 
would miss their classmates if their parents were deported for not having 
papers. From the audience, Warsi snatched the two-year-old Shamima from 
her father Mannan and marched up to the podium reserved for speakers. 
Shamima’s presence in his arms made Warsi look human. Shamima seemed 
momentarily taken aback by the attention, but recovered soon enough to 
clap her hands in glee and smile at a kindergarten teacher who sat in the 
audience. Cameras flashed once again. Warsi took out a somewhat crumpled 
poster from his inner jacket, and flashed it to the packed church. It read 
‘Shamima, our girl zonder papieren turns two today’. At the sight of a child, 
and the accompanying banner, the audience broke into loud applause and 
the drummers thundered once again. The noise slowly died down and the 
speeches concluded. Shamima jumped from Warsi’s arms to Marijke as 
we walked to a large kitchen room where benches had been lined against 
the wall.
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Mannan, who was trained as a cook had worked for two days to prepare 
meals for everyone involved in the regularization campaign to celebrate 
his daughter’s second birthday. He heaped generous spoonfuls of food onto 
paper plates, which we passed on as people streamed into the kitchen and 
f illed up benches. Shamima stood somewhat agitated in a corner, as her 
Indonesian Muslim friends had decided not to attend the dinner since it was 
held in a church. Despite the marital frictions that this dinner had created, 
more than 20 Bangladeshi men had gathered that evening to support the 
cause of regularization. Their faces bore signs of exhaustion from working 
all day in grocery stores and supermarkets; others left soon after dinner for 
shifts in night shops. They heaped a table with brightly wrapped presents. 
Marijke gently held Shamima and sliced a huge cherry cake as we applauded.
Events like this that demonstrated Bangladeshi hospitality and generosity, 
as well as the FBA, provided Bangladeshi men with an avenue to distance 
themselves from the criminality associated with being ‘illegal’ Muslim men. 
Most members of the FBA held that the Belgian state’s funding of the organiza-
tion’s activities demonstrated that they had a quasi-legal existence and that 
their presence had state support. In other words, their presence, although 
unauthorized, was not completely frowned upon by the state (Van Schendel and 
Abraham 2005). Further, the members of the FBA steered clear of comparisons 
with other settled Muslims communities such as the Turks and Moroccans, 
who the Vlaams Belang frequently linked to delinquency and crime.
The FBA’s emphasis on collective public activities was also important for 
paperwork: it created a sequence of documented evidence that included the 
participation of Flemish families. Unlike ordinarily, when their public pres-
ence was constrained, they found it relatively easy to claim public space as 
protestors and activists, sometimes forgoing a day’s earnings in the process. 
Congregating for meetings, writing and reading speeches, holding specif ic 
organizational portfolios, and conducting events counters their deep sense 
of being completely declassed and dehumanized in an alien environment, 
at least to some extent. The FBA provided a space to regain class status, to 
feel linked with their co-nationals, and to hold on to notions of belonging 
even in the absence of national passports. Protracted uncertainties about 
their status and residency compelled Mannan and others to be inventive, 
taking every possible chance to establish a sequence of events that would 
help organize their papers, even if this involved exploiting the image of 
innocence provided by their own children.
Flemish constructions of good citizenship have occasionally extended 
to ‘deserving’ and ‘integrated’ irregular migrants through the process of 
collective and individual regularizations. In their struggles for papers, 
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Bangladeshis in Antwerp have emphasized their deservingness while at the 
same time Belgian policies have increasingly limited their opportunities 
and claims to gain such deservingness over time. These processes effectively 
make deservingness both a civic obligation and a privilege (Chauvin & 
Garcés-Mascareñas 2014). On 19 November 2006, two church asylum activ-
ists were granted papers, but neither were Bangladeshi. As the church 
protests wound down, most of our respondents dispersed. At the same time, 
Vlaams Belang grew in electoral popularity. In 2009, the Belgian authorities 
decided to issue another general amnesty. Irregular migrants could apply for 
regularization based on a set of special criteria that were valid for a period 
of three months. During this period, irregular migrants could claim ‘durable 
local embeddedness’. In practice, this meant that persons who had been 
in Belgium for f ive years and who could prove ‘integration’ could apply. It 
was only possible to claim ‘durable local embeddedness’ during these three 
months. About 30,000 people applied, of which only about 10,000 cases were 
new applications. The others were individual requests for regularization that 
had been shifted to the general regularization campaign (van Meeteren 2010).
Conclusion
The struggles of undocumented Bangladeshis to integrate in Belgium fore-
ground two political conjunctures in contemporary Europe. Etienne Balibar 
has powerfully illuminated the f irst, arguing that the struggles and dealings 
of people without papers are privileged moments in the development of 
‘active citizenship’. Without this, he cautions that there is no polity, but only 
a ‘state cut off from its own society and petrif ied in its own abstraction’ 
(Balibar 2004). Read in the light of Balibar’s words, the FBA and the moral 
and political claim making of mensen zonder papieren illuminate citizenship 
from below – which, as Balibar argues, combines submission to the rational-
ity of the state with activist solidarity. For Balibar, the period of vacillation 
between the old forms of national sovereignty (which is not the same as the 
disappearance of nation-states) and the struggles of people without papers 
(sans papiers in France) and their defenders has made a contribution to the 
democratization of borders and the freedom of movement, which states tend 
to treat as arenas of their discretionary power. Cecilia Menjívar and Sarah 
Lakhani have provided another powerful interpretation of the political in 
the context of undocumented migration. They emphasize that state barriers 
and hostility towards migrants which push people towards the margins 
of legality also create conditions that provide the foundations for making 
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‘transformative, lasting changes’ in people’s lives (Menjívar and Lakhani 
2016: 1818). These, they argue, shape integration. They further posit that in a 
social and legal context of increased ant-immigrant sentiment, pressures to 
integrate and conform may become stronger (Menjivar and Lakhani 2016).
In exploring the worlds of collective protests, organized civic participa-
tion, and the distressing everyday circumstances under which people like 
Mannan and Tanveer operate, we have shown how paperwork is integral 
to integration, and how civic participation and legalization efforts can 
have profound effects on the personal and social lives of asylum seekers 
in resettled contexts. Integration processes, then, can only be properly 
understood by taking both collective and individual struggles for papers 
and their effects into account. The efforts of the Bangladeshi protestors who 
were a part of the 2006 regularization campaign and whose lives represent 
the tightening of asylum provisions are important, as they will inform 
resettlement policies in Europe the coming years.
For Bangladeshi men, several of whom would have swelled the ranks of 
educated unemployed in Bangladesh, Antwerp is both a location that offers 
new possibilities as well uncertainty. In a poignant short story ‘Uddin’ (‘The 
Flight’) the Bangladeshi anthropologist and novelist Shahaduz Zaman 
illuminates the other side to this story. He describes the journey of a young 
cattle herdsman from a village in Bangladesh who, caught between rural 
poverty and urban unemployment, is mesmerized by the images of wealth 
and bounty hurled through satellite transmissions. Having no land to sell and 
buy a ticket, he clings onto the wheels of an airplane in a desperate attempt 
to escape despair. The clouds swirl at his feet and he slowly slips away, 
his body frozen and dead as the airplane lands in his dream destination. 
This story, and the everyday struggles of integration in Antwerp that we 
have emphasized, deserve scholarly attention so that the debates within 
the European Union that have slowly shifted from arenas of public debate 
and policy to crime and inter-governmental co-ordination, can once again 
re-think what it means to cross diff icult borders (Guiraudon 2000).
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Abstract
This chapter argues that, despite hundreds of years of movement between 
East Africa and India through the Indian Ocean, histories of slavery are 
conspicuous by their absence in Indian and Gujarati collective memories. 
This lack of awareness and discussion of slavery in India has increased 
the danger of ignoring the presence and plight of the Siddi communities, 
whose African heritage still shapes their position in Indian society. Within 
this prevailing apathetic climate, Gunvantrai Poptabhai Acharya’s novel 
Dariyalal, which centres on Ramjibha, a Gujarati slave trader turned 
abolitionist, assumes a double-sided signif icance. Acharya’s f ictive 
novel challenges mainstream Indian history, which has forgotten or 
deliberately omitted the recording and narrating of unsettling encounters 
and relationships. It helps us to confront the erasure of the non-European 
communities who played a role in abolishing slavery. Concurrently, 
Dariyalal is also a discursive tool for negotiating a Gujarati identity that 
is tied to slave trade. In the end, the novel upsets a Eurocentric history 
only to replace it with a Gujarati Hindu-centric version of the slave trade 
in the Indian Ocean, illustrating the lingering impact of migration and 
diaspora in the region.
Keywords: Gujarat, Gunvantrai Poptabhai Acharya, slavery, Indian Ocean
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Introduction
Over the course of the second half of the eighteenth century, Laxmichand 
Motichand, a prominent Vāniyā (merchant) from the island of Diu at the 
southern end of the Kathiwar peninsula in present-day Gujarat, developed 
signif icant business interests in Mozambique, in southeastern Africa. He 
began his career as a young boy on Mozambique Island in the early 1760s, 
apprenticing at his family’s f irm. He learnt Portuguese, the language of trade 
and the empire, and Emakhuwa, the African language of commerce. Soon 
he began climbing the commercial hierarchy and in the 1780s became the 
f irm’s main partner in Mozambique. Like the other Vāniyās on the island, 
Laxmichand was heavily invested in the procurement and importation of 
Gujarati cotton textiles.
Textiles were one of Gujarat’s chief exports and Africa’s principal import. 
Laxmichand’s imported Indian textiles, which were in high demand among 
African consumers, were crafted to suit African consumers’ taste, styles, 
and designs each trading season. To be successful, he needed to be closely 
connected to agents in both the interiors of Africa and in Gujarat. Vital 
information was transmitted through multiple channels from Africa and 
India to Laxmichand in his f irm in Mozambique. Placed at the centre of 
networks of procurement and distribution on both sides of the Indian 
Ocean, Laxmichand held an influential and significant commercial position, 
allowing him to further his f irm’s f inancial activities.
In the early eighteenth century, he began extending cloth-financed loans 
to other merchants along the coast and in the interior of Mozambique, 
aided by his f irm’s reputation as honourable and credit-worthy. His loans 
f inanced purchases of African ivory, which was sought by Indian consumers 
in Kathiawar and Gujarat for its durability and quality. He began to ensure 
that his ships bringing cloth to Africa would continue to be profitable on the 
way back to India by leasing valuable space in their holds for the transport 
of ivory. From the middle of the eighteenth century, the credit Laxmichand 
extended was increasingly used to fund the purchase of African slaves as 
Mozambique developed into an important source of slave labour.
One of the benefits of trading cloth with slavers was that Laxmichand 
often received payment in silver dollars. As slave trading expanded, so did 
the silver dollar as currency. The silver currency acquired by Laxmichand 
was shipped to India and used in payments to Gujarati bankers and to 
secure credit that helped his cloth and loan empire. Despite his deepen-
ing involvement in it, Laxmichand never redirected his business into the 
slave trade: his commercial focus continued to be on textiles and ivory. 
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However, he did adapt to the changing reality of the time and Mozambique’s 
economy. He invested in slaving and shipped small cargoes of slaves to India, 
where new military and domestic markets were cropping up. Ultimately, 
the exchangeability of cloth for silver allowed slave trading to expand 
and brought the markets in the Indian Ocean world into close relations 
with those in the southern Atlantic, forging trans-oceanic linkages in the 
eighteenth century.
Like many other Vāniyās, Laxmichand played a central role in the ex-
change, production, and selling of African slaves. His story, however, remains 
largely untold. Laxmichand’s career is symbolic of the Vāniyā network in 
the western Indian Ocean, and thereby critical to our understanding of 
how oceanic relationships were mediated (Machado 2014: 1-18). Despite 
their signif icance, the Vāniyās’ role in expanding slave trading has for 
the most part been forgotten save for a few scholars of the Indian Ocean, 
particularly in the collective memories of Gujaratis at the regional level 
and of the Indian nation as a whole.
As opposed to the history of Atlantic slave trading, which has been kept 
vigorously alive through various means including the arts, literature, and 
coverage in the mainstream media, histories of Indian Ocean slavery are 
conspicuous by their absence in Indian and Gujarati collective memories. 
In the Americas, art exhibitions in open public spaces, conferences, and 
f ictional and non-f ictional publications have kept the memory of slavery 
alive. Speech and artwork have produced and re-produced memories of slav-
ery, leading to the institutionalization of this memory by organizations like 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) 
founded in the United States in 1909. Together, these discursive means 
have proven to be invaluable for starting discussions and reflections on 
the Atlantic slave trade and its contemporary effects. The bias of dominant 
European remembrance of slavery is relativized and challenged daily, by 
revealing the socio-political motivations and concealment tactics behind 
this bias (Haehnel and Ulz 2010). In sharp contrast, the lack of discursive 
means and material discussing slavery and challenging dominant positions 
has entailed the near absence of discussions on slavery and its after-effects 
in the Indian public space. It is certainly possible to argue that East Africa 
never played as important a role in the history of the Indian Ocean as it 
did in the Atlantic. This relative difference has sometimes been used as a 
justif ication for the deficit of discursive material on experiences of slavery 
and slave trade in the region (Alpers 1976). Doing so, however, increases 
the danger of ignoring the presence and plight of the Siddi communities of 
India, who are the descendants of African slaves.
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The Siddis reside in Gujarat, Hyderabad, and Karnataka – regions that 
historically served as central nodes in the network of maritime trade in the 
Indian Ocean. In North Kannara (Karnataka), the assimilation of the Siddis 
with the Indian populace and culture has been almost complete. Most have 
opted to convert to Hinduism; a few others have opted to become Christians 
or Muslims. Conversion, however, has not aided the social mobility of this 
community; they continue to live at the bottom of the social scale in the region 
and on the margins of poverty (Alpers 2000). In Hyderabad, the Siddis suffer 
from a similar fate. Centuries of neglect and marginalization has prompted 
many of them to refuse to be addressed as Siddis, which they believe represents 
being a stranger to the region (Yimene 2004: 199). In Gujarat, their fate is even 
worse. There, Siddis are classif ied as Scheduled Tribes, relegating them to a 
place outside the caste system and reifying their African origins (Alpers 2000).
In this anaemic landscape of discursive practices around histories of 
slave trading, Gunvantrai Poptabhai Acharya’s novel Dariyalal, the focus 
of this chapter, assumes a double-sided signif icance. Acharya is recognized 
as one of the most prolif ic writers in Gujarat. Influenced by stories told 
by sailors and his own father, who was a policeman in Colonial India, he 
has produced a massive body of literature on the sea and the adventures 
of sailors faring between Gujarat and Africa. His books such as હાજી કાસમ 
તારી વીજલી (Haji Kasam’s Vijli), દરીયાપાર (Across the Sea), હરારી (Harari), and 
દીલાવર પાષા (Dilavar Pasha) have made him one of the most widely read 
Gujarati authors. Of the 169 works of f iction Acharya has produced, દરિ યાલાલ 
(Dariyalal) is by far his most popular (Datta 1987: 15).
The Story of Dariyalal
Dariyalal follows Ramjibha, a Gujarati slave trader employed by one of the 
biggest Gujarati slave trading firms in Jangbar (modern day Zanzibar), which 
is headed by and named after Jeram Shivji. As the novel begins, Ramjibha 
is on his way to sell kidnapped Jangbaris. As the thirsty and famished 
kidnapped men, who are chained together, begin to lag, Ramjibha orders 
the group to take a short halt. As the group rests in the shade of a tree, one 
of the guards spots a rhinoceros nearby and, panicking, shoots the animal. 
Enraged, it attacks. The slaves attempt to run from the trampling beast, but, 
chained and shackled to each other, they are unable to flee. All but one of 
the men fall haplessly before the animal and are killed.
Unable to do anything besides look on with horror, Ramjibha witnesses the 
death of nineteen slaves. As he stands frozen in terror, Ramjibha remembers 
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his Vaishnava upbringing. He is a slave trader, but he is also the son of a 
woman who helped injured animals and a father who forgave debts to help 
families. Unable to reconcile his choice of profession with his non-violence 
based upbringing, he vows to never again put a man in the ‘demonic shackles’. 
Amid this epiphany, the twentieth man, who has miraculously escaped the 
rhino, wakes up from his faint. It is not long before Ramjibha realizes that the 
poor man had been driven mad by the attack and the death of his fellows.
This development hammers the f inal nail in the coffin. Ramjibha decides 
to not only quit the slave-trading business for good, but he will not stop until 
he puts a halt to the entire slave-trading enterprise in Jangbar. As the story 
further develops, Ramjibha is thrown into the local politics of Jangbar. He 
must function from within this framework and deal with other complex 
characters like Jangbar’s Sultan Said Bin Suleiman, the thriving Gujarati 
slave-trading f irm, and the arriving Europeans. Acharya’s Dariyalal soon 
becomes a complex narrative of political intrigue, adventure, and just cause 
(Archarya 2000).
Although it was written in 1938, I argue that Dariyalal remains relevant 
today for two contradictory reasons. Border-crossing has always been 
a source of storytelling or narration. Indeed, Reece Jones’ narration of 
Moushumi’s trip across the India-Bangladesh border in Chapter 1, Andrea 
Wright’s recounting of the working Indian women’s emigration process 
in Chapter 6, and James Weir and Rohullah Amin’s narration of Akbar’s 
experiences on the migrant route in Chapter 7 are all meaningful examples 
of this. But people’s experiences of crossing borders in this book and in the 
broader border studies literature are not merely an act of narration, or an 
attempt to promote understanding. These stories are moments that bear 
witness to border formation.
Borders, as they coagulate, begin binding more than physical territories: 
they begin to conceptually bind ideas and imagination. Successfully challeng-
ing these insidiously concretizing notions of the ideologies of the state and 
migration requires us to employ a myriad of techniques. Since public discourse 
is crucial in the (re)deployment of hegemonic ideas, we must not hesitate to 
expand from historic narrative techniques like those found in this edited 
volume to other genres like f iction in order to create moments of resistance 
to repressive border formations. In this context, f iction can be interpreted 
as a ‘performative re-negotiation’ of both tangible and intangible borders.
I argue that Gunvantrai Acharya’s portrayal of Ramjibha’s journey in 
Dariyalal is an attempt to imagine the diverse peoples who played a role in 
the slave-trading industry in Jangbar but who are excluded from Eurocentric 
accounts of history. The book confronts the erasure of the non-European 
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communities who played a role in the abolition of slavery, and simultaneously 
plots character interactions that unsettle formal history and the current 
hegemonic imagination. Instead of attempting to demolish the identity 
boundaries created by linear histories, Dariyalal’s plotline ‘punches holes’ in 
the mental walls of contemporary identity and linked history. Subsequently, 
he employs these characters and plotlines in endogenous Gujarati techniques 
to push on the rigid boundaries of European historiography.
Cognizant as I am of Dariyalal’s role as a discursive tool that upsets Euro-
centric history, I will also argue that the book replaces the male Eurocentric 
history of slave trade in Eastern Africa with a male Gujarati Hindu-centric 
version of the same. To quote Thapar, we ‘choose histories that make us 
who we want to be’, and Dariyalal is a prime example of this (Thapar 2010). 
In the struggle between the past, the present, and the future – a struggle 
that is not only historical, but also political – Acharya deploys Dariyalal as 
a discursive tool to re-imagine the Gujarati role in the African slave trade.
Acharya ensures the ‘non-presence’ of the Other in its plotlines, which is 
why the stereotypical depictions of Gujarati women and black slave bodies 
are never challenged in the narrative. This ‘non-presence’ of the Other in 
Dariyalal has had two signif icant consequences: f irst, although Dariyalal 
has been an important tool for displacing Europe in the collective Gujarati 
imagination, it has also reinforced traditional societal boundaries around 
the identities of black bodies, women, and inter-racial relationships; second, 
because of the reinforcing of traditional boundaries, Dariyalal actively 
prevents and mitigates meaningful conversations in the Gujarati community 
about its role in Indian Ocean slavery. In the end, Dariyalal contrapuntally 
is a tool that disorders European hierarchy by replacing it with a Hindu 
Gujarati male imagination in the collective memories of Gujaratis.
Countering Linear Histories and Rigid Historiography
Acharya’s Dariyalal is structured in a format one might call racy. Ramjibha’s 
story from slave trader to avid abolitionist spans several years. To cover this 
extensive physical as well as metaphysical journey, each chapter begins from 
a different timeframe that often covers months in a few lines. Sometimes 
a span of f ifteen days is covered in less than ten lines; at other instances, 
a minute-long conversation is detailed over pages. The passage of time is 
not a linear movement. Intriguingly, the content page of Dariyalal, though 
arranged in a vertical fashion intimating progression, lacks chapter numbers 
leaving the reader to decide which chapter to begin or end with.
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The chapter ‘The Suburb of Halar’, which would normally be counted 
as Chapter 1, starts in 1844. ‘The Wisdom of the Pyramids’ – numerically 
Chapter 9 – takes us back to 1795. Since every chapter is a small episode in 
itself, jumping from a chapter placed in the middle to one at the start does not 
really break the flow of the story or of the reader’s thought. Funnily enough, 
I recognized this only after reading the chapters in a chronological order. 
Time and narrative appear to be closely linked for Acharya. The language 
and grammar of Dariyalal refer to temporality and temporality is, in turn, 
required to structure the narration of Ramjibha’s journey. Unlike universalist 
models of temporality, however, time in Acharya’s f iction is not linear and 
successive. Events in Ramjibha’s life take place in time. Acharya indicates 
temporality by stressing at different hallmarks in Ramjibha’s journey. The 
measuring of time is thus not inherent but is rather a function imposed on 
time as needed (Ricoeur 2002). The capacity of Ramjibha’s f ictional account 
to render multiple temporalities assumes greater importance than linear 
temporality when one realizes that the interactions between characters 
in this f ictional account are a remembering of several unspoken histories.
Acharya pens diverse characters like the Gujarati slave traders Ladhabhai 
and Ramjibha; the priest Mahanta and his Hottentot tribe; English explorers 
Dunkirk and Park; Captain Stanley of the English Man-of-War Selbar; Sultan 
Said Bin Suleiman; Arab rescuers; runaway slaves; and the lamenting wives 
of people sold into slavery with equal weight and complexity. Throughout 
the story, each character interacts with two minor or major characters, if not 
more. While violence often tempers the complex interactions between the 
characters, this does not preclude other sentiments such as respect, admiration, 
understanding, and pragmatic cooperation. Take, for instance, the Sultan’s 
reaction after being told an English explorer was missing: ‘In his [sultan’s] 
imagination he saw the tired and the hungry Dunkirk and in his heart he felt the 
warmth of one adventurer for another’ (Acharya 2000: 61). Another example of 
a complex interaction is when the Mahanta ordered a Lion attack on Ramjibha 
for selling people into slavery. When the Lion refused to attack Ramjibha, 
Mahanta’s character expresses perplexion. ‘The worst punishment had failed. 
In his heart of hearts he developed a respect for this devil’  (Acharya 2000: 53).
Acharya reminds us of Gujarati culpability and collusion with the English 
in slave trading, and their contribution to the British Empire-building 
enterprise in the Indian Ocean. After the lion’s refusal to attack Ramjibha, 
the Mahanta decides to hand him over to the women:
This was a temple where even the shadow of a woman was not tolerated… 
where did these women – young and old, beautiful and plain – come 
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from? These were no ordinary women. These women were called ‘God’s 
Daughters’. When on the eastern and western coasts, the Arabs, the whites, 
the Indians and Chinese looted Bomas, burnt down Kraals and took away 
able-bodied men as slaves, these women were left behind without shelter, 
without hope, without help […] The women came and surrounded Ram. 
His name was branded in f ire in their hearts. He was […] responsible for 
their present state. He was the desert wind that lays green f ields barren 
[…] They scorned and they taunted… why don’t you call your masters for 
help? Those across the ocean? Those who grow opium and cotton seeds? 
Who own sugarcane and indigo plantations? […] Tell them their servant 
Ram is in great trouble. (Acharya 2000: 51-52)
The story keeps alive a record of slavery and the misery slave trading caused, 
which the Gujaratis would prefer to remain silent about. Yet another example 
of a remembering of multiple histories is the passage describing Dunkirk 
and Ramjibha’s journey after escaping the Hottentot goma and fleeing into 
the jungle. ‘They had a long way to go. Both were brave. Both had travelled 
alone and had much to talk about… As they talked the distance mattered 
less and less’ (Acharya, 2000: 78). Dunkirk, amazed and bewildered after 
learning about the strength, influence, resources, and equipment Jeram 
Shivji’s f irm wielded in Jangabar, declares, ‘“I cannot understand […] Why 
don’t you declare this land to be under your rule? […] you have already 
established yourselves. Now to safeguard it you must grab power”. Ramjibha 
futilely explains, “Our rule? But the Sultan rules this land? Why should 
we try to rule this land? We have come here to trade”’ (Acharya, 2000, 79). 
Through the views explored by Ramjibha and Dunkirk in this exchange, 
Acharya presents a cultural perception of state violence. State violence in 
the Indian Ocean both before and after the arrival of the European powers 
has been an issue of contention and debate, spawning a large literature in 
and of itself. Dunkirk’s views, which are given in considerable detail in this 
book, represent the political history of how European state violence was 
extended into the Indian Ocean. Conversely, Ramjibha’s views represent 
earlier notions of free trade in the Indian Ocean. In the end, after listening 
to Dunkirk, Ramjibha becomes increasingly thoughtful. Here Acharya 
successfully illustrates the doubt, turmoil, and confusion generated in 
the aftermath of the imposition of a European understanding of trade 
and state violence on the region. Ultimately, like many discussions on 
this issue, Ramjibha and Dunkirk’s discussion comes to a stalemate, with 
‘Dunkirk [thinking] Ramji was short-sighted’ while Ramjibha felt Dunkirk 
was materialist (Acharya 2000: 81).
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The juxtaposition of multiple voices in Dariyalal’s narrative calls to mind 
Romila Thapar’s Somnatha: The Many Voices of History. In this treatise, she 
uses Persian, Sanskrit, and British historical sources to reconstruct how the 
destruction of the famous Somnath temple in India became a historical 
event of considerable magnitude. The sources are juxtaposed to reveal 
the process by which the ‘traditional version’ – wherein the destruction of 
Somnatha is associated with Hindu community trauma – is constructed 
in the House of Commons in Great Britain, and is subsequently adopted 
by the Hindutva ideology.
Dariyalal is a work of f iction and Somnatha: The Many Voices of History 
is a work of contemporary history. Even so, the objectives of both narratives 
are congruent. If Dariyalal is an attempt to keep alive the many voices of 
history via the fictive characters of Ramjibha, Ladhabhai, Stanley, Dunkirk, 
Jamadar, and Suleiman, Thapar’s treatise does the opposite by deconstructing 
how mythology has become history in modern-day India. These works throw 
light on the ‘many voices of history’, for good or for bad. Both authors aim to 
recollect historical events from multiple perspectives and different angles. The 
difference between the two is that Thapar’s work falls well within the bounds 
of how conventional historians write, while Acharya’s f iction falls within 
Gujarati oral tradition that marries aesthetic value with its unique perceptive 
functions. Thapar’s text attempts to ‘objectively’ outline the events that arouse 
varied sentiments in the modern context of Hindutva ideology, while Acharya’s 
characters express sentiments in the context of historical events.
The western tradition of historiography may scoff at sentiment in histori-
cal texts, but sentimental history telling is not an uncommon phenomenon 
in Gujarati. Like Dariyalal, school children in Gujarat have for decades been 
taught to sing ‘Haji Kasam’s Vijli’. Also a subject of many f ictive novels, 
the songs and novels about Haji Kasam recollect the actual incident of the 
missing Glasgow steamship Vaitarna in 1888.1 Referred to by the locals as 
Vijli (‘lightning’) and by contemporary accounts as ‘Gujarat’s Titanic’, the 
steamboat disappeared off the coast of Bombay along with its 798 passengers 
(Gurav 2010). Here the gap between the historian and the society dissolves, 
as people themselves perform and listen to/read these events. Historical 
events become living history that people transmit and use to transform 
(Barz and Theil-Horstmann 1989: 1). Sung in a mournful tone, the song is a 
lament as well as a record of the tragic death of Haji Kasam, the captain of 
the ship and its crew. It is an ‘embalming in memory’ of the disappearance 
1 ’Vaitarna SS (1888) Document,’ Wrecksite, n.d; Khambhayata, L. 2012 . સવાસો વર ્ષ પહલેાં ડબૂલેી 
ગજુરાતી ‘ટાઈટનેિ ક’હાજી કાસમની વીજળી!!». Sandesh Gujarati Newspaper (in Gujarati).
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of Gujarat’s f irst lighting-equipped steamboat – a historical event of some 
magnitude for the people of Gujarat (Byock 2008).
The sentimental narration in Dariyalal should be treated in a similar 
way. Sentimental narration in Acharya’s f iction serves to illustrate ‘what 
it must have been like’ for the natives of Zanzibar when slavery was legal. 
Acharya poses this question for the reader’s consideration through the vari-
ous encounters of the protagonists and their consequences. After witnessing 
the death of the slaves by the rhino, Ramjibha thinks to himself, ‘How 
would he feel if he were made a slave? He heard the blood curdling whistle 
of the Rhino and saw his bloody dance for a moment. Aren’t we like the 
rhino too? The black man must see us as two-legged rhinos’ (Acharya 2000: 
34). At a time when slave trading was legal, the sentiments evoked by the 
protagonists express the immorality of slave trade. Sentimental narration 
becomes a platform for Ramjibha to articulate his dissent to the prevailing 
norms of the time. History, then, is no longer a mere recording of events; by 
‘recuperating the commonplace experience of ordinary people’, Dariyalal 
performs an affective history that is a reminder and caution against the 
repetition of historical mistakes (Phillips 2008).
Ramjibha’s epiphany of the hurt and pain he was responsible for causing 
the natives of Zanzibar is brought about by several incidents. His witnessing 
of slaves being gored to death and his encounter with ‘God’s women’ have 
been discussed briefly before. But it is in his f inal encounter with the mad 
slave, the only survivor of the rhino attack, where the slave convinces the 
Mahanta to release Ramjibha, that is representative of the Hindu karmic 
cycle in which each event has a domino effect on another. His encounter with 
the former slave, who saves him despite having been kidnapped and nearly 
sold into slavery, cements Ramjibha’s determination to abolish slavery in 
Jangbar. He decides to confront Ladhabhai, the owner of the slave-trading 
f irm, and eventually convinces him of the moral integrity of this decision. 
Ramjibha’s conviction of the immorality of slavery is a narrative structure 
of mourning slavery in the Indian Ocean.2
Storytelling and Collective Memory Making
Acharya’s sentimental narration of what it must be like to be a slave, Ram-
jibha and the Gujarati f irm’s participation in the slave trade, and Ramjibha’s 
feelings of remorse require further in-depth analysis. In Dariyalal, Acharya 
2  Ned Bertz, Lecture Indian Ocean History, University of Hawai’i at Manoa, 2015.
diSoRdeRing hiStoRy and ColleC tive MeMoRy 239
employs sentimental historical narration to expertly detail how the same 
historical event is experienced differently. Acharya’s elaborate descriptions 
of Ramjibha’s repentance and Ladhabhai’s unhesitating support for the 
stopping of the slave trade function to provide a measure of vindication to 
the Gujaratis, whose history is stained by that same trade. Acharya, who 
grew up in colonial India, could hardly have been impervious to popular 
accounts and descriptions of the Vāniyās that strongly implicated them 
in the slave trade. For instance, the Glossary of Anglo-Indian Colloquial 
Words and Phrases and of Kindred Terms published in 1903 offers several 
interpretations of the term Vāniyā or Banyan:
Banyan: A Hindu trader, and especially of the Province of Guzerat, many 
of which class have for ages been settled in the Arabian ports and known 
by this name […] The word is adopted from Vāniya, a man of the trading 
caste (in Gujarāti vāniyo), and that comes from Sansk. Vanij, ‘a merchant’ 
[…] The Banyan follows the Soldier, though as contrary in Humour as the 
Anti-podes in the same Meridian are opposite to one another […] The 
men of this class profess an extravagant respect for animal life; but after 
Stanely brought home Dr. Livingstone’s letter they became notorious as 
chief promoters of slave-trade in Eastern Africa […] In trade these Banians 
are a thousand times worse than the Jews; more expert in all sorts of 
cunning tricks, and more maliciously mischievous in their revenge. (Yule 
and Burnell 1903: 63-64)
The Glossary’s emphasis on trade and slavery’s connection to Gujarati 
identity is not without reason. Gujarati merchants made use of African 
slaves from Mozambique Island, Macuana, and elsewhere along the Eastern 
African coastline in various capacities. They were put to work as sailors in 
voyages on Gujarati vessels that traversed the Mozambique Channel as far 
south as Delagoa Bay; utilized as quayside labour to unload vessels and 
carry textiles and other cargo to merchant warehouses; and as domestic 
labour in homes. Such was the Gujarati labour dependency on African 
slaves in Mozambique that the merchants collectively petitioned to reverse 
the ban imposed by the Portuguese in the eighteenth century prohibiting 
non-Europeans from owning and trading slaves. When all else failed, the 
merchants threatened to relocate to another part of East Africa should the 
Portuguese continue insisting on the prohibition (Machado 2014).
Given how critical Gujarati merchants were to the economic and financial 
life of the colony, Acharya’s employment of the sentimental narration of 
Ramjibha’s remorse and Ladhabhai’s willingness to change must be viewed 
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as a political deployment of discursive material to help Gujaratis perceive and 
construct their reciprocal identities. Individual memory can never discount 
collective memory; identity is therefore inseparable from collective identity. 
However, individuals can and do contribute to the process of identity-formation. 
Acharya’s Dariyalal, based entirely on the sentimental narration of the experi-
ences of a slave trader and a slave-trading firm, must be understood as a form 
of individual negotiation – an endeavour to enter, modify, and reconstruct 
the collective identity and collective memory of the Guajarati community 
using story telling as a discursive practice (Carli, Sussi, & Kaučič Baša 2002).
On a closer look at Ramjibha’s character, one cannot fail to notice that 
though many plots of the novel are endogenous to the Gujarati way of think-
ing, the transformation of Ramjibha’s character into an adventure-seeking, 
risk-taking man with a heart of gold bears a striking resemblance to Rudyard 
Kipling’s Victorian archetype of manliness (Eliot 1941: 273). Ramjibha is 
introduced as someone whose ‘name spelt terror in the hearts of black men 
because he was known to be an expert at attacking the Bomas […] black 
women cursed him but it meant nothing to him’, but who transforms into a 
man that would pledge to ‘uproot slave trade from Jangbar’ (Acharya 2000: 
5, 72). In the process, the lone survivor of the rhino attack declares him 
to be ‘the only man […] trying to remove the tragedy [slavery] our people 
have been facing for centuries’. Even so, the depiction of Ramjibha as the 
saviour of the Jangbari black population was not suff icient: Acharya also 
felt the need to create a plot where Ramjibha rescues Dunkirk – an English 
adventurer – from death. This daring rescue provides Ramjibha’s character 
with the sense of being able to walk as an equal with the white man, both 
metaphorically and literally, through the African wilderness, where ‘the light 
and darkness [would] not bother them. Both were brave. Both had travelled 
alone and had much to talk about. About their countries and people, their 
clothes and customs and food and the adventures they had had’ (Acharya 
2000: 78). This is not to suggest that Acharya mimics Kipling, whose work 
was at its zenith of popularity with Indian readers in the 1930s-40s. In fact, 
Ramjibha is the epitome of Bhabha’s (2004) hybridity.
Despite his crossing of the kala pani (‘black sea’), which is generally be-
lieved to taint all those who dared to embark on overseas journeys – a belief 
that persists to this day –, Ramjibha is successful in staying true to his Hindu 
Vaishnav upbringing. His remorse links him to his Gujarati motherland; at 
his core, Ramjibha is traditional and religious. At the same time, he is also 
a modern man. He believes in the abolition of slavery – an ideal that puts 
his belief in line with the British colonial project of ‘civilizing’ the Indian 
Ocean. Ramjibha also proves excellent at handling modern technology and 
diSoRdeRing hiStoRy and ColleC tive MeMoRy 241
capable of rescuing brown women held hostage by pirates and even white 
men from the African wilderness. He therefore becomes the ideal Gujarati 
man: someone who is both traditional and modern at the same time.
However, Ramjibha’s mastery of modern technology and progressive 
values such as the abolition of slavery are not possible in the absence of 
white male characters that reciprocate in kind. Acharya devises several 
plotlines where the White man – exclusively British in nature – is required 
to seek assistance from the Gujarati Halari community in Jangbar. We ac-
cordingly have Captain Stanley of the English Man-of-War, who is searching 
for Dunkirk and is directed to Ladhabhai – the only man with the resources 
to organize such a search. We also meet Dunkirk himself as he is rescued 
by Ramjibha. In asking for help, these characters never use coercion. They 
remain respectful and even admiring of the Vāniyā’s presence in Jangbar’s 
f inancial and political life.
Acharya’s portrayal of Ramjibha as the ideal modern-traditional Gujarati 
man is understandable. It is rooted in his loyalties to his religion and his 
regional identity. His depiction of white British characters, however, is 
curious. Nowhere in the book is the relationship between the two English 
men and the Vāniyās marred by a shadow of racism. Acharya’s characters of 
Captain Stanley and Dunkirk cannot be attributable to notions of idealism 
alone. By the end of his book, the readers are also treated to the sight of 
grateful slaves, freed from their bondage, who ‘One by one […] bowed to 
the leaders [Ramjibha and Ladhabhai] and Rukhi. Anyone watching this 
spectacle would have seen an awe-inspiring sight. This was the zenith of 
Indian civilization, non-violence and humanism. It was a historic moment 
as the men left the town and headed back to the jungle’ (Acharya 2000: 107). 
This is the f irst and the last time Acharya uses the term ‘Indian civilization’ 
in his book. Such diverse representations of Hindu Gujarat, the Empire, 
and the Indian homeland are an attempt on Acharya’s part to mediate his 
own identity as a loyal subject of the Empire with a growing regional and 
national consciousness. This act of mediation must not be understood as 
Acharya having to choose between the King and the Country. At a time when 
the monolith of the Indian nation was in the process of being constructed, 
the diverse representations and characters in Acharya’s book demonstrate 
that active mediation was indeed underway in his imaginary. Yet, it did not 
mean that the borders of those identities were either completely separate 
or clashing with each other, as we are bound to imagine today. On the 
contrary, if anything Acharya’s brown and white characters live for the most 
in harmony. To put it simply, their identities were not boxed into separate 
compartments. Rather they existed on the same continuum.
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This also means that these identities need not necessarily be in conflict, 
and that the individual had flexibility in choosing what representation he/she 
would allow to dominate her/his identity. In contrast to Acharya’s deliberate 
attempts to override the identity borders between white and brown men, a 
strict hierarchy of identity borders emerges through the ‘non-presence’ of 
the ‘Other’ in this novel (Carli, Sussi, & Kaučič Baša 2002: 50).
In contrast to the brown and white male characters developed in the story, 
Acharya does not develop his female characters. In fact, there is barely any 
attention to the details or personalities of female characters in Dariyalal. 
The ‘God’s women’ who move Ramjibha to tears with their laments appear 
together as a collective and as a tool to emphasize the absence of men in 
their own society. A brown Gujarati woman, Rukhi, appears at the very end 
of the novel, only to be held hostage by pirates. As a hostage, Rukhi gives 
Ramjibha the opportunity to mount a daring rescue, thereby demonstrating 
his respect for all Gujarati women and his fearlessness by putting his life at 
risk to rescue ‘sister Rukhi’ even from the ‘depths of dariyalal [the beloved 
sea] (Acharya 2000: 87). When her husband dies, Rukhi immediately chooses 
to leave Jangbar in her widow’s garb for Kashi to spend her life mourning on 
the banks of the river Ganges for her husband. Neither Ramji nor Ladhabhai 
attempt to dissuade her from spending her life mourning for a person who 
had been absent for the better part of her married life; in fact, Ramjibha 
takes on the responsibility to deliver her safely to Kashi.
Next, Acharya depicts, in some detail, a character that is for the most 
part referred to merely as the ‘black woman’. Though freed by Ramjibha, she 
returns to her previous owner Lalia, who turns out to be Rukhi’s husband. 
She tends to Lalia, heals him, and helps him regain his health, only so he 
can play a key role in freeing Ladhabhai’s fortress from the Arab army. It 
is only in the end that her name is revealed to be Bashuta, and we never 
learn of her fate.
Finally, we have Acharya’s treatment of the black slaves on whose shoul-
ders rest the depiction of Ramjibha as a remorseful former slave trader 
attempting to shift the very foundation of Jangbari society. Except for the 
Figure 10.1  Ramjibha’s Identity Tangent
Religion Region Masculinity Empire Nation
diSoRdeRing hiStoRy and ColleC tive MeMoRy 243
Mahanta (the Hottentot priest), black bodies in the novel are given no names 
or personalities. For the most part they appear as a collective: ‘twenty slaves’, 
‘God’s Women’, ‘the Hottentot tribe’, and so on.
The systematic ‘non-presence’ of women and of the black population in 
Jangbar in Acharya’s novel serves to reinforce identity borders and ultimately 
to repress the ‘Other’. We see Rukhi sailing to Jangbar by herself without a 
male protector. The revolutionary nature of her action – since women did 
not regularly travel to Africa – is cloaked by searching for her husband. It 
appears that Rukhi can only cross literal borders by travelling across the 
ocean if she is looking for her husband – that is, if she is guarding the borders 
of her own traditional devoted-to-husband identity. In this sense, Rukhi is 
an ambassador of the traditional Gujarati identity to Jangbar. While Acharya 
is willing to let Rukhi cross regional borders, however, he is unwilling to 
cross the border of an inter-racial relationship with the characters of Lalia 
and Bashuta.
Acharya’s description of these two characters after Ramjibha releases 
Bashuta from slavery hints at an intimacy between them. After Bashuta 
nurses him through sickness, Lalia makes a choice to remain with her 
instead of returning to his wife Rukhi. In the beginning, Bashuta’s character 
is shown to be deeply in love and committed to Lalia, while Lalia accepts 
her ministrations because ‘his manhood had been compromised’ when 
Rukhi was kidnapped by the pirates. Over time, Lalia loses his anger with 
Rukhi and decides to love Bashuta, who ‘was turning him into a human 
being’. However, their relationship never proceeds further than this. Lalia 
and Bashuta are never shown pondering marriage, and by the end of the 
book Lalia has sacrif iced himself to save the Vāniyās – leaving Bashuta to 
her own devices. In their brief relationship, Bashuta never stops referring 
him to as ‘master’ and Lalia is never shown to think of Bashuta without 
also thinking of Rukhi.
Rukhi and Bashuta are the only female characters given more than a few 
lines in Acharya’s novel. The integrity of their identities depends on their 
invisibility: it is only through the conspicuous absence of the black Jangbari 
population and women can Ramjibha achieve prominence. Their absence 
makes it possible to depict Ramjibha as a brute capable of terrorizing and 
subjugating the entire population in Jangbar according to the policies of a 
slave-trading Gujarati f irm, and then as that same population’s protector 
and saviour. Acharya creates a hierarchy in which the black body is waiting 
on the bottom rung to ascend and take his place beside the brown and 
white man. In other words, he displaces dominant Eurocentric ideas only 
to replace them with a narrative of Gujarati Hindu dominance.
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The ‘non-presence’ of the Other and the prioritization of a Gujarati male 
identity in Dariyalal fosters the tendency to repress potential discussions 
and debate surrounding the issue of slavery and/or the treatment of women. 
When Dariyalal, which was already popular with Gujarati readers, was made 
part of the Gujarati curriculum, this selective construction and representa-
tion was normalized – which, in the absence of other competitive discursive 
tools, def ined how this society remembers its past history of slavery and 
its aftermath.
Conclusion
Dariyalal is a work of imagining psychological, emotional, and cultural 
histories that informs, or dis-orders, our thinking that is based on analytical 
historical discourse that tells us what happened in ‘reality’ (Handoo 2006: 
23). The fact that the book has been reprinted several times, with the latest 
edition printed in 2000, suggests that it continues to be popular and perhaps 
engenders meaningful discussions on Gujarat’s seafaring history, racism, and 
communal relations among children and adults in contemporary Gujarat. 
In the long history of historical writing, the idea that history provides a 
window to the question ‘what was it like’ has arrived late on the scene, and 
even then is yet to make a mark.
History has traditionally been thought to be the desire to record events, 
followed by the need to explain them. However, with the ever-expanding 
horizons of modern historiography and the new desire to reach beyond 
analysis and narration, history now requires sources that Western historio-
graphy may consider non-traditional and innovative at best and illegitimate 
at worst (Phillips 2008). Historical f iction is an illuminating genre that 
interrogates the set practices of history and its texts. Historians may be fans 
and even authors of historical f iction, they may read such novels voraciously 
and even assign them as readings. The truth, however, is that historians for 
the most part do not consider them worthy of critical engagement. Unlike 
alternative representations of history like memorials, historical f ilms, 
artefacts in museums, and historical photographs, historical novels are 
yet to be completely included in scholarly work (Pinto 2010). Within this 
set of challenges, Gujarati historical f iction faces even higher hurdles in a 
discipline that is dominated by English-speakers and -writers.
At the same time, Acharya’s Gujarati novel could have been a better 
vehicle for communicating the cultural trauma of slavery to the Gujarati 
descendants of slave traders if it had not erased female and black characters. 
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‘Cultural trauma’ refers to a ‘dramatic loss of identity and meaning, a tear in 
the social fabric, affecting a group of people that has achieved some degree 
of cohesion’ (Eyerman 2001: 2). This trauma may not necessarily have been 
felt directly by everyone in the present Siddi community, or even the whole 
community itself in India. However, its traumatic meaning is established 
and accepted through processes of mediation and representation over long 
periods of time. Acharya’s refusal to push the boundaries of traditionally 
held identities, instead of the relatively radical re-envisioning of identities 
like that accorded to Ramjibha’s character, was the loss of an opportunity for 
the public acceptance and credence of the memory of what it must have been 
like to be a slave. Dariyalal was perhaps one amongst many that forwarded 
selective mediation of experience and representation as a discursive tool. 
Such a discriminatory construction of events has led to a near-absence 
of efforts to grapple with the nature of the victim and to fully undertake 
the responsibility for these historical events. This lack of struggle over the 
meaning and the consequences of the slave trade continue to create a crisis 
of identity and meaning for the descendants of slaves in India.
In imagining a world where a Gujarati man plays an anti-hero at the centre 
of slave trade in Jangbar, Acharya challenges the f inancially and politically 
strong communities who have managed to erase themselves from much of 
the history of the slave trade. Originally written in Gujarati, the story defies 
expectations and strongly paints the community in shades of grey. By imagin-
ing the involvement of the community in the slave trade, Acharya narrates 
a much more cosmopolitan history of systematic oppression. Because it is a 
work of f iction, Dariyalal transcends cultural ghettos. It does not claim to 
demolish the painstaking boundaries and frontiers that nations have created. 
Rather, it punches holes in the mental walls of contemporary identity and 
linked history. Through these holes in the wall we are afforded a glimpse 
into the ‘Other’ – an(other) identity in an(other) time – as we rethink borders 
and mobility in South Asia and beyond (Shafak 2010).
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Abstract
The work of Sudesh Mishra, a contemporary Fijian-Indian-Australian 
poet, addresses the idea of the fragmented diasporic identities of Indo-
Fijians and the ability to locate a ‘home’ amidst borders of history, 
memories, and intergenerational remembrance. There is an attempt 
at understanding the nature of the memories that sustain the ethnic 
borders that still exist in Fiji, and give rise to racial and ethnic ten-
sions. Far from being geographical in nature, the borders in Fiji are 
mostly historical and psychological, and the history of colonization 
and indenture constantly reiterate the presence of borders that cannot 
be dissolved or reconsidered. In times of globalization and multiple 
border crossings, the study of the Indo-Fijian diaspora offers dislocated 
sites of contestation of the homogenizing forces of globalization. And 
it is precisely these sites of dislocation and instability that create pos-
sibilities of redef ining a home for a diasporic community, a home that 
travels and traverses time and space to become more inclusive and 
comprehensive.
Keywords: Indo-Fijian, diaspora, memory, borders, home
Introduction
How do theorists of border studies and transnationalism capture a state of 
being that is f luid and exilic, and that attests to remembering, rather than 
forgetting, the anguish of the self? How do memories shape the conscious-
ness of not just an individual, but also a nation that must come to terms 
with historical trauma and dislocation? In times where state and national 
borders are becoming increasingly elusive, f luid, and mobile, the positions 
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of certain populations are shifting from disadvantaged and peripheral to 
become important participants in dialogue and expression. Such interfaces 
create new avenues for understanding the existence and perpetuation of 
the borders that run deep in a nation’s psyche, and deeply engage with 
memory studies as a tool for understanding how, and how much, a nation 
remembers. Fiji is one such site where memories of the borders and conflicts 
that emerged in the process of nation-building continue to thrive, affecting 
the political and cultural landscape of the nation.
This chapter seeks to understand the notions of borders, home, and 
belonging of the Indo-Fijians through the poetry of Sudesh Mishra, a 
contemporary Indo-Fijian-Australian poet. Mishra’s poems engage deeply 
with the memories and postmemories of intergenerational remembrance 
that signif icantly contribute to identity formation and the development of 
a diasporic identity – especially in the case of Fiji, where borders of race 
and identity run very deep and are placed against the history of colonial-
ism, indenture, and coups. In a constantly changing landscape shaped by 
mobilities and positionalities, the idea of a citizenship that is tied to the 
terrain and imagination of the nation-state is called into question (Anderson 
1991: 6). Turbulent political conditions over the last 30 years have led to 
large-scale migrations of the Indo-Fijians, raising signif icant questions 
about the community’s citizenship and belonging to the land of Fiji. This 
chapter is an attempt to understand the nature of memories that sustains 
the ethnic borders that still exist in Fiji, thereby giving rise to racial and 
ethnic tensions. Beginning with a summary of the historical conditions of 
girmit (‘indenture’) in Fiji and a brief overview of the coups, this chapter 
explores the nature of memory, postmemory, and identity in diaspora, 
f inally establishing that the possibility of envisioning a singular, stable 
home for Indians in Fiji is severely challenged by the constant movement, 
displacement, and borders inherent to a diaspora.
Sudesh Mishra is the author of f ive books of poems: Rahu (1987), Tandava 
(1992), Memoirs of a Reluctant Traveller (1994), Diaspora and the Difficult Art 
of Dying (2002), and The Lives of Coat Hangers (2016). He has also written 
literary criticism, including Diaspora Criticism (2006) and Preparing Faces: 
Modernism and Indian Poetry in English (1995); two plays, Ferringhi (2001) 
and The International Dateline (2001); and several short stories. His writing 
problematizes the nature and meaning of home, which is a dynamic and 
complicated process made more complex by the political instability of 
the nation. The nature of his conception of ‘home’ contradicts the usually 
understood notion that home is a stable, secure, f ixed place of belonging 
that evokes beliefs of citizenship and nationality.
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The Bitter Land of Fiji: Grappling with Internal Borders
I am of Feejee,
The bitter land of Feejeee,
And hate is all we know,’ cried she,
‘Leap down that mango tree
And dance with me
In this bitter land of Feejee. (Mishra 1992: 19)
The year 2016 marked the 100th anniversary of the abolition of indenture 
in Fiji, a system under which the colonial government transported about 
40,000 Indians to work on the sugarcane plantations on the islands. The 
Indian diaspora to Fiji can be described as following two waves of migra-
tion. The f irst wave began in May 1887, when the f irst ship carrying Indian 
indentured labourers arrived in Fiji, most of them from Uttar Pradesh, a 
North Indian province, and Calcutta, in eastern India.1 Indians ventured 
abroad in anticipation of economic gain, but what began as a hopeful quest 
turned out to be a never-ending journey of tyranny, disillusionment, and 
despair. These labourers signed a contract or an agreement (known as 
‘girmit’, a corrupt form of the English word ‘agreement’), under which they 
continued to arrive in Fiji until 1920 when the system was abolished. After 
abolition, their living conditions improved. It is estimated that about 24,000 
of the indentured migrants and their families returned to India, but the 
majority stayed in Fiji (Lal 2009: 89-109). The Fijians owned 87 per cent of 
the land and after the indenture ended it was leased out to Indians who 
earned their livelihood working on plantations, so that they could gradually 
work towards a better future. Indians eventually came to dominate trade 
and commerce in addition to agriculture; in particular, the free Gujarati 
migrants who arrived in Fiji from 1914 onwards established themselves as 
traders, and became the face of Indian commercial success (Mishra 2002: 
154). While f irst-generation migrants were predominantly labourers, the 
second and third generations of Indo-Fijians established a strong economic 
and cultural base in Fiji.
1  Migration was never a part of Indian society; in fact, as historian Brij Lal states, most 
Indian peasants sent away to labour in f ields, were bound to soil and would have never thought 
of leaving or exploring unknown lands, across the seas. During the late nineteenth century, 
however, rural India was undergoing profound changes due to the introduction of new land 
ownership regulations, increasing debts, and natural calamities such as droughts and famines. 
Out of the 60,000 migrants who came to Fiji at this time, 45,000 came from Uttar Pradesh, a 
state in Northern India that was most severely affected by drought and famine (Lal 2009).
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The second wave of diasporic migration happened in the wake of the two 
military coups of 1987 followed by one in 2000 and the last one in 2006, when 
communities of expatriate Indo-Fijians formed in other countries.2 After 
the 1987 coups, some 70,000 to 80,000 Indo-Fijians migrated to Australia, 
New Zealand, Canada, and United States. As the historian Brij Lal states, 
‘Indo-Fijians, now fourth or f ifth generation, are thought to be still regarded 
as outsiders in the land of their birth, threatened with the denial of equal 
citizenship and equal protection of law’ (Lal 2000: 180). The coups were an 
outcome of a deep-seated belief, in Lal’s words, that the taukei (‘Fijians’) 
regarded their neighbours the Indo-Fijians as vulagi (‘foreigners’), who were 
welcome to stay and enjoy their hospitality as long as they recognized that, 
as outsiders, they do not have a claim to the land. Indo-Fijians, now in their 
fourth and f ifth generations, still feel threatened about being denied the 
rights of equal citizenship and protection under the law. This can be traced 
to the history of colonial rule, which ruled through racial and ethnic com-
partmentalization that lead to a lack of inter-group contact and ultimately 
resulted in a severely fragmented society. A culture of mistrust arose from 
the promotion of ‘ethnic-blocs’ by an alliance between indigenous Fijians 
chiefs and the European community, who opposed the Indo-Fijians who 
were pushing for independence. As a result, there was a clear polarization 
of the communities post-independence, and inter-group contact continued 
to be dominated by an ideology of indigenous paramountcy, without any 
effort toward inclusive nation-building, a national identity, or even equal 
citizenship. This eventually undermined the formation of a socioculturally 
plural society that recognizes the existence of diverse social, cultural, and 
sub-national groups and their signif icance for nation-building. Instead, the 
struggle for ethnic dominance and superiority led to racial violence and 
military interventions, belittling any attempts at meaningful inter-group 
dialogues and peaceful coexistence. This led to four coups over the span 
of twenty-one years, the f irst two against a multi-ethnic government in 
1987, and one against the multi-ethnic People’s Coalition Government in 
2000 and the f inal one in 2006, aimed at asserting indigenous hegemony 
over the nation and its politics. Widespread unrest and violence led to 
2  While most political analysts/historians view the events of 1987 as comprising two coups 
d’état, one in May and one in September, others describe the situation as one coup that began in 
May and ended in September/October. Though the second military intervention in September 
1987 did not depose a formally recognized government, I adopt the former position as the more 
commonly recognized one. Consequently, I refer to four coups in Fiji’s recent history: May 1987, 
September 1987, 2000, and 2006.
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the delegitimation of the democratically elected government, constitu-
tional values, and minority rights, sparking fear and insecurity for the 
Indo-Fijian minorities.
The study of borders in Fiji offers a prismatic understanding of the society 
and of the space that signif ies home for Indo-Fijians. During all of these 
coups, particularly the f irst three, Indians suffered both economically and 
psychologically. Satendra Nandan, an Indo-Fijian writer and historian, 
encapsulates the Indo-Fijian experience thus: ‘As a migrant, stripped much 
of his history, his human dignity, his roots, once again uprooted by the 
coups, the twice-banished, thrice-betrayed, had to live by his wits’ (2000: 
15). Nandan believes that the tragedy of Fiji is that Indians and Fijians have 
lived in separate cultural worlds, largely caused by colonial policies and 
continued by communal performances such as attending different schools 
and places of worship; practicing different lifestyles, rites, rituals, and 
ceremonies; speaking different languages (Nandan 2000: 14). The creation 
of such distinct boundaries is problematic because they impede any attempt 
for communities to integrate or even have the meaningful dialogues that are 
required to create homes. The coups were therefore an outcome of economic 
and political power struggles between the two communities, Indo-Fijians 
and Fijians – a struggle that can be traced back, again, to the colonial policy 
of apartheid. The Indo-Fijian scholar and literary theorist Vijay Mishra 
states that, although Fiji has been ‘postcolonial’ since its independence 
from Britain in 1970, for the native Fijian the coups signalled their moment 
of anti-colonial struggle by re-defining what indigenous people meant by 
rights and the social democratic notion of the common good. Curiously 
enough, this moment of postcolonial aff irmation could only happen with 
demonstrable claims of indigenous Fijian supremacy over the migrant, albeit 
thoroughly Fiji-born, population of Indo-Fijians (Mishra 2007: 37). With 
multiple coups, the Indo-Fijians’ sense of exile and borders was perpetuated, 
invoking memories of indenture and their original displacement.
Seen as the remains of an old capitalist endeavour and symbols of 
imperialism, Indians remain aliens in the land of Fiji. In his poem ‘Feejee’, 
Sudesh Mishra expresses a state of disarticulation and dispossession which 
must be read against the history of the coups of 1987 and 2002, which were 
a grim reminder of Indo-Fijians’ status as outsiders on the island:
We have forsworn our landscape; there’s nothing
But the throng of disarticulate words
Searching for meaning in a barren skull.
Is this the madness of the deracine?
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Or the confusion of some imbecile?
Both betray the mendicant’s way. Old man,
Who shall render our world meaningful?
Define our dispossession? Like primates
Sharing gutturals in a brittle cave,
We strive for articulation, shaping
Each vowel from the stiff bone of language.
And though words, like the affairs of the heart,
Are ephemeral, and will not redeem,
Ours is the simple faith in what is said. (Mishra 1992: 17)
The images of uprooting and the confusion brought about because of it, 
the struggle to articulate this state and the inadequacy of language to 
convey it, all express the insecurity and sadness of an Indo-Fijian com-
munity that has suffered threats of expulsion and ethnic cleansing, with 
the coups deepening the divide between the communities. Military rule, 
curbed rights, and minuscule representation at the political level have 
since led to large-scale migration of Indians. Since the coups, more than 
100,000 Indians have left, especially professionals (Srebrnik 2008: 95). Fiji is 
a plural society where economic and social activities are clearly segregated 
and compartmentalized; homes created on such borders are unstable and 
uncanny, often giving way to confusion. Borders constantly def ine and 
negotiate the spaces that we know as home, blurring the boundaries between 
the mental and physical/geographical home, and oscillating between the 
past and the present.
Postmemories of Girmit
The generations of Indians in Fiji who descended from the girmitiyas 
(‘diasporic indentured labourers’) keep their memories of dislocation and 
pain alive through the intergenerational transfer of memory, known as 
‘postmemory’ in the words of Marianne Hirsch. ‘Postmemory characterizes 
the experience of those who grow up dominated by narratives that preceded 
their birth, whose own belated stories are displaced by the stories of the 
previous generation, shaped by traumatic events that can be neither fully 
understood nor re-created’3 (Hirsch 1992). The term originally referred 
3  First used by Hirsch in 1992 in her article on Art Spiegelman’s Maus, this term falls under 
the large canopy of memory studies, a term she explored in greater depth in her 1997 study 
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primarily to the relationship between the children of Holocaust survivors 
and the memories of their parents. Since then, the term has been opened up 
to include the relationship that later generations or distant contemporary 
witnesses bear to personal, collective, and cultural trauma – of others, as 
well as the experiences they ‘remember’ only through stories, images, and 
behaviours. Through postmemory, events of the past continue to haunt 
the present. Collective national and family memories that are transmit-
ted from one generation to the other through political, social, historical, 
testimonial, and documented memories create an understanding of home, 
which instils a sense of belongingness to the past and the present. However, 
in certain cases memories can also induce trauma caused by historical 
displacement and exploitation, as in case of Indians in Fiji. Geographical and 
temporal distance and the trauma of exile or expulsion make it diff icult for 
diasporic communities to develop an integrated memory of their lost home. 
Postmemories of indenture and servitude play a signif icant role in shaping 
the worldview of the contemporary generation of Indo-Fijians, who have 
witnessed multiple political coups and racist tensions in the last thirty years.
Contemporary theories of borders engage in interdisciplinary approaches 
to studying postmodern identities and spaces of belonging. Understanding 
the border as a literal visual object such as a wall, fence, gate, and line 
on a map has been a traditional practice. Moving beyond understanding 
borders in terms of the territories that define nation, identity, and belonging, 
however, border studies engages with understanding the nature of borders 
in reference to the politics of representation and interpretation and the 
global movements of people. Often used interchangeably in literature, 
the terms ‘border’ and ‘boundary’ are distinct. While ‘border’ suggests a 
geographical space that divides different locations, ‘boundary’ refers to the 
cognitive divisions that exist between people. Questions about internalized 
borderlands based on history, caste, religion, gender, and ethnicity need to be 
addressed, redefined, reframed, and rediscovered. One way these questions 
can be addressed is by foregrounding the role of the memories and colonial 
discourses that shape the narratives of the self and community of a nation. 
Memories play a signif icant role in the formation of diasporic identities 
because transnational communities’ association with their homelands 
does not come from strong f ilial bonds, but through transgenerational 
memories – Hirsch’s postmemories. Consequently, it is not territories or 
borders that determine the formation of distinct identities, but instead 
postmemories, which also regulate and sustain these identities.
Family Frames: Photography, Narrative, and Postmemory.
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For the second and subsequent generations of Indians in Fiji, the island is 
their homeland, the land of their birth. However, they also have postmemo-
ries of ‘imagined India’ handed down to them by the older generations and 
through religious texts and the popular media. While most of the Indians 
born in Fiji would never be able to relate to India as a homeland, they are 
constantly reminded that they are Indians in Fiji. The home they call Fiji 
therefore becomes a contested site, and raises questions of what exactly 
constitutes home. For instance, in his poem ‘Nightfall’, Mishra narrates the 
plight of a migrant haunted by displaced dreams:
Evening.
Mynahs are prunes moving against the sky.
The diminishing light holds me together,
Buttressed in retrospect:
A Brahmin Nana rehearsing
His father’s dream
Exchanged Lucknow for a vision stretched miles into the ocean.
The lawn is treed in shadows.
Beyond the road sugarcanes inject the night with stars.
The sky’s gourd leaks profusely, pigmenting
The west with burgled colours-
Of Madras, Bombay.
Even when the scourge snaked over shoulders
The mind stayed focused-
Ayodhya was more real than agony or arkathi.4
It is different now, here, on this island;
I glare with post-lapsarian orbs
Stranger even to darkness. (Mishra 1987: 22)
This stanza invokes the postmemories of the girmityas who were recruited 
through fraudulence and deception, and who would never have dreamt 
of leaving their homes for unknown places. The poet reminisces about 
an old Brahmin from Lucknow against the backdrop of Fiji’s sugarcane 
4  Arkathi means the recruiting agent, someone who unscrupulously recruited Indians for 
indentured labour in Fiji.
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plantations, recollecting memories of his life in Ayodhya5 – revealing 
the blurred boundaries of past and present, belonging and un-belonging. 
The uncanny repetition of the pain and loss of a homeland give rise to 
postmemories of an indentured past that haunts the texts produced in the 
present. ‘A Well’, for instance, reminds Mishra of a palimpsest, with each 
generation adding layers to the ancestral experience, and attributing newer 
meanings to it. Farmhands working near the well echo the experience of 
his forefathers who dug through the sod with machetes and ploughs, and 
invoke memories of khol-eyed women snapping beans and gossiping. An 
old cartwheel rotted from its axle, rusted bolts, an old box standing like a 
milestone, all remind him of his ancestors. Standing there, he says,
I wish to unpack
The bracken-wrapped mandala of my ancestors,
Take up pitchfork and machete and plough,
And do what farmhands do, till clods of earth
Glisten for the ploughshare, and new generations
Of children, starting at night from humid dreams,
Wonder what ghost claps in our unlit catacombs (Mishra 2002: 42)
The well and the landscape surrounding it signify a space that reverberates 
images and sounds from the past. Mishra wants to unpack this ‘mandala’ 
or ancestral universe for the new generation that must relate to the past to 
make sense of the present, and this he does through his poetry. In another 
poem, ‘Dear Syd’, Mishra relives the nightmare of the Syria,6 a recurring 
historical trope in Mishra’s poems:
5  Ayodhya is a city in Uttar Pradesh, India, that is believed to be the birthplace of Lord Rama 
and the setting of the Hindu epic Ramayana. Through the invocation of Rama’s banishment, 
his trials in the forest, the abduction of Sita, his victory over Ravana, and their f inal return to 
the utopian Ayodhya, the nineteenth century girmitiyas recast their narrative through ‘reverse 
millenarianism’. India signif ied Ayodhya, and by extension, the golden age that they forfeited 
through their crossing of kalapaani (‘the black waters’). The story of Ram resonated with the 
emotions of the Fijian Indians, who believed that like Ram, who was exiled for fourteen years 
without any fault of his (in their case they were misled and deceived by the arkathis who showed 
them a utopian picture of life in Fiji), eventually returned to Ayodhya, triumphing the good over 
evil. This myth consoled them and gave them hope of escaping indenture and returning to Ram 
rajya (‘the kingdom of Ram’), which signif ied India.
6  Considered the worst maritime disaster in the history of Fiji, the S.S. Syria was a ship 
carrying immigrants from Calcutta to Fiji that wrecked on 11 May 1884. An inexperienced crew 
had allowed the Indian immigrant ship to drift off course, and it was wrecked on the Nasilai reef 
at Nakelo in Tailevu at 8:30 PM. 497 men, women, and children were on board, and many had 
never seen water before they had embarked on the voyage. The unforgiving reef decimated the 
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And in nightmares the cries from broken Syria
Break me like no book-the splintering hull,
The seething ocean, the human struggle;
Afterwards the wash of sea and a silence.
These images won’t let me be, macheteing
Through my equanimity, sinking the coracle
Bobbing inside my archipelagic heart. (Mishra 1992: 27)
Though he neither witnessed nor experienced this event f irst-hand, the 
cries of people struggling against the unrelenting sea, followed by a long 
silence of amnesia, still haunt Mishra, f illing him with despair and shaking 
his composure, even after more than a century.
The postmemories of trauma passed on through intergenerational 
narratives, prevent the possibility of forgetting such events that marked 
important times in the history of Indians in Fiji. Certain landscapes, such 
as the cane f ields of Fiji, are reminders of a time from the past. These f ields 
are the actual sites where the Indian girmityas sang songs of longing and 
mourning for a lost homeland, where the capitalist venture of the girmit 
(‘agreement’) to work was realized. These f ields remind Mishra of not just 
one lost home – the one that the Indians left behind in India –, but also the 
other lost home that he was born into, and which was ravaged by coups and 
racial tensions. The space of the f ields, therefore, blurs the borders of time, 
memory, and history, where both bleed into each other and waver between 
different times of history:
Green spears lancing heaven, column after column,
Proud, rigid. No Macedonian prepared this phalanx,
Just a bunch of bedraggled Biharis7
Emerging from the lagoon like some promised mirage,
And the sea sang estrangement to displaced ears.
[…]
And each column, season, re-enacts Harrapa, Pataliputra.8
And every mimosa that infolds within, infolds
207-foot, 1010-tonne iron ship. By the time the shipwrecked passengers were brought to safety, 
59 had drowned, and eleven more died within a week while being treated. Others were rescued 
by Fijian villagers. 
7 ‘Bihari’ is a demonym given to the people from the state of Bihar in North India. Many 
migrants to Fiji hailed from Bihar.
8  Harappa was an ancient city in the Indus civilization (3300-1300 BCE), currently a part of 
Pakistan. Patliputra (built in 490 BCE) was an ancient Indian city near modern-day Patna, Bihar.
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A part of the racial memory. (Mishra 1987: 23)
In this poem titled ‘Canef ield’, Mishra traverses layers of memories 
and re-creates the images of estrangement that the Biharis would have 
experienced while working on the f ields – a memory that continues to 
haunt him, though he did not experience indenture directly. By taking 
the readers through different temporal planes, the understanding of 
intergenerational memories gets extended even to ancient civilizations 
and the racial history of the Bihari labourers working on the f ields. In 
‘Glacier’, which was written during his travel to Aotearoa, South Island, 
the poet is asked by a stranger to describe the glacier in front of him. 
Instead of describing the glacier, he relives the pain of his ancestors who 
drowned at sea:
But I’d leap back in time by a hundred
Years, coolie-boy held in talons of fear,
While salt raged, riving the reef to Syria. (Mishra 2002: 54)
As important it is to remember the past because it is instrumental in 
shaping the present and future, memories are storehouses that are not 
f ixed in time and space: they travel and change with time. As Daniel Levy 
states, ‘A shared sense of the past becomes a meaning-making repository 
which helps def ine aspirations for the future’ (2016: 291). They cannot be 
stored securely and neatly, and therefore cannot be retrieved without 
intervention, or without being processed. This reflects Hirsch’s discussion of 
postmemories as a set of recollections that take place through imaginative 
investment, rather than being directly connected to the past like memories 
are. ‘Full or empty, postmemory seeks connection. It creates where it cannot 
recover. It imagines where it cannot recall. It mourns a loss that cannot 
be repaired’ (Hirsch 2012). Mishra’s poems are an imaginative rendition 
of such postmemories that do not mourn the loss of an ancestral land in 
India so much as they mourn the dislocation and trauma that his ancestors 
experienced upon arrival and working in Fiji. For instance, when Mishra 
undertakes an actual physical journey to India, he pens these lines while 
waiting in a retiring room:
A brisk language connects me to India;
I’m my ancestor f leeing its famine.
Looking in the mirror I see only him,
The young girmityas departing India.
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In India trying to get away from India.
I’d ride a reindeer to get away from India. (Mishra 1994: 42)
While journeying through India, Mishra can only imagine a young girmitya 
departing from his famine-ridden homeland. There is no sense of nostalgia, 
longing, or even satisfaction at having visited India, because he does not 
associate India with the idea of a homeland.
Diaspora as a social form is f luid and unsettled, historically linked to 
forgetting, remembering, and imagining an identity attached to ancestral 
land while simultaneously seeking membership in another host land. As 
opposed to the nation, which is def ined by exclusive boundaries and f ixed 
borders, diaspora is based on geographical dislocation or migration. There 
is distinct movement in terms of time, space, and location: a movement 
away from a place of belonging. When a community becomes diasporic, 
everything moves, including memories. The memories of a diasporic com-
munity also travel with them, becoming displaced from the point of origin 
and altering with time and space. Thus, when examined from the binary 
perspective of the nation and diaspora, national memory is natural, coherent, 
authentic, and homogeneous, while diasporic memory is hybrid, broken, and 
displaced. Therefore, Mishra challenges Hirsch’s presumption that a diaspora 
is always attached to a former territorial home by identifying himself as a 
transnational poet with a blend of multiple identities. The borders of a nation 
do not confine the identity of a multifarious poet like him, who articulates 
himself and his identity from several locations, moving restlessly between 
Fiji and Scotland, Australia and New Zealand, Malta and Italy (Mishra 2002: 
back page). For instance, in his poem ‘Venice’, Mishra oscillates between 
memories of Marco Polo in the spring of 1271, to those of Dante Alighieri in 
1321, and then six centuries later to those of a runaway from a slum in Agra, 
India. As the long poem progresses, the historical characters live out their 
lives, while that of the runaway Indian transforms in hue:
Exhausted by memories, Kabir julaha9
came to inside a vase-hipped trough
where matter changed to spirituous glass
without form, mass, weight, music,
so that everything was pure miasma:
9  The Kabirpanthi Julaha are a Hindu caste mainly found in the northern Indian state of Uttar 
Pradesh. The word julaha means a ‘ball of thread’ in Persian; their main profession is weaving 
cloth on handlooms.
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warp, breath, camber, sag, texture.
in that hueless space he alone was hue. (Mishra 2002: 8)
The temporal shifts in the narration of the poem create temporal and 
cognitive discrepancies and ambiguities where meaning making is based 
on unstable fragments of memory, which leads to questioning the stability 
of the narrator’s identity. The distractions offered by these memories of 
different times and spaces make Mishra a multi-faceted diasporic poet, 
who, as Rosemary George believes, does not yearn for assimilation into the 
mainstream discourses of citizenship and belonging. She writes, ‘While 
the desire for assimilation into the mainstream is popularly read as the 
trademark of the immigrant experience, “feeling at home” may not require 
assimilation. At the same time, the process of making oneself at home is a 
project that may not be completed even by several successive generations’ 
(George 1999: 184). Mishra is not a migrant in Fiji; he was born and raised 
in Fiji. However, his ancestry is Indian, and time and time again he is made 
aware of it, and therefore questions whether assimilation in terms of ‘feeling 
at home’ can ever happen for the Indo-Fijians.
Conclusion: Fragmented Homes
Given this ambivalent relationship between Indo-Fijians and the land of 
Fiji, it becomes diff icult to posit the idea of ‘home’ and ‘host’ – making 
conventional ideas about homeland and belongingness problematic. In the 
case of Indo-Fijians, the margins of home and non-home appear blurred as 
the ghosts of girmit and coups mingle with each other, giving rise to an acute 
sense of alienation and dislocation. The more borders are crossed, the more 
they seem to increase along the lines of race and ethnicity, and multiple 
coups reiterate this ambivalent state of being. These borders come to life 
through the everyday experiences of individuals and memory narratives 
expressed through different mediums of communication. With a fragile 
and chaotic history, it becomes interesting to study the effects of border 
crossings on Indian Fijians, for whom the experiences of immigration and 
exile constantly intermingle. Homi Bhabha, a contemporary postcolonial 
theorist and writes, ‘Where, once, the transmission of national traditions 
was the major theme of a world literature, perhaps we can now suggest 
that transnational histories of migrants, the colonized, or political refu-
gees – these border and frontier conditions – may be the terrains of world 
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literature’.10 This is precisely where one can locate Mishra’s work. Modern 
diaspora disrupts the apparent closure of home and generates transnational, 
translocal communications and communities, redefining new dimensions 
of home as a space of becoming rather than being. Even if one lays claim to 
being an Indo-Fijian, the idea of home transcends the boundaries of Fiji, 
giving way to a decentred, diverse expression of transition and belonging. For 
a diasporic poet like Mishra, different cultures constantly intermingle and 
engage with each other in a dynamic way, where each location’s history and 
geography create newer ways of thinking about nation, region, and territory.
This idea captures the essence of Mishra’s writing, the way his poetry 
is unstructured, broken, and erratic. His poems subvert the genealogy of 
structured time and expression, often making them obscure and diff icult 
to comprehend, reflecting his state of being a wanderer, a nomad. In his 
poem ‘Memory of Jarek Woloszyn’, Mishra expresses,
A world that began with the drought in Basti,
Then forever turned molten as the Danube11
Caught the trades at Kidderpore
And cut through the aspy addery braids of Kali.
Now I roam stateless, looking for the resolute world
In a world that is no more
Or no less than the sea (Mishra 2002: 42)
Boundaries survive through their presence. Like the phoenix, they con-
stantly re-create themselves only to be broken down and come back to 
life again. In a fragmented Fijian society that oscillates between being a 
democracy and a military-run nation, multiple coups over twenty years 
have caused internal divisions of race and power to thrive and multiply.12 In 
10  Bhabha borrows the concept of ‘unhomely’ from Freud and calls it a paradigmatic colonial 
and post-colonial condition, describing how the boundaries between the public and private 
spheres collapse, giving rise to disorientation. He discusses how the ‘unhomely’ informs the 
traumatic ambivalences of personal, psychic history to the wider disjunctions of political 
existence. He believes that ‘unhomely’ is the condition of the modern world and, taking this as 
a point of departure, one can argue that Mishra’s works depict the state of the modern diasporic, 
transnational poet (Bhabha 1994:17).
11  Reference to the ship Danube, which had 149 girmityas on board on 15 June 1891. In 1892 
she went missing, and her fate is still a mystery.
12  The constitutional crises started on Friday, 10 April 2009, when the Fijian President an-
nounced nationwide through radio broadcast that he was abrogating the Constitution of Fiji. He 
also announced emergency rule, which led to media censorship and increased police powers. 
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an essay describing the state of the society during the post-coup elections 
of 2001, Lal writes,
The fabric of national society has been strained. Although on the surface 
things look calm – people go about their business, intermingle in their 
workplace, on the sports f ield, around the yaqona13 bowl, more visibly in 
parts of Fiji not directly traumatized by the events of 19 May [2000] – but 
hidden behind the rhetoric of multiculturalism and reconciliation lie 
deep suspicions and raw prejudices, more widespread now than in Fiji’s 
recent past. (Lal 2005: 210)
Sudesh Mishra’s poetry holds a mirror to this unrest, giving voice to the 
people and events that are otherwise forgotten in everyday life. Through his 
narratives, the reader gets a sense of the fragmentation and dislocation that 
mark the lives of Indians in Fiji, and at the same time the hybrid nature of his 
poetry draws similarities between disparate forms that conjure the ghosts 
of the past, uniting the community through an invocation of postmemories.
In his preface to Diaspora and Difficult Art of Dying, Mishra states that the 
structuring principle to that volume of poetry is founded on discontinuities, 
rather than continuities. This is brilliantly portrayed in his prose-poem of 
the same name, which spans different locations ranging from a village in 
India to a ship carrying girmits, to the lands of Fiji, Edinburgh, and Australia. 
The poet metamorphoses into different genders, characters, and professions 
to show the f luidity of borders (which is ironic, since borders have been 
established very strongly in Fiji) and diaspora. The text is one piece of 
prose, not broken by stanzas or breaks until the end to signify the end of the 
journey, which in turn, signif ies the end of the text. Mishra’s prose-poem 
is sparsely punctuated, with diverse images, interspersed with Hindi and 
Fijian words and scattered with different thoughts, clearly indicating the 
state of Indo-Fijians. He says, ‘so it was little by little i went through another 
sea-change as my discovery of an oceanic present leaked into my memory of 
an indian past, until a time came when i could no longer think of machli14 
as word and idea and culture had never existed prior to ika15, prior to my life 
on this archipelago, and yet one was forever inside and around the other’ 
(Mishra 2002: 75). While Mishra laments the coup-ridden state of Fiji, he 
13  Yaqona, or kava as it known, is a traditional national drink of Fiji associated with a social 
gatherings, festivities, and rituals. It is also presented as a traditional gift to visitors. 
14  Machli means ‘f ish’ in Hindi.
15  Ika means ‘f ish’ in Fijian.
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also celebrates the creative space that the exilic experience offers. The 
ability to write from within and without, as both insider and outsider, gives 
Mishra the perspective of a transnational writer, an approach that might 
best describe his diasporic state. In times that speak of global identities 
and transnational economies, the study of home breaks away from the 
conventional understanding of nation and nationalism. Henk van Houtum 
explains that the national border is a symbolic demarcation of an appropri-
ated space, an imagined truth, that is reproduced symbolically, semiotically, 
and formally every day in time and space. Therefore, it is a fabrication – a 
fantasy to which communities seek belongingness. It is through seeking 
national membership that communities achieve a sense of being a part of 
the meaningful, collective making of national narratives. A nation thus 
creates borders that demarcate the rest of the world as the ‘other’, against 
which protection is to be sought and distance to be maintained. Borders 
are hence ‘partial, selective and opportunistic’, created to f ill a void in 
one’s own rootedness and self and identity. Consequently, the dreams of 
a national utopia based on shared narratives, spaces, and fantasies create 
internal power struggles of control that are never-ending (van Houtum 2011: 
56). It can be argued that, far from being geographical in nature, borders in 
Fiji are mostly historical and psychological and manifest through constant 
political, social, and psychological tensions between the two communities. 
The history of colonization and indenture constantly reiterates the presence 
of borders that cannot be dissolved or reconsidered. However, as van Houtum 
states, the border is Janus-faced, in that it offers the potential of mobility 
and freedom, a desire to cross over, as much as it reinforces national identity 
and homogeneity.
Study of the Indo-Fijian diaspora offers dislocated sites of contestation 
to the homogenizing forces of globalization, creating alternative discourses 
of borders by being the sites of dislocation and instability. These sites then 
create the possibility of defining a home for a diasporic community, a home 
that travels and traverses time and space to become more inclusive and 
comprehensive. The complicated borders of history and geography in Fiji 
f ind their representation through the intergenerational postmemories that 
extend the memories of one generation to subsequent ones, cutting across 
and establishing a relationship with the past. It is essential that memories 
of trauma, conflict, and violence be addressed rather than be forgotten, and 
silence be articulated instead of being suppressed under off icial censorship. 
Lal estimates that the Fijian coups of 1987 polarized a society that had the 
potential to be multicultural and inclusive, and instead generated violence, 
social instability, corruption, and censorship – including censorship of 
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history and culture (Lal 2000; 2009). To challenge state-controlled censorship 
that threatens to forget history and relegate it to the margins, it is essential 
for postmemories to thrive and raise questions of identity and belongingness, 
so that a possibility of envisioning a present and future can be created. 
Andreas Huyssen believes that ‘The form in which we think of the past is 
increasingly memory without borders rather than history within borders. 
Modernity has brought with it a very real compression of time and space. But 
in the register of imaginaries, it has also expanded our horizons of time and 
space beyond the local, the national, and even the international’ (Huyssen 
2003: 4). The poetry of Sudesh Mishra transcends all borders, literal and 
metaphorical, to arrive at an understanding of home as multidirectional and 
transnational. His poetry is structurally disjointed, reflecting the nature of 
diasporic memories, and his engagement with postmemories of indenture 
bring to the fore the existing borders of ethnic and racial alienation in Fiji.
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Partition’s Borders
The partition of British India illustrates how the decisions of a few people 
over a very short period of time can have lasting impacts on the lives of 
billions of others for many generations. The momentous and calamitous 
event was enacted within a two-month period in the summer of 1947 and 
relied heavily on the judgement of a single man, Sir Cyril Radcliffe, who had 
never even visited India prior to his appointment as the head of the Boundary 
Commission that would decide the permanent borders for India, Pakistan, 
and eventually Bangladesh (Chatterji 1999). To perform this mammoth 
task, the commission had only six weeks and Radcliffe started drawing 
the line on the map without any empirical knowledge of the people living 
along that borderscape (van Schendel 2005; Whyte 2002). The result of 
this cartographic scissoring was not only the mass migration and violence 
immediately following Partition, with over a million deaths and over ten 
million more people displaced, but also the long-term impacts on the lives 
of those who had no choice but to live with the new territorial limits to their 
idea of home. The quickly made, and often ill-informed, decisions of that 
fateful summer 70 years ago continue to shape the daily practices, politics, 
religion, economy, and culture of both those who reside in South Asia today 
and those who have migrated to distant homes. Those imagined lines on the 
map are the increasingly hardened borders over which guards nervously 
eye each other, on which civilians risk their lives to work their land, and 
about which politicians experience cartographic anxiety over how f irmly 
they control the allegiance of the people and territory (Krishna 1994). Those 
lines also are the departure point for the millions of people who have set 
out in search of better opportunities elsewhere in South Asia, the Middle 
East, Europe, North America, and the South Pacif ic.
South Asian borders have a complex and significant history, but are at times 
overlooked by scholars in the f ield of border studies and allied disciplines. 
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However, the legacy of arbitrary borders left behind by colonists and the 
subsequent decades of conflict between the various states over the territorial 
extent of their sovereignty creates an ideal location for interrogations of 
state categories of power, place, and identity (Chester 2008, 2013; Cons 2016; 
Jones 2009; Samaddar 1999; Shewly 2013; Sur 2013; van Schendel 2005; Whyte, 
2002; Zamindar 2007). While some of the borders in South Asia are among 
the most violent in the world, others are still wide open and feature cross-
border flows and connections. Even the most securitized sections – along 
the India-Pakistan border and the West Bengal-Bangladesh border – divide 
people who share an ethnic, linguistic, and cultural history. Similarly, the 
meaning of these lines to people on the move, and to those living permanently 
in distant lands, are fraught and complex. The borderlines of South Asia 
do not represent ancient polities that have always been in conflict, but are 
instead examples of how new territorial states are written over, across, and 
through other histories, ancestral lands, and identities. In turn, these borders, 
histories, and identities continue to shape the complex interplay between 
place and mobility for the people who find their lives contained by them.
This book is an indication of the productive nature of South Asian borders 
as it sheds light on how people experience and negotiate borders in their 
daily lives, how borders restrict human mobility, how certain movements 
are branded as legal and others are not, and how borders influence the 
diasporic population of South Asia. The three sections of the book offered 
three distinct lenses to understand the consequences of borders in South 
Asia and beyond. The f irst section, ‘Experiencing Borders in South Asia’, 
delved into the lives of the people who continue to live around and along 
the borderlands 70 years after Partition. The second section, ‘Mobility in and 
beyond South Asia’, analysed the experiences of people on the move who 
undertook journeys for work, for better opportunities, or to escape violence 
in their homes. The f inal section, ‘Representations of Borders and Mobility 
in Diaspora’, suggested that people with ancestral connections to South 
Asia produce and reproduce the borders of the nation and the state through 
their actions, imagination, and language. In the process, they reimagine 
their sense of identity, their connection to place, and their idea of home.
Arguments and Implications
The book began with the question: In an age of global migration, economic 
flows, and information exchange, how do borders and restrictions on mobil-
ity affect the lives of people from South Asia and beyond? The multiple 
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perspectives in this book can be distilled down to three primary answers 
to this question. First, despite hardened and violent borders, people still 
f ind ways to move, often ignoring the rules of the state and risking their 
lives by taking ever more dangerous routes. The f irst two chapters of 
the book use the productive South Asian borderland spaces to develop 
new theoretical insights such as spaces of refusal and layered borders. 
Second, gender affects the migration experience both en route and in the 
opportunities in the destination countries. These impacts are evident 
at all stages of the process, from who is able to migrate, to how they are 
treated in transit countries, to how they are perceived by other migrants 
and locals in their new homes. Third, diaspora populations continue to 
renegotiate their connections to their place of residence and ancestral 
home for generations after migrating as the relationship between place 
and identity evolves. This conclusion considers the broader implications 
of these f indings.
Many of the chapters demonstrated that the situation for migrants 
has become more challenging in the past 30 years as states around the 
world crack down on migration and make movement more diff icult. The 
hardening of borders is evident in South Asia, where barbed wire fences, 
f loodlights, and aggressive security forces patrol borders, as Chapter 4 
by Kavitha Rajagopalan illustrated. It is also evident at the borders that 
migrants encounter along their journeys to the Middle East and Europe. In 
an age of globalization, states take full advantage of technology to ‘secure’ 
their borders in every way possible, including powerful cameras, motion 
sensors, and drones, as described by Marta Zorko in Chapter 8 (Jones 2016). 
In tracing the relationship between people on the move and the state, this 
volume contributes to a growing body of scholarship that demonstrates that 
bordering and borderwork do not only happen at borders, but also at many 
locations within and beyond the territory of the state (Johnson et al. 2011; 
Jones and Johnson 2014; Amilhat-Szary and Giraut 2015). This experience 
is not only restricted to mundane interactions such as showing a passport 
in the airport or buying a new cellular data plan in a foreign country, but is 
also evident in the violence perpetrated on vulnerable migrants by police 
and smugglers, the constant fear of being deported once a migrant arrives 
in their destination country, and the inability to get a good job without the 
proper papers.
This book shed light on these journeys by telling the stories of people 
who moved in search of better opportunities elsewhere and demonstrated 
how the hardening of regional borders can have an effect on the patterns 
and demographies of migration from South Asia to the Middle East and 
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Europe. Micronarratives, such as the stories of the Lushai people navigating 
the border in Chapter 3 by Azizul Rasel or Akbar’s journey detailed by 
James Weir and Rohullah Amin in Chapter 7, offer valuable insights into 
the borderwork produced by interactions with families at home, smugglers, 
border guards and police, and other migrants encountered on the route. 
These f irst-hand accounts demonstrate that borders are not only situated 
at the edge of the state, but could also materialize at many other locations, 
depending on whose body is on the move (Rumford 2006; Butler 2011).
Despite the hardening of borders and the anti-migrant sentiments in many 
countries, people around the world continue to defy arbitrary restrictions 
on their movement. Borderlanders experience, negotiate, transcend, and 
make meaning of borders based on their own subjective positionalities. In 
doing so, borderlanders make borders the sites of not only overt and covert 
def iance, but also of opportunity (van Schendel 2005). From cross-border 
trips to the market to longer labour migrations, people f ind ways to get 
to the place they need to go to be reunited with family or to seek better 
opportunities for themselves and their children. The contributors to this 
book peered into the cracks in the walls of the state and opened up spaces 
of refusal where people opted to ignore or redefine the borders imposed by 
the state and continued to live their lives as they desired. In some instances, 
this also meant that states are forced to create spaces for cross-border 
connections, as Edward Boyle and Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman demonstrated in 
Chapter 2. Although the total trade in the cross-border haats is minuscule 
compared to trade through the regular ports, both India and Bangladesh 
have taken on the burden of facilitating them. Their existence, particularly 
along a border that has been fenced and militarized in the past twenty years, 
illustrates the important role borderland residents can play in negotiating 
and shaping the nature of the border.
The second finding of the book is that the experience of migration is often 
gendered as people face different challenges based on societal norms and 
beliefs about who should have the right to move and work. In South Asia 
and the Middle East, there is a persistent stigma associated with leaving 
home and becoming independent that discourages many women from 
making the trip and harms those who do. Women face more obstacles to 
migration and are more vulnerable to formal and informal rules and laws. 
In Chapter 5, Ananya Chakraborty described the experiences of Bangladeshi 
women working in India and in Chapter 6 Andrea Wright demonstrated 
the obstacles Indian women face even before they leave home as colonial 
laws and contemporary attitudes about gender roles impede their ability 
to migrate to the Middle East for work.
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For South Asian men who migrate to Europe, particularly Muslim men, 
the stigma of terrorism shapes interactions with host country residents 
who fear the straw man of how they believe Muslims act and what impact 
they will have on the local culture. These gendered biases affect the abil-
ity of migrants from South Asia to completely access opportunities and 
integrate into new host communities. In Chapter 9, Malini Sur and Masja 
van Meeteren detailed the challenges faced by migrants from Bangladesh 
for years after arriving in Belgium. Their lack of papers, the diff iculty of 
f inding good jobs, and the stigma of terrorism all made their lives diff icult, 
but they worked together to protest the situation and raise local awareness 
of their plight.
The third f inding of the book is that even for South Asian migrant 
populations that have lived for long periods in new homes, there is a 
constant process of rethinking and reconsidering their place in the 
world. Many migrant and diaspora communities retain connections with 
distant relatives for decades through remittances and the performance 
of identity in their new society in relation to other groups (Rahman and 
Yong 2015). These contested visions of place, homeland, and identity 
are often evident in poetry and prose, as well as in how past events are 
memorialized and remembered by diasporic communities. Partition 
has been the subject of many books, f ilms, and plays, but there is also a 
growing literature that investigates the lingering impact of cross-border 
movements and divided identities in the decades since the imposition 
of borders in South Asia.
Borders have moved from the edge of the state to locations throughout the 
interior and exterior of the territory (Jones and Johnson 2014). The spread 
of borderwork to many new locations results in a transformation of how 
people on the move imagine place and their position within it. The process 
of placemaking involves their daily activities, their interactions with local 
people, their struggle to make a livelihood, their efforts to work around the 
system, and their attempt to learn new languages. The longing for the place 
left behind is always there and is often expressed in the forms of collective 
memories, literature, celebrating different events, memoirs, and building 
monuments. In Chapter 10 Riddhi Shah considered the forgotten history of 
Indian Ocean slave trading, and in Chapter 11 Tana Trivedi illustrated this 
ambiguity through the poetry of Sudesh Mishra, who details the unique 
sense of home for the Indo-Fijian community. In sum, the third section of 
the volume demonstrated through memories and literature how a sense of 
place and belonging is negotiated and redefined in the South Asian diaspora 
around the world.
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Final Thoughts
The overarching theme that links these chapters together is an awareness 
and concern with how the arbitrary lines on the map of partition – and their 
increasingly militarized and violent borders on the ground today – shape 
the movement, identity, connections to place, and sense of belonging for 
people of South Asian descent, both within the region and around the world. 
The borders of states are a jumping-off point for many of these discussions, 
but a state-centric approach is not enough to draw out the dynamic picture 
of mobility in the contemporary world. It might provide a partial picture 
of formal actions, for instance, the making of categories such as citizens, 
residents, aliens, legal, and illegal, or of policies for cross-border trade and 
investment. However, a focus only on the story of the state would miss the 
perspective and narratives of the people who move across borders on a 
daily basis. This book told many of these stories, from farmers who cross 
the border informally to participate in a border market to people of South 
Asian descent who have lived for generations in diaspora, deposited halfway 
around the world by the colonial machine. Every borderland community has 
their own narratives, lifestyles, and actions that are connected to the notion 
of the line, but that are distinct and based on the sense of place where they 
reside. A clear understanding of state and local discourse and practices, as 
well as an analysis of how those discourses and practices align, conflict, or 
even combine on a daily basis, is necessary to grasp the subtleties of any 
given border on the ground.
The objective of this book was to engage with the dynamics of life along 
the borders of South Asia, on the migrant routes to distant lands, and in 
the diaspora communities of temporary workers and permanent residents. 
The chapters focused on notions of citizenship, identity, and belonging, 
often drawing on the lives and stories of minority populations living both 
in South Asia and in the diaspora. Together, they develop a broader fabric 
of experience that deepens our understanding of how borders and mobility 
are shaping and reshaping the lives of people in South Asia and beyond. 
Despite the stories of cross-border movement and connection that f ill this 
volume, borders also divide people by granting legitimacy and rights to some 
while excluding many others from equal access and protection to the law. 
At the most basic level, borders are a system of controlling resources and 
opportunities and excluding others from the same. These border effects are 
produced by the political actions of different state and non-state actors who 
perform the sovereignty of the state and enact the rules that give power 
to lines on the map. It is this relationship between the map, the border, 
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the land, and the people who move across it that shape the chapters of 
this book, and that will continue to be a focus for scholars of borders and 
mobility for years to come.
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